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STATUS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVES

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREPAREDNESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 1, 17, 1981

MANCHESTER, N.H.
JANUARY 22, 1982



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(III)

STATUS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREPAREDNESS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session at 2:20 p.m., pursuant to notice, in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Humphrey and Denton.

Staff present: Michael B. Donley, David S. Lyles, José E. Martinez, and Anthony J. Principi, professional staff members; Richard D. Finn, and Ralph O. White, Jr., research assistants; and Carol J. Rudolph, staff assistant.

Also present: George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Don Ingraham, assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton; and Edward Morabito, press aide to Senator Humphrey.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY, CHAIRMAN

Senator HUMPHREY. Good afternoon, and my apologies for the delay. As you know, we had a vote right at 2 p.m. I hope they will not be frequent during the balance of the afternoon, but that is only a hope.

The Preparedness Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony concerning the status of the Guard and Reserves.

The subcommittee's interest in the health of the Reserve components is rooted in our responsibility for the overall readiness of the Armed Forces and our appreciation of the contribution made by Reserve components to the total force. Our particular interest in this series of hearings is generated by the knowledge that the manpower and equipment readiness of too many Reserve components is far below desired levels.

A poor State of readiness within the Reserve components has clear and adverse implications for any planning associated with employment of the Conus-based strategic reserve and calls into question the sustainability and—ultimately—the survivability of U.S. Forces in combat. Moreover, the fact is that the requirements on this strategic reserve are growing, not shrinking. Thus, under the current force structure, real demands are growing on a portion of the force least prepared to accept them.

In broad terms, the subcommittee seeks to understand what force structure changes may be contemplated which would affect the organization and size of the Reserve components. In addition, we hope to establish, to the extent possible in open session, the actual condition of the Reserve components and the extent to which this differs from those forces listed on paper. In later hearings the subcommittee intends to examine the Reserve components of each Service in more detail.

This afternoon we will discuss policy, management, and readiness issues as seen by the civilian planner and by the military user.

The subcommittee welcomes Dr. Edward Philbin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and Brig. Gen. Randall Peat, Assistant Deputy Director for Force Development and Strategic Plans, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If you can remember all of that, you get another promotion.

Good afternoon, gentlemen, and I understand you have statements. You are at liberty to proceed as you wish. Mr. Secretary, will you lead off.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Philbin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. PHILBIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee; I am grateful for this opportunity to provide you with information on the status of the Reserve components of the United States which include the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve. At the outset I must state my firm conviction that this nation cannot successfully engage in any form of serious combat activity without the use of the Reserve components. I acknowledge that one could hypothesize a quick, short-warning, and a devastating nuclear exchange which would preclude commitment of the bulk of these Guard and Reserve forces but, excluding that eventuality, the nation must be prepared for the break out of hostilities in a number of locales, perhaps simultaneously. If deterrence fails, deployed elements of the U.S. Armed Forces can be expected to be hard pressed, and heavy casualties and equipment losses must be viewed as probable and perhaps unavoidable. If we do not possess the necessary depth of military capability to counter such hostile activities, replace our losses in personnel and equipment and, militarily strengthen other threatened areas, we could be faced with the alternative of losing the war or employing weapons of such a nature that the conflict could be escalated to a worldwide conflagration. Strong, combat-ready Reserve components provide this necessary depth. I should add that the very existence of militarily sound Reserve components is also a visible expression of our national resolve to defend our own interests and those of the rest of the free world. A firm demonstration of this resolve would not be lost on our adversaries and would serve as a deterrent to their more overt acts of aggression.

The maintenance of the Reserve components as part of our deterrent posture exacts a price in the form of opportunity costs. The Reserve not only costs defense dollars but also makes use of other scarce and perishable resources. Despite over three decades of service in the Naval Air Reserve and the Air Force Reserve and my position as head of Reserve Affairs, I am not committed to the existence of the Guard and Reserve for its own sake. If the job of national defense could be adequately performed without this capability I would be a strong voice in support of expending these resources elsewhere. But, I am convinced that it cannot. I firmly believe that we as a nation cannot afford a standing force of the required magnitude and necessary technical complexity to meet the current perceived threat. In my opinion combat ready Reserve components are the only militarily and economically feasible alternative.

A historic cornerstone of America's democratic tradition has been the premise that our standing forces shall be no larger than required to maintain a credible deterrent and to react immediately to aggression. For military requirements

beyond that we have relied on the augmentation of our forces with citizen soldiers. Military and economic imperatives overlaid with a recognition of this philosophy have prompted Congress and the Defense Department in recent years to place far greater emphasis and reliance on the Reserve Forces. As a consequence, the Guard and Reserve of today are a far more viable force than any peacetime Reserve Forces we have known in the past.

With the advent of the Total Force Policy in 1973 the Department of Defense and the Military Services began a sustained effort to man, equip and train the Reserve components to meet their enhanced mobilization and contingency requirements. The Guard and the Reserve was often viewed in the post-Korean period as a repository for old equipment and personnel of doubtful competence and motivation: hordes of middle-aged veterans pursuing youthful fantasies with outmoded equipment. That negative image still lingers in the minds of some—in denigration of contemporary reality and to the detriment of the greatly revitalized Reserve components of the 1980's. In addition, many of our citizenry think of the Guard and Reserve, when they think of them at all, as a back-up to the "Professionals" of the active forces. The inference is that the Guard and Reserve are not professionals, that they stand less tall and perform less well than their counterparts in the Active components. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Ready Reserve of the United States constitutes an armed force of over 1.3 million men and women who possess not only a high sense of duty and obligation but the self-confidence born of demonstrated ability. Moreover, in the process of maintaining mission readiness, they make a large, vital and indispensable contribution to the daily work of our Active component forces. It is of the utmost importance that you, the leaders and lawmakers—along with the other citizens of this country—recognize that the Reserve components are not merely forces in reserve. Today, they are adjunct forces, as professional and dedicated as their Active component counterparts and largely indistinguishable from them and fully integrated in the daily operations of the Total Force and the Nation's deterrent posture.

Table 1 is a representative view of the capabilities contained in today's Guard and Reserve Forces. To emphasize the diverse nature and the magnitude of the role played by the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, I must quote some startling statistics:

Thirty-nine percent of the Total Force of three million four hundred thousand military personnel are members of Guard or Reserve units, Guard/Reserve trainees, or part of the Pretrained Individual Manpower resources of the Reserve components.

TABLE 1.—REPRESENTATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GUARD/RESERVE TO TOTAL FORCE

(End fiscal year 1981)

	Number (thousands)	Percent of total
Manning:		
Active Force.....	2,082	61
Selected Reserve.....	889	27
IRR/ING.....	419	12

FORCES

Army

- 38 percent divisional forces ;
- 69 percent nondivisional forces ;
- 67 percent tactical support forces ;
- 46 percent medical units.

Marine Corps

- 25 percent division/wing strength ;
- 29 percent observation aircraft ;
- 34 percent light attack aircraft ;
- 33 percent anti-aircraft missile battalions.

Navy

- 14 percent carrier air wings;
- 88 percent minesweepers;
- 35 percent maritime patrol squadrons;
- 60 percent military sealift command personnel.

Air Force

- 65 percent air defense interceptors;
- 57 percent tactical reconnaissance;
- 48 percent strategic airlift crews;
- 59 percent tactical airlift.

The Army National Guard represents 33 percent of the Army's Combat Divisions, 46 percent of the Combat Brigades and 57 percent of the Armored Cavalry Regiments.

The Army Reserve represents 11 percent of the Army's non-divisional combat structure, 33 percent of the tactical support, 26 percent of the special theater forces and 25 percent of the general support forces. The Army Reserve contains 100 percent of the training divisions and brigades. One half of the deployable Army Reserve units will be committed within 30 days of mobilization and an additional 37 percent will deploy in the 30 days that follow. Practically all will be deployed within 90 days of mobilization.

A sizeable portion of the strategic and tactical airlift capability for the Total Force is supplied by units and individuals of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

Twenty-five percent of the Marine Corps total combat strength in air and ground units is contained in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.

In addition to this mobilizable force, many active duty missions are performed on a regular basis by units and individuals of the Guard and Reserve. For example, one half of the Air Defense Interceptor Alert sites in the United States are manned by crews of the Air National Guard. The air defense of the Hawaiian Islands is the sole responsibility of the Air Guard. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical and strategic airlift squadrons directly support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve also provide KC135 tanker aircraft and crews not only for SIOF alert on a round-the-clock daily basis but also for daily refueling missions.

The Army Reserve contributes a significant number of Engineer, Ordnance, Medical, Transportation and other units to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The Naval Reserve maintains two carrier air wings equipped with fighter, attack and reconnaissance aircraft. One of these wings is kept carrier qualified and deployable at all times. P-3 aircraft of the Naval Reserve share daily maritime patrol responsibility with their regular Navy counterparts. Refueler aircraft of the Marine Corps Reserve perform tanker missions for deploying tactical squadrons across both the Atlantic and Pacific.

Within funding constraints, units and individuals of the Reserve components train and work side-by-side with active duty personnel on land, sea and in the air often at the risk of and sometimes at the cost of their lives. They take part in overseas and CONUS based exercises throughout the year to maintain combat mission readiness and the capability to counter the current threat.

The call-up authority granted by Congress to the President makes 100,000 members of the Selected Reserve subject to immediate mobilization for 90 days without a declaration of national emergency; one million Ready Reservists may be mobilized for up to 24 months once a national emergency has been declared by the President. All Reservists can be mobilized by a Congressional declaration of war or national emergency for the duration plus 6 months. The immediacy of this possibility of being mobilized is not lost on the Guardsmen and Reservists who maintain mission readiness with the knowledge that the work they do in support of the current peacetime mission could be expected of them in a wartime environment with little notice. I am also constantly aware of that fact and I personally and fully support the actions being taken by the DOD to ensure that Reserve component mobilization procedures provide the flexible options suited to a dangerous world in which varying degrees of military tension can arise in different locations at the same time. Our ability to mobilize and deploy Guard and Reserve Forces must keep pace with the many roles assigned to them in defense of the Nation.

Although various methods of calculation result in somewhat different numbers, approximately five percent of the fiscal year 82 total obligation authority for DOD is designated for Guard and Reserve forces and the significant military capability which they provide.

READINESS

At this juncture I have reported the good news about Reserve component capabilities and responsibilities but to give you a comprehensive picture of the role of these forces in the National Defense posture we must examine their readiness—readiness defined in terms of numbers of Guard and Reserve personnel, their state of training, and the quality, quantity, sustainability and interoperability of the equipment with which they have to work.

When viewed statistically, within the framework of the unit readiness reporting system established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Reserve component figures are sobering. Land forces, both Army and Marine Corps, are suffering from severe personnel shortages. In addition, the Army land and Navy surface forces are laboring under serious equipment shortages as well. Aviation units of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps are in substantially better condition, but their readiness also suffers because of shortages of trained personnel, an inventory of aging aircraft and support equipment and limitations on their training opportunities. Classified readiness figures are available and I will be happy to provide these if the committee so desires.

In order to place these statements in perspective I wish to make two points: The shortages of equipment which are evident in the Reserve components are a reflection of the overall shortages of equipment in the Total Force which have developed over the years. However, even in those instances where the readiness reporting system labels some units as neither fully nor substantially combat ready, a great many of these units can still effectively perform a wide variety of combat missions and could be made fully ready in relatively short order given adequate resources. It should be noted that at present many of these Reserve component units are programmed to be equipped and/or manned only at the C-3 readiness level. Deficiencies in many cases could be remedied relatively quickly. If the shortfall is in training, for example, the required skills can often be acquired with relative ease and rapidly when needed. For example, special weapons delivery techniques or aircraft carrier qualification of flight crews can normally be accomplished with minimal training since Reserve aircrews have typically achieved these qualification skills at least once during their active duty tours. If, however, readiness shortfalls are equipment related, corrective measures may be far more difficult to apply—as I will expand upon later in my testimony. The bottom line is that achievement of the full capabilities of many of our Guard and Reserve units are undeniably hampered by shortages in personnel, equipment and in training. I will address each of these problem areas separately beginning with Personnel.

PERSONNEL

Table 2 presents the strength issue in Selected Reserve units.

TABLE 2.—SELECTED RESERVE UNIT STRENGTH

[In thousands; fiscal years]

	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1987
Wartime requirement.....	1,005	1,015	1,045	1,056	1,072	1,080
Actual.....	748	797				
DOD program.....			859	943	1,004	1,029
Shortage.....	257	218	186	113	68	51

The most significant shortfall in Selected Reserve personnel strength occurs in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. However, these two components have increased their strength by 37,700 in fiscal year 1980 and 40,800 in fiscal year 1981. You will note that planned action by the Services coupled with manning levels currently planned by DOD will reduce the 257,000 man shortfall in fiscal year 1978 to 51,000 in fiscal year 1987. Notwithstanding this

significant improvement, the fact remains that there will be major shortages of personnel during these years in Reserve component units which supply half of the combat and two-thirds of the combat support capability of the Total Force. It should be noted that a number of these units are programmed for combat before some regular units. Therefore, continued action to eliminate this shortfall in personnel is vital to our national security.

Congress has been extremely supportive of our efforts to achieve the desired manpower objectives by continuing to fund increases in end strength and to provide incentives for enlistment and reenlistment in the Reserve components.

For the Selected Reserve an enlistment bonus of \$2,000, educational assistance to a maximum of \$4,000, and a reenlistment bonus of \$900 and \$1,800 respectively for 3 or 6-year reenlistments have been provided through September 30, 1985. The Joint Conference Report on the DOD Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1982 has proposed extending a bonus of \$25 per month for each remaining month of military service obligation until 1985 to enlisted individuals who affiliate with the Selected Reserve. This report also recommends the extension of the Federal Student Loan repayment program of the greater of \$500 or 15 percent, through September 30, 1983. We continue to request and to receive Congressional approval for additional full-time Guard and Reserve personnel to serve on active duty to organize, administer, recruit, instruct and train members of the Reserve components. I feel confident that as long as Congress continues to support these initiatives, we can count on achieving strength levels that will assure that the units of the Selected Reserve have the manpower to carry out their combat missions upon mobilization.

A second critical category of wartime strength requirements is Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). The shortage of the pretrained manpower needed in the event of mobilization has been of continuing concern to the Department of Defense since 1976. Numerous low-cost or no-cost initiatives designed to increase the strength of the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard (IRR/ING) have been completed or are on-going. While these legal and policy changes have had a positive effect and will continue to do so, they will never increase IRR/ING strength sufficiently to meet wartime requirements. I feel that the low-cost and no-cost actions have now been virtually exhausted and few, if any, remain that would have a positive, significant effect on strength although we shall continue to search for them.

The remaining source of pretrained manpower is the category of military retirees. I believe this asset is now being fully utilized. Depending on the type of mobilization, the Military Departments plan on recalling to active duty approximately 200,000 to 300,000 retirees, the majority of whom are Army retirees. While retirees are considered an essential category in the pretrained manpower pool, their utilization is somewhat limited and their numbers are fixed. The only category of pretrained manpower that can be numerically increased is the IRR and ING. The Department of Defense is currently developing a comprehensive package of initiatives designed to substantially increase the IRR and ING manpower supply.

A long-term correction to the shortage of pretrained individuals would be to increase the length of the military service obligation currently set at 6 years for anyone who joins the Armed Forces. Most individuals now enlist for three or four years of active duty or duty in Selected Reserve units and serve the remainder of their military obligation in the IRR or ING. A proposal currently being considered by DOD would increase the amount of time served in the IRR or ING by extending the current 6-year military service obligation (MSO) to 8 years. Because this proposal would affect only those who entered the Armed Forces after its enactment, any such extension of the MSO would not produce an increase in the size of the IRR or ING for 6 years after its enactment. In the interim, other initiatives and incentives are necessary to retain current members of the Reserve components for longer periods of time and to provide new sources of entry into the Guard and Reserve.

The first of these initiatives is the direct enlistment of individuals into the IRR. This concept was tested in 1979. Direct enlistment would allow an individual to join the IRR, go on active duty for initial training, and then return to the IRR for the remainder of the military service obligation. After initial training, the individual could also be given the option of remaining on active duty or joining the Selected Reserve. If the choice was to serve out the MSO in the IRR, periodic refresher training would be required. We are planning to have the Army start a

direct enlistment program in fiscal year 1983. However, to ensure the success of this program, an enlistment bonus may well be necessary to attract a significant number of quality individuals into the combat arms skills that are most needed. This program would remain in effect at least until strength increases from the proposed longer service obligation began to be realized.

During fiscal year 1981 Congress authorized a \$600 reenlistment bonus for individuals who had completed their military service obligation and reenlisted in the IRR or ING for three years. The initial results of this program indicated that the amount of the bonus was too small to be effective in increasing strength to the desired degree although the results were positive. The bonus authority was not extended and the program ended on September 30, 1981. Currently, the only consequence of membership in the IRR or ING is the liability of being recalled to active duty, probably for combat service. This is not a great inducement to reenlist. An enhanced Ready Reserve reenlistment bonus program appears to possess the greatest potential for significantly increasing IRR strength. The proposal under development would provide a reenlistment bonus of up to \$900 for individuals who agree to reenlist or extend their term of service for three years beyond their statutory military service obligation. This program would also end after the proposed longer service obligation showed results.

Another proposal currently being staffed would open eligibility for full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) to members of the IRR and ING. These members of the Ready Reserve, although subject to recall to active duty as replacements and fillers during a national emergency, are presently excluded from participation in this program. Since the premiums would be paid by the individual concerned, it would essentially be a no-cost program to the government.

I believe this integrated program would resolve the mobilization manpower shortages by the late 1980's primarily through the use of an extended service obligation. Enlistment and reenlistment bonus programs and widening eligibility for group life insurance would provide the incentives needed to reduce the personnel shortfall during the interim period.

EQUIPMENT

The equipment problems confronting the Guard and Reserve Forces are far more disturbing than the personnel issues. In the most extreme of circumstances an individual, albeit initially untrained, can be found to fill a manpower vacancy. However, even in an emergency, an aircraft, a tank, a ship, a critical item of support equipment or a vital spare part that does not exist when it is needed will require a finite time perhaps a very long time to produce. Some of the significant shortages in Reserve component equipment are illustrated in Table 3.

TABLE 3.—GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS
[Samples]

	Number
Army:	
Tanks.....	1,949
Trucks.....	9,161
Personnel carriers.....	5,214
Aircraft.....	1,167
Navy/Marine Corps:	
Ships.....	34
Comm/elect.....	1,357
Motor trans.....	1,392
Aircraft.....	300
Air Force:	
Aircraft.....	130
Vehicles.....	1,918
Support equipment.....	4,426
Funding required to eliminate shortfalls (billions).....	\$17.8

The dollars required to eliminate these shortages are substantial to say the least. Even this amount of money will only bring existing equipment up to required wartime levels. These funds do nothing to affect the more important issue of equipment modernization.

Modernization is intrinsically tied to the tortuous process of procurement that plays special havoc with the Reserve components. The Guard and Reserve Forces

have historically, and often as a matter of service policy, operated with equipment that has been replaced as outmoded or declared as excess by the Active components. This process has produced what is probably the single most significant long-term problem within the equipment arena, the impending obsolescence of entire communities or models of military hardware, i.e., block obsolescence.

Obsolescence is exacerbated in certain areas, by shortages of support equipment and spare parts. As a result, there exists to varying degrees, incompatibility of equipment between the Reserve components and their Active component counterparts. Some Reserve component equipment is non-deployable due to age and spare part shortages and would not be sustainable if deployable for these same reasons. Such shortcomings, in turn, denigrate retraining, peralize the combat capability of the units affected, increase the cost and complexity of maintenance and other logistic aspects and, at least in the case of aircraft, present safety hazards as well. Less obvious is the fact that equipment deficiencies have a negative effect on personnel recruitment and retention.

Using only aircraft as an example the problem is well defined. The C118, which provides organic airlift for the Navy Reserve will be unsupportable by 1984. The status of replacement aircraft is tenuous at best. As a consequence not only will a significant airlift capability be lost but accompanying the demise of the equipment will be the loss of trained aircrews, maintenance and support personnel and, conceivably the support sites as well. Navy management improvements have sought to integrate Navy lift requirements through better scheduling and correlation with common-user MAC airlift but this is still not adequate to meet total requirements. Organic airlift is not the only problem confronting Naval Reserve Aviation. Modernization of the two Naval Reserve Carrier Air Wings is required due to the pressing need for commonality of supply support and the technological improvements in capability available in newer weapon systems. Modernization of existing aircraft by backfitting new equipment to upgrade mission capabilities is equally essential to maintaining mobilization readiness for high threat areas. Similar problems exist in the other components as well; e.g., engine modification required to significantly reduce the smoke trails left by Air Reserve Forces F-4 aircraft.

The near-term obsolescence of Marine Corps Reserve aircraft which, with the exception of the UH-1N, are all of Vietnam or pre-Vietnam vintage, further emphasizes the problem. The average age of USMCR attack aircraft is 13 to 17 years, fighters 14 years and transport helicopters 13 years.

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, while somewhat better off because of general compatibility between Active and Reserve aircraft types, nevertheless, because of low procurement rates, face block obsolescence as well. At the end of fiscal year 1980 the average age of USAF aircraft was 12 years 8 months, the ANG 14 years 4 months and the USAFR 16 years 4 months.

To modernize just the aircraft in the Guard and Reserve will entail the expenditure of funds on a massive scale. Combat essential equipment for the Navy surface forces and Army and Marine Corps land forces is no less vital to national security and its modernization deserves no less of a priority. I believe we must make a serious start now to modernize the equipment of all of our Reserve components and convert inevitable block obsolescence into a manageable vertical obsolescence. If we delay until large blocks of equipment became obsolete, the cost of replacing them will be monstrous.

In making this statement, I fully realize that funding constraints imposed by finite resources are a reality with which all the Services must contend. Satisfaction of Reserve component needs when the equipment of the Active components is in desperate need of replacement, additions and modernization may appear to be an irreconcilable problem. I nevertheless contend that if the Total Force is to be a reality and the Guard and Reserve Forces are to be relied upon to fulfill their ever-increasing wartime responsibilities, then the fiscal strategies and the policies for equipment procurement, modernization and distribution must recognize that need.

Continual management attention to the status of Reserve equipment and the procurement and distribution actions taken by the Military Services is an essential ingredient in overcoming the equipment shortages. Congressional action this year which requires an annual report on the status of Guard and Reserve equipment is a positive step toward correcting the existing problem but the ultimate solution will require a fully dedicated effort by the Services, the Depart-

ment of Defense, Congress and the industrial capacity of the country. The problem is of that magnitude, but I believe the need is commensurate with the effort required.

TRAINING

Unit training problems are, to an extent, the progeny of personnel and equipment shortages, but the paucity of funds dedicated to meaningful Guard and Reserve unit training is a major ingredient as well. Home-site active duty training and classroom instruction rather than hands-on training in a realistic field environment not only impedes the achievement of unit readiness but is a significant source of personnel attrition as well. If the program offers little challenge or excitement to the individual it is extremely difficult to retain that individual as a productive member of the unit. It is impossible to pay an intelligent person enough money to bore him indefinitely. Our losses in middle grade enlisted NCO's and petty officers is especially heavy because of the lack of challenging utilization. Critical training time is often lost because equipment must be shared by two or more units. More devices and simulators are needed to offset ammo and fuel constraints and to increase the efficiency of available training space, ships and ranges. Guard and Reserve units also need increased opportunities to train with their Active component counterparts in joint exercises.

Current policies, supported by Congress, now provide for additional training assemblies that enable commissioned and non-commissioned officers to prepare more effectively for unit training. These initiatives are extremely important to effective training management and provide badly needed flexibility.

With the advent of modern and more complex equipment Guard/Reserve personnel will require increased training in equipment maintenance. This is especially true of personnel who must maintain their current proficiency and productivity with assigned equipment while gaining expertise on more modern equipment. New equipment training must be accelerated for Reserve component maintenance units because many of them are scheduled for deployment in the very early stages following mobilization. Your support of these expanded training requirements is crucial to our future material readiness.

I wish to take this opportunity to raise a particular problem in the Coast Guard Reserve.

The House-Senate Conference on Appropriations authorized \$49.483 million for fiscal year 1982 for the Coast Guard Reserve, which is the same funding level authorized for fiscal year 1981. I understand that the Coast Guard Reserve needs additional funding in excess of \$5 million just to manage the pay raise, which was authorized effective October 1, 1981, in order to maintain last year's level of training.

In my office, I have a grouping of flags, one from each of the seven Reserve components including the Coast Guard Reserve. I have taken the Coast Guard Reserve flag and set it at the head of my conference table to remind myself and everyone who enters my office that the Coast Guard is a Military Service which may be assigned to operate under the Department of the Navy in time of war or when so directed by the President. The Coast Guard Reserve is a vital part of our nation's military readiness posture, especially in the area of port security in wartime. I urge this Committee to give the Coast Guard Reserve the same consideration as the other Guard and Reserve components serving under the Department of Defense.

FACILITIES

The importance of adequate, modern, and well-kept armories, reserve centers, and training facilities to the overall readiness of Guard and Reserve units and personnel cannot be over-emphasized. It is imperative that we provide modern facilities for proper training, operations, support (including troop housing and messing), and the equipment maintenance functions of the Guard and Reserve components. In this regard we are working closely with other Department of Defense offices and the Reserve components themselves to insure that construction funds are utilized for facilities that will provide the quality of training required to achieve mobilization readiness and the technical competence required of both the users and maintainers of our military hardware.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to present a balanced and unclassified portrait of the Guard and Reserve as they exist today. Their capabilities are enor-

mous; the Guard and Reserve units and Pretrained Individual Manpower are the repository of skills that this country desperately needs and that would exact an incalculable price to replace. At the same time, I have been candid about the problems facing our Reserve components. Recognizing the vital contribution they make to our national security, I believe that the fiscal and management attention needed to solve their problems can and should be provided by the Military Services, the Congress and ultimately the American people. I am therefore particularly grateful for the opportunity to testify before this Committee today. Your continual support, and that of the Congress as a whole, is essential to the vitality and mission readiness of the Reserve components. Working together, we can assure that the Guard and Reserve retain their deterrent capability and, if deterrence fails, that they fulfill with great distinction and effectiveness the missions they have been assigned for the defense of this Nation. I believe, as did Napoleon, that "... a nation that is defended by its citizens will never be defeated."

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. PHILBIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

Dr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to provide you with information on the status of the Reserve components, which include the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Coast Guard Reserve.

I have submitted for the record an unclassified detailed statement on this subject, so I shall make these remarks brief but pointed.

Each year since Secretary of Defense Laird first published the total force principle in 1970, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger promulgated it as the total force policy in 1973, the units and individuals of the Reserve components have been increasingly integrated into the military structure of the United States.

The Reserve components are not merely the backup augmentation force for Active components in time of war, but are intrinsic elements in the deterrent posture of the Nation and an important component of our daily military operations. Reserve Forces are no longer forces in reserve. They are adjunct military forces as professional and as dedicated as their Active component colleagues and largely indistinguishable from them professionally speaking.

These units and individuals of the Reserve components of today are a far cry from what many remember them to be in the early 1950's. These units and individuals constitute a formidable fighting force in size and in quality, and can be depended upon to give their utmost in war as they have in time of peace, since they are all volunteers.

Unfortunately, they are neither fully manned nor fully equipped at the present time, and this fact is reflected in their readiness ratings. However, the microscopic rating camouflages the fact that even units which are C-3, meaning marginally ready overall according to this evaluation system, could still be fully capable of carrying out a wide variety of military missions, and in many instances could be brought to higher readiness levels in a short time or with modest investments of resources.

In short, I wish to focus on the fact that, despite the very real problems in these Reserve components, they are a crucial part of our military capability and a tremendous and cost-effective national resource.

I believe, as did Napoleon, that a nation that is defended by its citizens will never be defeated.

I am prepared now to respond to the best of my ability to any of your questions, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Dr. Philbin.

General Peat, will you give us your statement, please.

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RANDALL D. PEAT, USAF, ASSISTANT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC
PLANS, PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE, ORGANIZATION OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General PEAT. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

I am doubly pleased to appear before the subcommittee today, first of all because it is my maiden voyage from the back benches to the witness stand, and second because I get the opportunity to provide you with the JCS perspective on the requirements of the Guard and Reserve Forces.

The Guard and Reserve Forces are essential elements in our force structure which we consider necessary to carry out the national military strategy, a strategy which is intended to insure that we meet our global objectives. Specifically, we must be able to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and against vital U.S. interests worldwide, including sources of essential materials, energy, and associated lines of communications; we must be able to prevent political coercion by any enemy of the United States, its allies, and friends; and in the last analysis—we must be able to fight at whatever level of intensity and for as long as necessary.

Since the adoption of the total force policy in the early 1970's and with the current increased emphasis on the need for global capabilities, the contribution of Guard and Reserve Forces has become even more critical. These forces are critical because as Dr. Philbin has pointed out, they represent a significant portion of the total combat and combat support capability. In fact, approximately 46 percent of the total force are members of Guard or Reserve units or part of an individual manpower pool.

From the JCS perspective, however, numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The dependence on and contributions of the Guard and Reserve are highly significant because, in conventional conflicts with an enemy possessing significant warfighting capabilities, many active units could operate successfully for only a very limited period before requiring augmentation or reinforcement by Reserve Forces as well as the additional war material produced by the U.S. industrial base.

For example, we have documented that in peacetime Reserve Forces provide over 30 percent of the strategic airlift support and approximately 20 percent of the tactical airlift support provided to JCS exercises, joint training, logistic missions, and contingency operations. In wartime, these contributions would grow to 48 percent for strategic airlift and 59 percent for tactical airlift. Therefore, capabilities to mobilize the Reserves, to expand the forces to the degree necessary, and to expand and expedite industrial production are all critical elements of the overall U.S. deterrent and warfighting posture.

Let me turn to readiness for a moment. The JCS and military commanders use several reporting systems as well as commanders' evaluations to assess the readiness of both Active and Reserve Forces. In addition, joint and combined training exercises provide realistic appraisals of readiness, both in command post and field exercises.

It is the current JCS assessment that a large proportion of Reserve Forces, especially ground combat units and surface ships, are less than combat ready. As with the Active Forces, the most critical problem is a lack of adequate manpower. Although the total strength of the Selected Reserve has increased each year since 1978, it still remains more than 218,000 people short of the wartime requirement and the Individual Ready Reserve shortfall numbers approximately 300,000. In addition, the Reserve components generally use equipment which has been or is being phased out of the Active components. Consequently, there are continuing problems associated with obsolescence and lack of interchangeability of equipment, spare parts, and maintenance skills. On a positive note, however, current plans and programs do call for the introduction of newer equipment into the Guard and Reserve; the Army M-198 howitzer and trucks are being delivered now; the Navy will begin the transfer this fiscal year of 12 modern *Knox*-class fast frigates to Naval Reserve Forces; and the Air Force has just converted five Reserve squadrons to A-10's and will convert one Guard and one Reserve squadron to F-16's starting in fiscal year 1983.

As to readiness improvements, recent budgets have addressed many of the most pressing readiness deficiencies and that leads me to the cautious judgment that efforts to improve readiness have indeed turned the corner. However, much remains to be done. Lasting improvements will depend on continued emphasis and funding for several years. DOD is now emphasizing efforts to achieve the necessary levels of readiness with programs to provide for adequate maintenance, spares support, manpower, training, deployments, and exercises. The current readiness of the Guard and Reserve Forces in specific qualitative terms is classified information, but can, of course, be provided for the record.

In general there are major problems with the Reserve Forces which currently preclude many Reserve Force units from meeting their required employment schedules. In order for the Reserve Forces to constitute a credible portion of our overall defense posture these problems must be solved. Let me touch briefly on mobilization planning.

When mobilized, Reserve Forces augment, reinforce, support, and sustain the Active Force as well as expand the training and logistical base in Conus. Reserve Forces, in fact, provide the staying power to support the Active Forces. But Reserve Forces are essential not only for staying power, they are also necessary for initial wartime operations. The Active Army relies on the Reserve component to provide the preponderance of combat support and combat service support units for major operations plans, and after deployment of the Active Forces; Reserve Forces provide for almost the entire training base.

The ability to mobilize is dependent on many mutually supporting actions, not only within the executive branch, but also within the legislative branch and the civil sector as well. Mobilization planning is the process by which these actions are developed and coordinated.

Important planning activities were initiated or emphasized within the Department of Defense during the past year. The more significant

of these involved: Determining the impact of full mobilization on the civil sector and providing results of the study to the civil sector; determining the need for either new or revised legislation affecting mobilization; determining the adequacy of the industrial base and actions required to eliminate choke points; and reactivating a mobilization and deployment steering group to address critical mobilization issues within the DOD.

In addition, an Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board has been established within the executive branch to address critical mobilization matters in an interdepartmental forum.

This initiative, together with those undertaken within DOD, will help to insure that the United States is prepared to mobilize all its resources in support of defense requirements.

In summary, the U.S. defense posture of the 1980's will continue to emphasize a significant reliance on the Guard and Reserve Forces. The viability of this posture depends upon our Nation's ability and willingness to support the required number of Reserve units and individuals. Reserve units must be manned, equipped, and trained and be capable of mobilizing for deployment rapidly in time of need. Reservists and guardsmen who are not members of units must be trained and able to report to the right place at the right time after the declaration of mobilization day.

Reliance on Guard and Reserve Forces continues the common defense militia concept which has existed from pre-Revolutionary War times. The JCS continue to believe that a democratic nation is best protected by a standing armed force which can be augmented promptly in time of crisis by trained citizen-soldiers.

The most demanding requirement placed on Guard and Reserve Forces is the ability to participate in a major conventional war in Europe that begins with little or no warning and is of such high intensity that many Guard and Reserve Forces must be capable of deployment and employment within the first 30 days.

A timely Guard and Reserve Forces mobilization early in this crisis situation hopefully would contribute to deterring the Warsaw Pact from launching an attack. Failing deterrence, the Guard and Reserve Forces would help stabilize the front and repel the invader.

Should the Soviets prevail in the opening battle of a European conflict, Guard and Reserve Forces would be necessary to continue conventional operations against the aggressor. Let me also point out that a nuclear attack against the continental United States would require mobilization of Guard and Reserve Forces to maintain order and to assist in alleviating the effects of the attack.

In conclusion, our Active Forces cannot be quickly deployed, properly sustained, or sufficiently reinforced during a conflict without mobilizing Reserve Forces. Our Guard and Reserve Forces have long been and will continue to be a bulwark in our country's defense. We in the Active Force cannot contemplate going to war and sustaining our warfighting capability without the Guard and Reserve as full and strong partners.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you General Peat.

Mr. Secretary, I think you will agree that the role of the Reserves has changed significantly over the last 10 years or so. Why is it necessary or desirable to still have a separate Guard and Reserve?

Dr. PHILBIN. The dichotomy between the Guard and the Reserve is largely historical in nature, as you well know. The Guard has essentially grown up from a localized group of volunteers in each State and community. It has continued to grow and expand over the years with the population in the various localities, and it is the force being required to perform State missions.

We found that they can also perform a Federal mission in a time when the entire country is in danger, and it works very well. It is a machine that works.

I always follow that old Air Force attitude, if it is not broken we should not fix it.

The Reserves have come in since approximately the early 1900's as an augmentation in a totally Federal sense to the Guard. I think that they complement each other very well, and they work very well together. That has been my experience over my 30-year career.

Senator HUMPHREY. Indeed, they do, and they complement each other and work well together. But it seems to me, let me be the devil's advocate, that it might be a justification for combining them.

I am thinking of efficiencies and more capability for every dollar of expenditure, and it seems to me that that might be an area which ought to be considered.

I understand the historical context of the basis of the National Guard, and certainly the Governors would not be anxious or justified in giving up their control over the individual units, the State units. But perhaps there might be some savings potentially there, and I hope that that will be considered.

It seems to me that the Reserves, notwithstanding its new and very important responsibilities as part of the total force, is still perceived by the public and perhaps many in Congress as the Reserve of the old days, the cast-off equipment and the weekend warriors and all of that kind of thing.

I think it is that perception which explains the disparity between the increased responsibility of the Reserve and the Guard, and the inadequate levels of funding that we have seen in the last 10 years or so, the last 8 or 9 years since the Guard and the Reserve were assigned these new important responsibilities.

What I am leading up to is perhaps to suggest that a new name is in order. That might not sound very serious on the surface, but I think you might consider the suggestion.

If we got rid of the name, "Reserve"—and I don't know what you would use in its place, but the Reserve units today are very much a part of the total force and very much a part of the Army, the Air Force or the respective units. They are going to be depended upon heavily to be there when the chips are down, and to be up to snuff. Indeed many of them are, but many of them are not.

I would suggest that that is another area you and your colleagues might ponder; namely, whether to change the name of this structure. Maybe in the case of the Army you would want to call it the Active Army, and you would want to drop that term, but maybe you would want to call it Army 1 or Army 2. But get away from this reserve concept, this perception of a glorified CAP, if you will, because I think it is hurting our efforts to adequately fund the Reserve and the Guard commensurate with their responsibilities.

Would you care to comment on that?

Dr. PHILBIN. I could not agree with you more. I myself use the term "adjunct forces" quite often. That is a good term that I learned from the Jesuits, meaning fully professional but part-time support for full-time professionals of the same caliber.

I think that describes the Guard and the Reserve of today, at least in their Federal role. I use that word a lot because I don't believe that the word "Reserve" really describes the forces that we have created and maintained today.

I do agree with you that one of the major problems that we have is the public image problem, that people remember the early 1950's, the weekend warrior. Nothing could be further from the truth today.

Senator HUMPHREY. I quite agree, and I think we are going to continue to have a battle to adequately fund the Guard and the Reserve until the new and important role assigned to these forces is finally perceived by the public and the Congress.

Let me address a question or two in the area of force structure. General Jones has often referred to the strategy-forces mismatch, implying that force structure has to grow if we are to meet existing national commitments. Mr. Secretary, how will the total force grow in the next 5 years and what role will the Reserve component play in this growth?

Dr. PHILBIN. Sir, at this stage, my knowledge of the growth of the force over the next 5 years is mostly speculative. There is a lot of discussion and a lot of feeling about it. There is discussion about any force structure growth being put into the Guard and Reserve.

I can tell you that if there is an expansion of the force, especially in the Army and the Air Force, I think much of it should go into the Guard and the Reserve, not because I advocate a Guard and Reserve per se, but that is where the most effective force structure can be located.

The cost savings between the active versus the Guard and Reserve is a function of the particular type of unit and the equipment that the unit has. But there is a cost saving in the Guard and Reserve. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserves Affairs and Logistics is launching a total force study of that particular issue, to include not only the Guard and Reserve but also the civilian and the contract elements.

I believe that a large portion of any future growth should be put into the Guard and the Reserve or at least seriously considered for inclusion in the Guard and Reserve.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat, do you have any comments on that? What are the plans, if you are aware of them, for increasing the responsibilities or decreasing the responsibilities of the Reserve, the Guard, and what ideas and suggestions do you have?

General PEAT. I have to defer for most of that answer to Dr. Philbin. However, I would point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff historically are not resource oriented. Our responsibility is that of a user. I must admit, we have never been able to adequately grapple with the problem of a mix of Guard and Reserve Forces. An infantry division in the Guard is much the same as an active infantry division when it comes to our war planning.

Senator HUMPHREY. How is a decision made, then, to make certain units reserve and certain active?

General PEAT. It is essentially a Service prerogative and is combined into total force planning.

Dr. PHILBIN. It is essentially a Service prerogative, Senator. And of course, you know that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has been accused over the years of micromanagement of the Services. We are very sensitive to that particular charge.

Since the new administration has come in, at least the ones I work with, we have tried to work with the Services on these issues rather than dictating to them. But at this point, I have to say that General Peat is absolutely correct, it is a military prerogative which we oversee and make recommendations.

Let me make one other comment, if I may, about the structure. I am certain that there is some limiting factor to the utility of the Guard and Reserve concept, some superlimit on size or complexity or numbers of equipment, complexity of equipment and complexity of technology involved.

There is some upper limit where it is no longer manageable and no longer cost effective. But I tell you that I personally believe that we are not even approaching those boundaries. There is room for growth and cost-effective growth at that.

How that might be planned as between the active, Guard and Reserve, I can't offer you a simple solution. I am sure it is a complicated issue and it has to do with the perceived threat as well.

Senator HUMPHREY. Speaking of the Guard, Mr. Secretary, does that come through your office or is there a side office?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir. At the level at which I sit, the Army Guard and the Air National Guard are a part of the seven reserve components. And when I use the term "Reserve components," I mean all of the Reserve and the two Guard components.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am glad to hear that. I am glad to hear that it is unified to that degree.

I have observed the functioning of the Air Force Reserve in conjunction with—I hate to keep using these terms; I would like to get rid of them—but in connection with the active Air Force; the air refueling squadrons. It seems to be a good, efficient, and effective operation. I would certainly urge you to expand that concept to as many other units as you can.

I think there has been an attempt to do that, has there not, in recent years?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir, there has. I would agree with you that the KC-135 refueling outfits, both Guard and Reserve, do a marvelous job, and it was a job that people thought could not be done. They have done it and done it well. As a matter of fact, a Guard refueling squadron on a standard operational readiness inspection achieved the highest grade award of any flying unit in the U.S. Air Force, Active or Reserve.

I do think it is a concept that can be expanded, but of course it is equipment limited and dollar limited.

The KC-10 problem was something of a disappointment to the Reserve because the Air Force Reserve was scheduled to put some

associate crews in with those KC-10's. I think there is room for improvement and expansion. But of course all of this is heavily dependent upon the funds made available.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. General Peat, you might have answered this question in part earlier, but what is the JCS recommendation, the recommended level for ground forces, for instance, a breakdown between the Active and the Reserve units? How do you come to that kind of decision?

General PEAT. Although the overall levels are in fact a debating point among the JCS, when we develop our 10-year or 12-year planning force, the actual breakdown between the Inactive and the Active Forces is left to the Services; we make no judgments or decisions in the JCS arena as to how the specific breakdown should be made.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the JCS reviewed recently the balance between Acting and Reserve components?

General PEAT. Not to my knowledge. I would have to research that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is the JCS satisfied with the current ratio, Active to Reserve units, or is there a basis for you to stay at this point?

General PEAT. Yes, the JCS have been most satisfied with the ratio as currently exists. And in point of fact, in my discussions I have heard over the last 2 years the point of changing that ratio, even with growing force structures, has never arisen. The ratio would remain approximately the same.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us turn to the question of readiness, the rating system. Mr. Secretary, will you give us an overview on the rating system and what ideas you have to change it, if any, and your thoughts about its adequacy, et cetera?

Dr. PHILBIN. Well, this issue has come up any number of times in past years, because there is almost a built-in conflict with regard to readiness ratings.

Military managers and civilian managers in the military need some short-hand tool to wave a flag at them when a unit is getting to a point where it might be nonutilitarian. At the same time, if you have a macroscopic rating system it tends to give you macroscopic answers to questions and it does not tell you the finer points of what else is possible. The current system just tells us that they are fully ready or substantially ready or marginally ready.

However, they might be marginally ready for the entire spectrum of the mission that they are assigned to, but at the same time fully capable of performing any number of missions within that spectrum. So there is a problem with the readiness ratings, and I am always concerned when I hear people say that this squadron is C-3, that they are overlooking the fact that a C-3 can do an awful lot of good by way of military mission.

We have to point out one other thing, that many of our Guard and Reserve units are funded and programed only to be C-3. That is the program level of readiness.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat, given what the Secretary just said about ratings having to be interpreted for each unit, and your having to take a closer look at each unit in order to determine just what its capabilities are, how do the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach planning conclusions based on this kind of rating system?

You have to know today, given the increased importance, vital importance, of Reserve units, whether or not your active people can rely on them, because if they can't a lot of people are going to get killed. How do you reach policy decisions based on this rating system which seems to be inadequate?

General PEAT. Well, when policy decisions are made, the "C" rating system is only one part of the ratings that go into the JCS process. There are CINC readiness reports coming in quarterly. Commanders in the field send special reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Operations plans also contain readiness judgments.

All of these are used as decision aids when a specific plan needs to be reviewed or employed.

The overall policy judgments in a broader sense, I believe, are influenced more by the commanders' overall readiness reports than they are specifically by "C" ratings of any individual units.

Dr. PHILBIN. I would agree with that, Senator. The only problem is what that level of sophistication exists at the JCS level. But when I am talking to people in the Senate and the House of Representatives and staff people within the building, they tend to focus on the "C" rating in a macroscopic sense. When they say an organization is C-3 or C-4, they are essentially labeling them as being subject to some type of military leprosy and not worthy of further resource investment. This is a problem that I have to grapple with daily.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, where do you see us going with the Reserves? We have some real problems and there have been a lot of optimistic and hopeful statements made over the last 8 or 9 years, and we made some apparently, but we are still far from where we ought to be, considering the important role of the Reserves. Where are we and where are you going to take us?

Dr. PHILBIN. Let me start answering that question, Senator, by saying that I agree wholeheartedly with Secretary Weinberger's assessment of the perceived threat. That being the case, we need a total force structure to meet a very large Soviet threat. No such total force is physically possible without utilizing the Guard and the Reserve, and in a very large sense. Essentially, that is at least the percentage we have today, 50 percent of the combat capability and two-thirds of the combat support capability.

That being the case, we have to assure that the Guard and the Reserve are combat ready, as General Peat has pointed out.

Now, the problems which exist are twofold: We have shortfalls in personnel and we have shortfalls in the equipment area. Shortfalls in personnel, I believe and others believe, are manageable. All of the indicators are up, at least in a modest sense, and they are going up. We hope that the curves will continue to be steep. That problem can be solved with the continued investment of resources and with better management and dedication to the problem.

The equipment problem is somewhat different. No matter how critical the situation, it is impossible to conscript a tank or a truck or a ship or a plane. It takes a finite period of time to produce them. If we need them on a particular day and we don't have them, we are going to be in a world of hurt. So, if we have all of our personnel but they don't have all of the equipment, I fail to see what we have gained.

I would suggest to you that the equipment problem is the most critical of the two because of the finite times involved. We are not only short of equipment in the Guard and the Reserve, we also have a problem with regard to modernization of the equipment.

I might point out at this point that the equipment problem which is most visible in the Reserve and Guard Forces is merely a reflection of the shortage of equipment in the total force which has been allowed to build up over a long period of years, which we are trying to solve now in as short a time as possible.

So, I suggest to you that the equipment problem is most crucial and I have asked Colonel Martin of my staff to prepare a chart which you can take a look at, to the scope of the problem as we have defined it from the information garnered at the OSD level.

[The information follows:]

GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS (SAMPLES)		Number
Army :		
Tanks		1,949
Trucks		9,161
Personnel carriers		5,214
Aircraft		1,167
Navy/Marine Corps :		
Ships		34
Comm/Elect		1,357
Motor trans		1,392
Aircraft		300
Air Force :		
Aircraft		130
Vehicles		1,918
Support equipment		4,426

Funding required to eliminate shortfalls: \$17.8 billion.

There is the equipment shortfall as we see it in the unclassified sense. Now, I won't swear to this plus or minus 5 percent. It is a ballpark estimate and you can see that these are major items of equipment in all of the services. Here at the bottom is the estimated cost just to purchase this equipment and not modernize the force which is about \$17.5 billion. That is a very substantial investment that is required.

In addition to that particular problem, there are nuances of the problem that I think are extremely serious, one of which is block obsolescence. The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard compared to the other Reserve components in the equipment sense are in very good shape: they have modern equipment which is compatible with the equipment in the active Air Force, but that equipment is going to slowly but inexorably become older and become obsolescent and finally become obsolete.

Unless we continually feed in new equipment—things like F-15's and A-10's and KC-10's—eventually we will see a day when most of the aircraft in the Air Guard and Air Reserve are obsolete and the amount of money required to replace that at that time will be monstrous.

I suggest that the technique to use at this point is to feed in new equipment at the top, slowly, so that we convert the block obsolescence monster that we face into a manageable vertical obsolescence.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is your counsel being heard with regard to the preparation of the 1983 budget?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir; it is being heard, but it is being heard within the arena where everyone is a special pleader. I might explain it this way, that after the years in which we failed to sufficiently fund the total force, we now are faced with a broad spectrum of problems and requirements, and they are all valid requirements.

The problem is not to throw out the invalid requirements; the problem is to prioritize all of the valid requirements that we must somehow fill as soon as we possibly can. I am in that arena. I fight for my requirements against everybody else's requirements.

I might add that Secretary Korb, for whom I work and with whom I work, has backed me to the hilt all along in this arena; but it is a very difficult problem to accommodate requirements which outstrip the finite resources available.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is your opinion that the equipment problem is the most severe. Yet we have personnel shortfalls just in raw numbers of hundreds of thousands, and shortfalls within units and people assigned responsibilities for which they are not fully trained and so on.

When you view those two shortcomings together, it presents a very serious picture. I want to ask General Peat, now do the Joint Chiefs factor these shortcomings of the Reserve system into its planning? I hope you do.

General PEAT. Indeed we do. The initial planning is not done by the JCS, but by our commanders in chief in the field, for example in the Pacific and Atlantic. Through a process in the JCS, in a document called the Joint Strategic Capability plan, the commander is allocated the forces that he is allowed to plan with. Those forces are prioritized in terms of their readiness and availability to the best of our ability to do so, based on all of the factors. As I discussed earlier, "C" ratings are only one of the factors the commander in chief looks at to determine the readiness of his assigned and allocated forces.

Backing up to an earlier point made by the Secretary about the personnel problem being indeed serious—the personnel problem permeates the "C" ratings. For the Reserve Forces, however, the production of additional personnel without the equipment to go with them merely exacerbates what is already a bad situation.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand. But to get back to the thrust of my question, in other words the Commander in Chief Europe and others with area responsibilities are making realistic adjustments to their plans based on the known shortfalls in the Reserves?

General PEAT. They certainly are. Of course, the forces they are given to plan with for the first 10 or 15 days are the most ready and most able to be there. In plans for CINCEUR, some of the forces aren't made available to them until the 6-month point, at which time we hope that our mobilization would have taken effect and those forces would be flushed out.

Senator HUMPHREY. What concerns me especially is the first couple of weeks. We are going to have real problems with mobilization and transport. I would hope that the theater commanders are taking a very realistic view of what they might get in the way of reinforcements, because it appears to me to be nothing like it is supposed to be on paper.

General PEAT. For the first weeks of a mobilization, in fact, the commanders in chief will get what they expect to get. The shortfall in transportation, as you pointed out, is certainly serious, but there, again, their plans are based on real world availability of transport that we now have and not upon some of our wishes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us say that we are into a conflict several weeks and you get into the second phase. What are the implications of grossly underplanned and underequipped Reserve units which are presumably going to be counted upon heavily to be frontline forces, and what are the implications of those deficiencies?

General PEAT. I would hate to put words in our field commanders' mouths, but I suspect that they are very serious. I suspect that they worry daily about the readiness of those forces that they are going to get not perhaps in the first month but in the second month and third month.

Dr. PHILBIN. May I add to that?

Senator HUMPHREY. Of course, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. PHILBIN. The basic equipment and distribution policy in the DOD is to distribute whatever equipment exists among those who will fight first. Early deploying Guard and Reserve units should be equipped to the same level as the active people deploying at the same time.

There is a time-phased deployment list, 30 days and 60 days and 90 days. The units of the Guard and the Reserve which are deployed within the first 30 days are in a very high state of readiness and specifically are managed that way.

Those in the next 30 days are less so, and in the 60- to 90-day period even less so, but it is a known thing and it is managed in that respect, so I don't want you to think that units may wind up on the beach the first day without equipment. That is almost certainly not going to happen.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Guard would make up about half of the Army's combat forces, would it not?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir, the nonstrategic combat force is about 50 percent in the Guard and the Reserve.

Senator HUMPHREY. What percentage of the Guard would be mobilized within 30 days, approximately?

Dr. PHILBIN. Sir, I would submit that to you for the record, if I may. I have in mind the numbers for the Army Reserve which I could offer.

[The information follows:]

Current war plans call for the Army Guard to provide primarily combat support and combat service support units during the first 30 days following mobilization. These represent 8 percent of the total Army Guard units and 5 percent of their wartime authorized strength. The bulk of the Army Guard combat brigades and divisions would be deployed or available for deployment between M+30 and M+90, most of these prior to M+60. All Air Guard units would be available for deployment within 72 hours.

Dr. PHILBIN. Within the first 30 days, something like 30 percent of the Army Reserve will be mobilized. Within the next 30 days almost 50 to 60 percent will be mobilized, and within 90 days all of it will be mobilized. So there are substantial percentages which will be deployed right up front, and I might add that in the Rapid De-

ployment Force there are quite a number of Guard and Reserve units which are intended to go within hours.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thirty percent of the Army Reserves would be mobilized within 30 days?

All of those units are fully equipped with the same equipment as the Active Forces—is that what you are saying?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't say it in that particular way, Senator, but it would certainly be managed so that they would be fully equipped.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Denton has joined us. Would you care to make an opening statement?

Senator DENTON. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. In what condition is the group that would be mobilized in the Army Reserves in the succeeding 30 days, and where would they get their equipment?

Dr. PHILBIN. There is a trickle down for the units that have equipment. Many of them do not have all of the equipment that they would use in a combat situation. They have enough to train with, and they have enough to keep their maintenance skills up, but in a deployment they would pick up equipment at various places and take it with them, or pick it up overseas.

Just what the amount would be I could not tell you offhand but I could submit that for the record, because that is probably pretty classified information.

[The information follows:]

The Army Reserve M+31 to M+60 units are short nearly one billion dollars worth of equipment (\$967.9 million). The amount and identification of the shortfall that would be picked up at various sites following mobilization is the subject of a high-priority Army study currently underway.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the program, or is there a program, to address this \$17.5 billion backlog in necessary equipment? Are we making any progress at all in this area?

Dr. PHILBIN. Sir, there is the beginning, the rudiments, of a program. I am now giving you a personal opinion. When I first started asking the question about equipment 6 months ago, upon arrival in Washington, I was assured that there really wasn't much of a problem. But I had heard so much about the equipment problem in the field, where I tried to spend a lot of time, that I kept pressing the issue and it appears now that another look has been taken at the whole situation by the military services.

In the Army it is acknowledged that there is a severe equipment problem, something of the dimensions that I showed you on the chart. The Army has gone into a very sophisticated effort to develop or to enhance management systems to: (1) Identify the scope and detail of the problem and (2) to address that problem.

But to tell you that there is a workable, sophisticated answer to the problem in actual operation, I couldn't go that far.

Senator HUMPHREY. Something doesn't quite add up. On the one hand, you seemed to reassure me a moment ago that the first wave of mobilized forces have all of their equipment and the second wave would surely pick it up somewhere, and yet where does this big shortfall come in? At some point it affects the battlefield situation and the support of forces already there, and that is what worries me.

Dr. PHILBIN. You are absolutely correct. The way the plan would work is that certain units of the Active Forces, the Guard and the Reserve, would deploy to the POMCUS. They would leave behind the equipment they were using in training and in their exercises.

Second, organizations and individuals would come forward and augment their existing equipment with that equipment, so you would have a time-phased rippling by which units will be armed. However, when there is an overall shortfall in the total force, there comes a time when you have more people than you have equipment. If you carry that to its logical conclusion in the Army, the equipment shortfall ends up in the training base, which is a very serious problem because we are depending upon the training base to convert civilian citizens into soldiers while the fighting goes on to augment the force after 90 days.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are saying that this massive shortfall of equipment would impact only in a combat situation, a mobilization situation, would only impact at the training level?

Dr. PHILBIN. If we are talking about numbers and units that is true. If we are talking about the deployability of the equipments that are assigned, the sustainability of those equipments, the needed modernization of those equipments, and the interoperability of units between the Active, Guard and Reserve and our allies, then we have another serious problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat, in what way do the Joint Chiefs see this Reserve equipment shortfall affecting the combat situation. At what phase, and how early?

General PEAT. That is a very difficult question to answer. It depends upon the intensity of the battle. For a short scenario, we could probably support almost any requirement.

Senator HUMPHREY. The classic Warsaw Pact situation?

General PEAT. It would affect the strategic reserve, which I consider those forces that arrive after about 90 days, to a considerable extent.

Senator HUMPHREY. You feel the Joint Chiefs are very comfortable for the first 90 days with regard to equipment in that scenario?

General PEAT. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. After that it becomes a problem?

General PEAT. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What kinds of problems, obviously a shortage of necessary equipment, and what are the implications?

General PEAT. The implications are, of course, those that the European commanders have to live with forever, and that is the flexible response option and escalation away from conventional warfare.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is to accept defeat, heavy casualties, or escalate after about 90 days?

General PEAT. Yes, sir. Well, I couldn't characterize that as after 90 days. The staff has different ideas about that.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a ballpark figure?

General PEAT. That is my comfortable figure, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the general figure used by the Joint Chiefs for a Warsaw Pact scenario?

General PEAT. There isn't one. Again, the intensity of the attack, the access of attack all play very heavily in determining sustainability levels.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it reasonable to assume that the intensity is going to be light or moderate?

General PEAT. I personally would assume a heavy intensity.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am disturbed sometimes by the surgical terms in which we talk about these things, and the optimism and the euphemisms which sometimes clothe our nakedness. I do think it would be well for us to address these things more realistically.

If we continue to underfund the Reserves and continue to depend upon them heavily, if we ever get into a conflict, we are going to lose a lot of people and stand a very high risk of defeat, in my view. It means a lot of dead Americans and all kinds of world strategy. I think it ought to be stated in those terms.

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that some of the Reserve units are designated for Rapid Deployment Force deployment?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yet they also continue to have their conventional responsibilities, do they not? Or what happens when they become assigned to an RDF unit, how would they pick up the loss of those units?

Dr. PHILBIN. I think that would be a question best directed to General Peat, sir, it is within his area of expertise, rather than my own.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat?

General PEAT. In point of fact, there are a number of Guard and Reserve units as well as active units which are multitasked for several situations, some to as many as 10 different contingency war plans. When those units are assigned and initially deployed to a scenario they are used up.

Then the commander in chief in the theater is forced to decide how to best use assigned forces plus what he is able to get.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am getting at is, is it sound to plan for double or multiple assignments of one unit? Isn't that what we are doing? I realize, of course, that this applies to the Active Forces as well, and the Active Forces are doubly assigned, if you will, and how would that work? Are we not deluding ourselves when we assign units to RDF that continue to have responsibilities elsewhere?

General PEAT. Well, only if one assumes that the RDF will always be the lead scenario and that we, in fact, would always go to the Southwest Asia area, which is the RDF's area of responsibility now. In point of fact, now if a war were to occur first in the NATO/Warsaw Pact area, I am quite certain that the forces would be deployed there first and Southwest Asia would become a part of what our Pacific Theater was in World War II, a holding action, catch as catch can, until such time as the industrial and mobilization base could catch up.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, how were the Reserve units chosen that were assigned to the RDF, on the basis of readiness, the most ready units, how are those assigned?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't say that is the way it was done, sir, because, again, that would be one of the prerogatives of the services, working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I am sure the most ready organizations were considered for it. If that were not the case, they would pick a unit and bring it to readiness in order to carry out its mission.

I can't say it strongly enough, sir, that we are depending upon Reserves to do the job.

Senator HUMPHREY. If we have early deploying units that can be expected to go into combat in hours, they are intensely managed so that they can meet that responsibility. As General Peat pointed out, the problem comes in later units, because you get to the point where there are not enough resources to go around and that is where the problem comes in.

Let us go back to the principal problems, material and personnel. You stated that you thought that the groundwork was being laid to address the equipment problem. Can you tell us more about that incipient plan? How are we going to get from here to some point down the road where we put a large chunk of that shortfall behind us?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't answer that question in detail, because it is the active Army which is currently studying the problem. That is where the major equipment problem lies, at least the one of immediate shortfall. I am assured, and have every reason to believe it is under intensive study.

The first step is that there is a recognition that there is a severe problem and I thought that was a rather large step forward.

Senator HUMPHREY. It only took 8 years. How long will it take us to get the funds?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't give you a specific answer, but I operate with a real sense of urgency in all of this, and I am constantly beating everybody about the head and shoulders to get answers, and they are responding.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, are we still on the trickle-down program? Is that still the emphasis for the Reserves?

Dr. PHILBIN. I would say for the most part it is, even though the Department of Defense policy for at least 10 years has been that existing equipment, available equipments, are to be distributed on the basis of who fights first. There is a directive which essentially says that. I thought I had invented that when I took office, but I found out I had not. But for the most part over the years I think that the Guard and the Reserves have been equipped on a trickle-down theory, with some exceptions, like the A-10's for the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve, and some F-16's which are coming in fiscal year 1983.

It is my opinion that the combination of the unitary buy and multiple-year contracting to obtain all of the equipments necessary for the total force is the most reasonable economic and military route to take. I can't say that that is now the policy. I believe that to date it has been essentially a trickle-down policy, but I urge everyone within earshot to look at the unitary purchase concept and multiyear contracting.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have read the testimony and, Dr. Philbin, your statement relating to Reserve equipment shortages is alarming and well taken.

As I understand it, you have prioritized the assignment of equipment to those units which would be deployed early, so there is no lack of planning with regard to prioritization on the part of the Reserves or DOD.

I understand there is a \$17.8 billion stated funding shortfall which you have outlined here in terms of the services and general categories. Have you broken it out any more specifically than that? If not, is it because you simply are running into a stone wall with respect to the budget limits and the DOD allocation to the Reserves. Where are you running into your resistance and do you have it all stated as to what your shortfalls are?

Dr. PHILBIN. The figures that we have presented here are unclassified figures which my staff were able to obtain from the sources, the Army, Air Force, and the Navy. I can't say that I received anything but cooperation from all of the services in this endeavor.

We gathered this information ourselves and therefore there is some question about how accurate it is, plus or minus 5 percent or something like that; but we had to gather it ourselves because the services could not answer us in these terms when we asked, "What is the equipment problem?"

When we asked enough, they finally turned around themselves and said, "We had better take a look at this", and that is exactly what they are doing now. They are somewhat well along, some months along, in this.

Senator DENTON. Being from the Navy, I would suggest you have units that could be augmented by the Reserves and it is hard to equate that with equipment.

Dr. PHILBIN. There are units which are augmented by Reserves. For example, the Army divisions augmented by Guard and Reserve brigades. Those Guard and Reserve brigades usually have equipment associated with them, so we are able to look at them and count.

The Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard are individuals who have in their possession only personal equipment. There is no equipment set aside for them as such. They would go to the units that they were assigned to, fill up and draw their equipment there.

Senator DENTON. There is a lack then of a comprehensive plan in specific procurement terms, service by service, which you have gotten the attention of the services directed toward. I can understand some of the difficulties that the services have coming up with overall requirements. It is an ongoing development for a procurement requirement in specific terms.

You are going to have that when?

Dr. PHILBIN. The answer to the first part of that is "yes" and the answer as to when, I cannot answer.

Senator DENTON. Would you have any insight into that, General Peat?

General PEAT. It is a very difficult problem for the services to break down. They can probably tell you easily how many tanks they need, but how many are Guard or Reserve oriented is almost an impossible problem.

Senator DENTON. I am just casting about in my mind, trying to see how I can best help bring the Reserves up to their needed strength. It is a question of developing the right language, and you all are having the same problems yourselves. Is that a fair assessment?

Dr. PHILBIN. That is precisely why I have pressed so hard to get that system developed to identify the shortfalls, so that we could

come to the Congress and tell them what the problems were and ask for assistance.

The answer is, we do not have that system developed, but it is under development.

Senator DENTON. Maybe General Peat could direct himself to this question: When I was at the Armed Forces Staff College, this joint operational planning system was in its early stages of development. Much like the young child who asked, "Is the emperor really wearing any clothes?", I found myself there for a number of years and put through a number of briefings. I was able to understand enough to ask some, which might have been, perspective and deep questions. It turned out that in some real situations that we set up, such as a war in the Middle East and one in Europe, we really were begging the question with respect to the numbers. In other words, we were using the same guy twice when it was impossible to do so. I would ask if there is still some of that going on?

General PEAT. I would have to admit that there is still some of that going on. We are doing our best to weed that out. A specific example is the 18th Airborne Corps, which is, of course, the element of the Southwest Asia RDF which has been multiple tasked for years.

We are clearing out to the best of our ability the multiple tasking for that unit. There will be multiple tasking in Joint Chiefs of Staff war plans as long as there is a resource shortfall, and it is a significant shortfall, perhaps in terms of Army divisions, some 16 or 18, in our view.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, General.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. PHILBIN. Senator Denton, if I may add one thing, I am reminded that the congressionally requested report on the equipment of the Guard and the Reserve which was due sometime in February might assist you in your effort to help the Guard and the Reserve. That is currently in preparation and part of the information we presented here today came from that effort.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, going back to the equipment problem, you said that the authorities are aware of the problem and I think that is where we decided our discussion for the moment. Is there anything in the proposed 5-year plan for the Department of Defense that begins to address this problem?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't say that there is in those terms, sir. When I have attended the briefings on the program objective memorandum, the service plans for the next 5 years, I asked, "Where is the equipment for the Guard and the Reserves?" I am essentially told, "It is there but we can't identify it."

Senator HUMPHREY. What does that mean?

Dr. PHILBIN. That means that the institutional military services, who control the purse strings for purchasing the equipment are purchasing it with a macroscopic viewpoint. They are not saying, "I am going to buy this for the Guard and this for the Reserves and this for the Active Forces." They are buying equipment and then they will decide how it will be distributed.

My major thrust has been to be certain that whatever equipment is available is distributed on the basis of who fights first, and I am con-

stantly asking that question and sending information forward on that basis.

My personal opinion is that one should look at the Guard and the Reserve and the active components and determine the requirements of each, and prioritize those requirements and buy the equipment in lots large enough to solve all of the problems at the same time.

There are economies of scale there and there are benefits of unitary contracting and certainly it would help with regard to the planning and programing of the force structure for the future.

I am especially concerned about the impending and inevitable block obsolescence of the equipment of the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

Now, we have received A-10's which are right off the line, which is a very, very big step forward.

We are receiving some F-16's in fiscal year 1983. They have a lot of age on those F-4's which have to be replaced. It seems to me that the F-16 is a good airplane, but we must start planning to move the new equipment in.

Senator HUMPHREY. At what level of command are the decisions made as to what goes to the Reserve units?

Dr. PHILBIN. I would say that is made at the level of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Staff and the Army Staff. Pressures can be applied from the OSD level to assist the conclusions in that respect. Again to avoid micromanagement—and that is a concept with which I fully agree—the avoidance of micromanagement, it becomes difficult to involve yourself in that process because there is no question that the military experts are at the military level. We are managers at the OSD level.

Senator HUMPHREY. How are you managing the personnel problems, the shortfalls which are still very severe despite the fact that you rank them No. 2 behind material shortages?

Dr. PHILBIN. Overall, the overall personnel problem I would rank behind material, but it is still a severe problem. There is no question about it. We have addressed the problems of shortfalls in the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve by management initiatives, bonus programs, education benefit programs, and reenergized recruiting efforts.

We are now starting to look at the retention efforts because it seems to me at least that in the Guard and the Reserve we have put an awful lot of effort into recruiting and it has been successful.

We have tended to forget retention, and now retention is starting to loom rather large since we have turbulence within the Guard and the Reserve ranks of about 20 percent a year, which is far too high.

Senator HUMPHREY. How short are we in the Individual Ready Reserve?

Dr. PHILBIN. Well, that number, too, is sensitive to the assumptions that are made, the number of troops committed, the scenario, the combat tempo, the casualty rate, and so forth. But the number which is accepted for the Army, and that is the worst situation, is 249,000 less than required.

Now, that assumes that all of the individuals in the Ready Reserve are perfectly fungible people who are soldiers in the broadest

sense and can be moved around among the combat skills. That is really not totally the case.

Many of the people in the Individual Ready Reserve are people who have skills which are too sophisticated. What is needed are people with combat skills, infantry and armor, and so forth. We tend to have more of the technological skills in the IRR than are absolutely required.

So, the number, if you look at it in that way, may be higher than 249,000 but I have seen analysis by the Army which indicates that the number may be as low as 157,000. So, the number is soft, but there is a shortfall, and it is a serious shortfall.

Senator HUMPHREY. I gather there has been some improvement there, but we are still a long way from solving the problem.

What initiatives do you propose or what is being done in addition to increasing emphasis on retention, and what else can we do?

Dr. PHILBIN. Specifically with regard to the Individual Ready Reserve, we are planning on starting a direct enlistment program into the Individual Ready Reserve. To date, the people going into the IRR have come from the active duty establishment. As the active duty establishment has shrunk in size and more people are retained on active duty, the numbers going into IRR have shrunk as well.

We feel we must, for a number of reasons, try to initiate direct enlistment into the IRR. Now, that is somewhat deceptive in its simplicity, because we don't mean that these people will go only into the IRR; what we mean is that we will look at a number of people who for whatever reason cannot or will not commit to a longer period of active duty at the very outset. We will enlist them with the offer that: "If you enlist and go to training, if that is all you want to do, you can go into the IRR and serve out your period there, with periodic retraining every 3 years or so. If you like it, you can go into a Selected Reserve unit, and if you really like it, you can go on active duty."

We believe that we can tap an entirely different resource pool that has never been tapped before with this particular program. We do believe that some bonus incentives might be required, but we can't tell you at this point how much it is. It is still under study.

Senator HUMPHREY. To what degree will that solve this problem?

Dr. PHILBIN. It won't solve this problem alone; there is no question about that. We must continue to retain people who are in the IRR when their enlistments are up. We want to do that by reason of a reenlistment bonus. As you know, there was a test of a reenlistment bonus program which the Congress decided not to extend. I personally felt that the final numbers may indicate that had we gone on with that, it would have been more successful.

It would certainly be more successful if we had more money to offer for a reenlistment bonus. I think we have to come back and ask the Congress for a new reenlistment bonus, perhaps of a greater amount.

I think we also have to ask for an extension of the MSO, the military service obligation for people who join the service. As it stands now, the MSO is 6 years. People normally will go into an active duty organization or a Selected Reserve unit for 3 or 4 years and then finish up their tour in the IRR, which should normally be 2 or 3 years.

We feel that there is a very good possibility that by extending the total MSO to 8 years we can in 6 years start increasing the numbers in

the IRR appreciably. That plus the other initiatives, we feel, should solve the problem by 1986 or 1987. That is in the defense guidance, to increase all categories of personnel to full wartime requirements by 1986 or 1987.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you on track with regard to that timetable, are you on schedule?

Dr. PHILBIN. I believe we are, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you anticipate the necessary funds?

Dr. PHILBIN. Well, that is up to the Congress.

Senator HUMPHREY. Apparently, you are convinced that the massive shortfall in the Ready Reserve can be overcome without a return to conscription?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir, I am.

I would like to elaborate on that, if I might. Historically, the strength of the Guard and the Reserve has been in two concepts, localism and voluntarism. I am very concerned at discussion about drafts for the Reserves only. I think that that would destroy the Reserve concept as we know it in the utilitarian sense today. If there must be a draft of the military, I hope it would come for the entire military and not just for the Reserves.

There was a time during the Vietnam era where, because of the operation of the selective service laws, the Guard and the Reserve became a haven for draft avoiders. That damaged us severely because we are an organization of volunteers.

A draft for the Guard and the Reserve only, I think, would put the nail in the coffin.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, in your statement, on the first page, you state the case pretty well: You think deployed elements of the U.S. Armed Forces can be expected to be hard pressed, and heavy casualties and equipment losses must be viewed as probable and perhaps unavoidable. If we do not have the depth in military capability to counter such hostile activities, replace our losses and strengthen other threatened areas, we could be faced with the alternative of losing the war or employing weapons of such a nature that the conflict could be escalated to a worldwide conflagration.

Do we have that today with regard to the Reserves?

Dr. PHILBIN. The depth must come from the Guard and the Reserves, and in the early deploying units; that is, 30 to 60 days. I have no doubt that we have that depth.

As General Peat indicated, it is in the later deploying units that I have some concern, and my concern is primarily with the equipment.

Now, again, we also have to look to post-90-day activity, where the depth must come from people who have been trained during the first 90 days, people who have either enlisted or have been conscripted. Those people have to be trained by the training base, which primarily comes out of the Reserve, and that is an area where we may have a severe equipment shortfall.

If we don't have the equipment to train those people, it will not be available 90 days after mobilization.

Senator HUMPHREY. You noted in your testimony that 5 percent of the fiscal year 1982 TOA's for the Department of Defense were designated for the Guard and the Reserve Forces.

In your opinion, what would be a more appropriate level?

Dr. PHILBIN. Sir, if I gave you a number now, it would be speculative; but I can tell you that 5 percent is not enough, if my figures are accurate, and that it would take \$17 billion to make up the equipment shortfall that my staff has been able to identify. Five percent of the DOD budget is not sufficient to do that.

Now, that 5 percent number, I have to tell you in all honesty, is a simple calculation from the 5-year defense program. There are various numbers which can be generated depending upon particular analysis that you make of the Guard and the Reserve and what goes into it. But the numbers cannot be greater than 6 or 7 percent, and there are some I have seen which are as low as 4 percent. I suggest that that is not enough.

Senator HUMPHREY. You feel pretty confident about the capability of the Reserves to measure up to what is expected of them in the first 60 days or so, and does that include medical units?

Dr. PHILBIN. That is another problem. All I can tell you on that is that when I first came to office I was told about that problem. I approached the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. John Berry, about it, and he immediately joined me in trying to solve the problem, and we are working very hard on that.

We are starting to show some degree of success. We have found that in a particular area the accession policies were stultified and inflexible, and people who wanted to join were presented with almost insuperable and maddening obstacles. We have eliminated those. We have created in the Reserve components, a medical council to examine the problems and come up with solutions, and this is not a study group; this is an action-oriented/solution-now group of people consisting of myself, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the military executive of the Reserve Policy Board, and either a general or flag officer from the Reserve or Guard medical components.

We are trying aggressively to solve these problems, but I have to tell you again that the problem as we define it is not monstrous with regard to personnel. We think that is subject to management and solution. The problem, again, is medical equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you do have a serious personnel problem?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir, we do. I have some figures that I could offer you now, if you would like to hear that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any figures on the improvements that have been realized in recent months?

Dr. PHILBIN. No, sir; I can't give you that, because we haven't compiled that as yet; but the figures of the problems are sobering enough. As of June 20, 1981, we were short in the Reserve components 3,321 physicians, 2,193 nurses, a handful of psychologists, 39 ophthalmologists, and enlisted specialists almost 10,000. I personally, and Dr. Berry, believe that those are rather optimistic numbers, that the problem is even greater than that. But we believe it is possible to solve those numbers, and in a relatively short order. The medical equipment takes somewhat longer.

Senator HUMPHREY. In what period of time do you think the personnel problem is solvable?

Dr. PHILBIN. I would say over a period of 3 or 4 years we could probably reduce that appreciably. I have been out in the field talking to medical people, trying to find out the scope of the problem, and

the source of the problem. All of the medical people are very optimistic that they can recruit doctors and nurses and specialists if they get some help from the management. The management is now giving them a lot of help.

Senator HUMPHREY. What has been lacking?

Dr. PHILBIN. What has been lacking, in my estimation, is the motivation to solve the problem. It was a problem that people kept putting off until the day after tomorrow and the day after tomorrow never came. Well, it is here now. I believe along with others that the minimum humane activity that we can engage in is to make sure that if we have to send people into combat, we send them with the medical help that they will need if they are injured.

Senator HUMPHREY. You state that the principal medical problem is one of equipment. What kind of equipment are you talking about?

Dr. PHILBIN. We are talking about medical equipment of various types, from the tents in which they would operate to the actual surgical equipment that they would use, that an anesthesiologist would use. The problem of an adequate supply of drugs and bandages, that type of thing, has come to the fore. It is a problem which is related to the capacity of the American industrial base.

We are beginning to wonder if we might not be forced into purchasing some of the medical equipment overseas, and that is a matter that we would probably have to approach the Congress on if we decided that that was necessary.

Senator HUMPHREY. Getting back to my original question with regard to the first 60 days, you have a high level of confidence in the broad spectrum of units, but how would you characterize your feelings about the medical units in the first 60 days?

Dr. PHILBIN. I haven't formed a conclusion about that, personally, sir, because that really gets into the field of expertise with which I don't feel comfortable, that is, the medical field. But the medical people with whom I am working seem to be fairly confident that they can handle that particular problem, at least for the early deploying days, 30 to 60 days. It is the sustainability which is the problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are short 3,300 physicians, and what part of those 3,300 would be deployed in the first 30 days?

Dr. PHILBIN. I can't answer that, but I will submit that for the record as well.

[The information follows:]

Nearly all of the shortfall of 3,321 reserve physicians required to meet a near-term contingency would be filled. The shortfalls are primarily in the surgical skills. The physicians will be needed to provide the necessary specialists to transition from a peacetime military medical system to a wartime posture. If a contingency broke out today, those deployment positions would have to be filled to the extent possible with active duty physicians from CONUS facilities, thereby decreasing our capability to treat those casualties returned to CONUS. Further complicating the problem are shortages of medical equipment and facilities in-theater to provide necessary initial care for casualties.

Senator HUMPHREY. And 10,000 enlisted specialists—these are medics, general-purpose medical specialists?

Dr. PHILBIN. Specialists, clinical, laboratory and medical and operating room, and the doctors tell me that that is the most severe shortage that they have, because there does not appear to be any civilian

organization or walk of life where we can draw from and enlist those particular specialists. There does not appear to be any civilian corollary to that particular specialty, so the doctors are now coming to the conclusion that what we are going to have to have is an energetic revitalized training program whereby we take qualified people from civilian life and enlist them in the Reserve for their particular specialty and send them to training for which we pay, and then put a long MSO in the Reserve and the Guard onto that type of training.

They think it is solvable in that particular way, but I am offering you nothing but rank hearsay, sir, because this is outside of my area of expertise.

Senator HUMPHREY. What percentage of the medical services would the Reserve units supply in a conflict situation and mobilization situation? It is very high, 60 or 70.

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, we have a chart that contains that particular component of the data for you, along with some others, and it shows you percentages.

The medical units for the Army coming out of the Army Reserve are 46 percent. Now, I would say that is a conservative estimate, and that over all it is probably greater than 50 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. If I recall correctly, Defense, departmentwide it is well over 50 percent.

Dr. PHILBIN. It could very well be.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat, are the Joint Chiefs of Staff taking into consideration this serious shortage in medical personnel and the effect it would have?

General PEAT. We have identified in our documents over a number of years the lack of units in the medical service; however, we are largely limited by resource allocation in this matter, which is largely an allocation problem for our friends in the services and the Secretary of Defense. That is where we are.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the implications if we mobilized in our present situation regarding medical care?

General PEAT. I would have to submit that for the record. I am out of my area.

[The information follows:]

MEDICAL SERVICE

Full mobilization would not detract from our ability to meet medical manpower requirements in the theater of operations. We would, however, be vitally short of hospital beds, surgical operating rooms, and experience difficulties in meeting related medical logistical requirements. Staffing theater medical units would require a drastic drawdown of CONUS medical personnel who will have to be replaced by comparable Reserve health care specialists. Under certain conditions, CONUS military hospitals will quickly become saturated and alternative health care facilities will have to be utilized. The Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System is designed to meet this requirement. Furthermore, pending legislation (S. 266 and H.R. 3502), if enacted, would allow DOD to use Veterans' Administration hospital facilities for Active duty military casualties. Finally, the expected wartime demand on DOD military medical facilities will necessitate a decrease in the availability of health services to other eligible beneficiaries.

Senator HUMPHREY. We would suffer a lot of unnecessary casualties?

General PEAT. I think that it is fair to say that we would be unable to provide the full care we would like to provide.

Dr. PHILBIN. We are talking about maimed and dead troops.

Senator HUMPHREY. And some of them unnecessarily dead?

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is amazing to me—I understand how a shortage of physicians and other skilled medical people could occur—but it is amazing to me that we would be short in some very fundamental supplies, such as surgical tents and surgical equipment and things of that nature. How are we fairing in the area of combat engineering? Are we in rather poor shape?

Dr. PHILBIN. I haven't prepared this especially for the hearing, but I am informed with regard to equipment in the combat engineering organizations that we are in somewhat better shape there, there seems to be more equipment and newer equipment in those particular specialties than there is in the combat arms.

But I can submit details for the record for you, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right.

[The information follows:]

The Services are in the process of responding to the Congressional requirement for an Annual Report, by February 15, on the status of Guard and Reserve Equipment. The data in this report will allow us to identify, by procurement item, the status of Reserve Component engineer equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right, General Peat, in your statement, you say the following: In order for the Reserve to constitute a credible portion of our overall defense posture, these problems must be solved, the problems to which you referred earlier. Since the problems exist and have not yet been solved, is it the position of the JCS that the Reserves Forces do not constitute a credible portion of our overall defense posture?

General PEAT. Not at all. They certainly do. Those that are ready to go, those that are deployed in the first 30 to 60 days, they are ready to go.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are you trying to convey in this statement?

General PEAT. I am trying to convey the fact that we have, in fact, had this force for 8 years and it seems to be not totally operative, primarily due to resources.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the JCS fully take that into consideration in its planning?

General PEAT. Senator, we do.

Dr. PHILBIN. May I add to that, Senator, I don't want to leave you with the impression which I may be generating, that it is blacker than it is. I am a colonel in the Air Force Reserve myself and I have spent as much time as possible in the field since I was sworn in—

Senator HUMPHREY. I have read of your impressive background.

Dr. PHILBIN [continuing]. Trying to determine the problem. I have flown with Guard units and Reserve units and fighter units and tanker units and I have walked with the troops and I have been aboard the ships. I have to tell you that the bottom line total of this is that these people do a magnificent job with the equipment that they have.

My motive is to get them the best equipment possible and as much as they need.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand. I haven't intended to impugn the motivation of our people or their caliber; but it seems to me that the status of the Guard and the Reserve, or the status of their readiness, is lower than it should be. Given the increased role that has been assigned them in recent times it is a very critical problem and one that is not properly acknowledged either by the Department of Defense or particularly by Congress.

Dr. PHILBIN. Yes, sir; I would agree with that.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Peat, how does the JCS deal in planning with the incompatibility of the equipment between the Reserves and the Active components?

General PEAT. I must say that the JCS itself doesn't deal with that. The individual services and the component commanders in the field are those who do.

From my experiences in Europe, I would suggest that it is difficult, but not impossible. For instance, if spares are not available in our pipelines for any given reason, our European allies are using some of the older equipment and the kind that our Guard are equipped with. Perhaps it is a difficult problem in a local area but not overly significant in a theater.

It would be far superior if our Reserve Forces were equally equipped with our Active Forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. But it would be little comfort to a local commander who was having problems with incompatibility to know that on a theater-wide basis there is no problem?

General PEAT. I would agree with that, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, what has been the trend in the participation by female reservists and what are the implications there with regard to mobilization?

Dr. PHILBIN. I think that the trend has been essentially similar to that in the active duty. I would say to you offhand that the percentages are probably about the same.

I have had females in units that I have commanded myself, and I give you the benefit of a personal observation, that they have been able to do the job very well. I am talking now about jobs like intelligence and professional organizations.

We follow the same rules and the same standards as the active duty organizations with regard to employment of personnel, types of jobs that they may have and standards that they have to achieve. I am aware of no particular problem with regard to female personnel in the Guard and the Reserves, but I will examine the issue further and submit it for the record.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right. Fine.

[The information follows:]

At the end of fiscal year 1981 the actual levels of women in the Total Force were 8.7 percent in the Active Components and 8.8 percent in the Selected Reserve. These statistics represent an upward trend. In fiscal year 1978 the Selected Reserve was 6.8 percent women and the Active Force was 6.5 percent women. As to the implications with regard to mobilization, I would refer you to two studies conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense which show that women are performing well in their expanded roles.

The first, entitled "The Use of Women in the Military", published in 1977 and updated in September 1978 found little difference in the performance of men and women. The second study, entitled "Background Review: Women in the

Military"—October 1981 also concluded that women performed their assigned duties as well as men.

In 1977, the Army completed a study which concluded that there was no degradation in mission performance in the field for company level combat support and combat service support units with up to 35 percent of the members being women.

Senator HUMPHREY. But are there significantly larger numbers of females serving in the Reserves today, or is it pretty static?

Dr. PHILBIN. I would not say that there are significantly larger numbers.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about the matter of single parents of either sex, is that a problem in terms of mobilization?

Dr. PHILBIN. It has not been a problem in the Reserve as far as ongoing operations go. As far as mobilization goes, there, of course, is speculation about whether single parents will actually mobilize and leave the children with the grandparents and so forth. It is the same problem and the same type of problem which exists or doesn't exist in the Active Forces. We have the same requirements that plans must be made by single parents to have someone take care of the child in the event of mobilization, or they don't qualify to be in the Ready Reserve.

They must be a mobilizing asset or they can't be in the Ready Reserve.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Senate—and I don't know whether it applies to the House—but in the Senate's Department of Defense authorization there was language that applied directly to the Reserves. In other words, the Senate got into the business of directing certain equipment to the Reserves and the National Guard. Do you favor that approach?

Dr. PHILBIN. There is a danger in that approach, sir. Certainly the attention of the Congress is crucial in reminding the military services that the Guard and Reserves must be adequately resourced according to the total force policy at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Congress does get a lot of attention from the military services, but when the Congress gets involved with specific resource distribution, no matter how well intentioned, it could actually interfere with the overall force structuring that the military forces are involved in. It is detailed planning of a very intrinsically complicated nature. I myself, being closer to the military services on a daily basis, would hesitate to make suggestions about equipment and where it should go.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is hard to see how the Reserves could do any worse under our management than under the Pentagon's management.

I think we have accomplished all that we set out to do today.

Mr. Secretary and General Peat, thank you very much for your testimony.

I intend for these hearings to be an ongoing affair. I think there is so much to look into that we will be in business for many, many months to come, and perhaps we will have the privilege of inviting you back.

Dr. PHILBIN. I would be delighted to come back. Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Levin will submit additional questions to you in writing. The record will remain open until 10 a.m., tomorrow morning to accommodate submitted questions.

[The questions, with answers supplied, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

STATUS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE

Question. What specific initiatives do you have to attack the problem of shortages in land combat skills in the Army and Marine Corps reserve components? For example, do you pay larger enlistment bonuses for infantrymen than for cooks or bakers?

Answer. The principle initiative to overcome shortages in the Reserve Components is the Selected Reserve Incentive Program. The program consists of a variable enlistment bonus up to \$2,000 maximum for six-year's service; educational assistance up to \$4,000 for six-year's service; reenlistment bonuses of \$900 for three years and \$1,800 for six years; affiliation bonus of \$25 per month for each month of remaining Military Service obligation; and educational loan repayment of \$500 or 15 percent per year, whichever is greater, for enlistment or reenlistment. In the case of the Army and Marine Corps Reserve Components, these incentives may be offered to high-priority units and/or individuals with critical skills. Both the Army and Marine Components are directing their bonuses to fill the most critical shortages. For example, while the Army Components offer a \$1,500 enlistment bonus to high-priority units, certain skills in that unit, primarily combat arms, are offered the \$2,000 bonus.

Question. What is the current requirement for Pretrained Individual Manpower, and how far short of this requirement is the current inventory?

Answer. The current requirement for Pretrained Individual Manpower is approximately [deleted] and the current usable inventory is about [deleted] short of this requirement.

Question. Describe in general the skill mix currently found in the IRR. What is the requirement and the actual inventory of infantrymen, for example, in the IRR?

Answer. The skill mix found in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) parallels that of the active forces since over 90 percent of the IRR are members who have completed their active duty commitment and are fulfilling the remainder of their six-year service obligation.

The requirement for Army close combat enlisted pretrained manpower is approximately [deleted] in the first three months of a mobilization. The inventory is approximately [deleted].

Question. Direct enlistment into the IRR and a reenlistment bonus for the IRR have not proved particularly successful in the last several years. What makes you think these programs will expand the pool of Pretrained Individual Manpower in the coming years?

Answer. The only Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) direct enlistment program operated by the Defense Department was the Army's 6-month test of this concept in four of its 66 recruiting districts from April through September 1979. Since the Army did not give its recruiters any quotas for this enlistment option the fact that about 450 people enlisted in it demonstrates that the option is attractive to prospective enlistees. The Army will be starting a program in fiscal year 1983 to access 5,000, recruits into the IRR. The IRR reenlistment bonus authorized for fiscal year 1981 was responsible for increasing the IRR by over 6,600 members. This was achieved despite a late start because funding was not assured until the passage of the DoD Appropriation Act in December 1980, administrative delays in the dissemination of bonus information to all those eligible, and the time lag involved between the official start of a program and the actual full-scale operation of that program. A reenlistment bonus is essential to eliminate mobilization manpower shortfalls. The proposal now under development within DoD would increase the bonus amount and streamline the administration of the program.

Question. Doesn't your proposal to increase the length of the military service obligation place a larger burden on those who volunteer to serve in the armed forces? What effect do you expect such a move would have on recruiting?

Answer. Lengthening the basic military service obligation does make an enlistee liable for mobilization for a longer period of time. However, an 8-year obligation did exist until 1958 when it was shortened because there were excess people in the IRR who could not be administered properly. Today, there are too few people in the IRR and lengthening the obligation is one method to increase its size. At this time, no one knows the impact on recruiting if the obligation is

lengthened. It is for that reason that the proposal now under development within DOD would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to vary the length between 6 and 8 years. If the obligation is lengthened and recruiting begins to suffer, the obligation can be shortened immediately without having to wait for the passage of legislation.

EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

Question. Discuss the process by which equipment is purchased or transferred to Reserve and Guard units. How is the decision made as to the amount of new equipment the Services will purchase for the Reserves each year? What role does OSD play in this process?

Answer. Following responses are provided relative to each of the Services:

Army

Equipment is purchased for the total Army, and not for just one aspect of it. The quantity of equipment procured (the Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO)) is computed based on the requirements of the structures of Active Component, National Guard and Army Reserve units (this includes POMCUS, war reserves, operational stocks, and maintenance floats). The recipients are prioritized by the Department of Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) that determines which units will receive equipment with respect to others. This priority system is based on the DoD Force/Activity Designator (FAD) Priority System whose criteria uses deployment dates and unit mission requirements. DOD guidance also prescribes that Active and Reserve Component units with similar missions have the same priority. Transfers of equipment, such as equipment phased out due to the fielding of new systems, from a higher priority unit to one lower are handled in a similar manner.

The Army does not have a distinctive decision process for the procurement of equipment for Reserve Component units. Unit priorities, coupled with the availability of funds, establish those units which get equipment. Funding availability for new equipment is governed by the Army's total obligation authority (TOA) and Army priorities: Modernization (new equipment/systems), Readiness (contains replacement equipment), Sustainability (repair parts, war reserves), and Force Structure. The ordering of priorities influence the share of TOA for equipping the force.

OSD plays a part in this process by allocating the Army share of the DoD TOA. It also provides Defense Guidance which influences the Army's overall priorities. OSD does not, however, give specific instructions on the expenditure of the Army TOA for the Guard and Reserve.

Navy

The source for major equipment for the Naval Reserve forces has traditionally been as the fallout from the active forces as their equipment is replaced with new or updated models. This procedure permits the peacetime deployed forces to possess the most modern equipment for immediate use in a premobilization situation, maximizes the useful life of somewhat less capable but highly effective forces and permits the retention of affordable mobilization forces.

The equipment requirements of the Naval Reserve are reviewed annually during the POM process. Their requirements are included in the Total Force requirements, the sum of which is considerably in excess of the funds available. The items funded are those which will result in the highest readiness of the earliest deploying units of the Total Force and is partially determined by procurement lead times and production rates. In the case of Navy, the Chief of Naval Reserve initiates issues identifying equipment shortages and proposes alternative actions to correct the deficiencies. The issue are reviewed as part of the POM process and those that are funded are included in the POM forwarded to OSD. The Marine Corps, through the Material Management Programming Model, determines the total equipment requirement for all its forces, which includes the Reserves. In accordance with the Defense Guidance and depending on the availability of funds, the Marine Corps procures equipment for its total forces, which also include the Reserves. The Marine Corps policy provides for, both the Active and Reserve forces to have the same type of equipment, however, the Marine Corps outfits active forces first then the reserves.

OSD establishes the policy relative to funding reserve equipment requirements, reviews the service POMs and ensures compliance with directed guidance.

Air Force

Two general planning techniques are employed in the process of modernizing the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES). The first and most frequently used system is to assign aircraft to the Guard and Reserve which have been released through modernization of the active USAF. An example is the release of F-4C/Ds to the ANG and AFRES as a result of the acquisition of F-15s and F-16s for active units. Under this method the rate of modernization is a function of the rate of production of the new weapon system. The second method is the concurrent modernization of both the active USAF and Guard and Reserve units. An example is the current distribution of new production A-10s direct to ANG and AFRES units concurrently with active units. In each case the modernization of all forces is dependent upon the total number and rate of production of a new weapon system. There is one other method of modernizing which does not directly involve programming by the Services. On occasion Congress has appropriated funds for the procurement of specific types and numbers of aircraft for the Guard and Reserve. An example is the current program for A-7Ks for the ANG and C-130Hs for the ANG and AFRES.

National Security Policy provides the focus from which the annual Department of Defense guidance, the Defense Guidance (DG) is developed. This DOD document provides the planning, programming and fiscal guidance to the Services and the Joint Staff. Using planning cycle products, DG and inputs from the Major Commands, the AFRES and ANG the Air Force annually develops its Program Objective Memorandum (POM). After OSD review and decisions by the Secretary of Defense, the approved service POMs, budget submissions and the DOD input to the President's budget become the Five Year Defense Programs (FYDP).

Question. What is the prognosis for improvement of the Guard and Reserve equipment shortfalls? How much improvement, for example, is anticipated in the current 5-year defense program?

Answer. Following responses are provided relative to each of the Services:

Army

Sec. 902, Section 138(b) of Title 10, United States Code, was amended to require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress not later than February 15 each year the status and projected status regarding equipment in the Reserve Components.

The Army Staff is currently developing this data and the report will be provided by February 15, 1982. The February report will provide information through fiscal year 1985.

Navy

Some of the existing Naval Reserve equipment shortfalls are funded in the current 5-year defense program. For instance, a new program to significantly upgrade the NRF surface combatants has been initiated by the transfer of four FF-1052 class frigates from the active force in fiscal year 1982. Additional frigates are programmed in the outyears to provide a force of 24 relatively modern frigates in the NRF. The existing MSO force is undergoing modernization through an ongoing SLEP program and are programmed for replacement by a new class of mine-countermeasures ships in the outyears. Various aircraft upgrades are also planned. Replacement of the aged C-118 airlift aircraft has commenced. SH-2Fs are scheduled to replace older SH-3Ds. Other aircraft in the Naval Air Reserve wings are scheduled for replacement beyond the 5-year defense program.

Major shortfalls remain in equipment for the Naval Reserve Construction Battalions and Cargo Handling Battalions.

Since the active forces are outfitted first, the Marine Corps reserves necessarily keep aged equipment for a longer period of time. Over the 5-year defense plan, assuming receipt of requested funding, it is anticipated that reserve units will receive the same type of equipment as the active forces with the exception of high dollar, low density communication electronics items and a few other low density selected items of equipment.

Air Force

The Total Force Policy is an important part of future programming for the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES). Modernization will continue in the next 5 years as older systems such as the F-101, F-105, EB-57, O-2, C-7 and C-123 are retired and more A-10s, F-4s and C-130s are

transferred to the Guard and Reserve. The F-16 will also be introduced in both USAFR and ANG in the next 5 years.

New and more modern communications electronics (CE) equipment will be assigned in line with the improvement in the Air Force equipment. Current planning for the TRITAC system includes assets for the Guard and Reserve.

Modernization efforts will continue in the future as the Air Force strives to maximize its war fighting potential through a balanced increasingly modern force in both active and reserve components.

Question. What are some examples of Reserve units that have been designated as part of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force?

Answer. Examples of major units made available for planning by the RDJTF are the Air Force's 150th and 188th Tactical Fighter Groups.

While the Army has not currently designated reserve component combat forces for the RDJTF, numerous combat support and combat service support units are planned to sustain deployed RDJTF combat forces.

STATUS OF GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. How does the overall readiness of the Reserve and Guard units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and other early deploying units compare to the readiness of the rest of the Guard and Reserve units?

Answer. The readiness of Reserve and Guard units assigned to the RDJTF and other early deploying units, is overall equal to and in some cases higher than that of the rest of the Guard and Reserve units.

INTEGRATION OF ACTIVE AND RESERVE UNITS

Question. What management systems do the Services have to allocate resources to early deploying units, or are resources spread evenly among all Reserve units regardless of mission?

Answer. Following responses are provided relative to each of the Services:

Army

Distribution of equipment to Active Component and Reserve Component units is routinely accomplished through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). The DAMPL is based upon the DoD priority system of Force/Activity Designators (F/AD) I through V. Both Active and Reserve Component units are assigned to Force/Activity Designator groups, and sequenced within each group, based upon DoD criteria for each group—essentially the deployment/employment dates of the units based upon their assigned missions. Reserve Component units are assigned the same priority as Active units with similar missions.

This system routinely allocates more resources to earlier deploying/employing units and places overall Army shortages in later deploying or CONUS units where the most time and flexibility exists to correct them in the event of mobilization.

Since the relative importance of a given piece of equipment varies by unit and varying degrees of availability of items exist, out-of-priority sequence issues are frequently made to meet urgent or new requirements such as activations, new training base needs, special projects like the High Technology Test Bed, and minimum levels for training. For critically short items, these requirements, and needs of deployed and early deploying units are frequently only partially filled to allow spread of the limited resources to fill maximum units/projects at least to minimum levels.

Navy

The highest priority equipment requirements are designated for forces deployed in peacetime. Naval Reserve force deployment requirements are scenario driven and may result in these forces being deployed earlier than some non-deployed active forces. For example, some NRF mine sweepers may be required to clear ports to permit deployment of other forces. For this reason the mine sweepers are given high priority for modernization and replacement. In other cases, such as construction battalions and other advance base components, equipment is maintained in the War Reserve stock for issue to the earliest deploying forces whether active or reserve.

The management system utilized by the Marine Corps to allocate material resources to early deploying Reserve units is Weapon System/Equipment Support

Management (WS/ESM). This management system identifies the priority of issue sequence as follows:

- (1) Initial Issue Active Forces;
- (2) 60 Days Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (Mount Out) Active Forces;
- (3) Initial Issue Cadred Units;
- (4) Initial Issue Reserve Forces;
- (5) 60 Days Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel (Mount Out) Reserve Forces;
- (6) Operational Readiness Float (ORF) Active Forces;
- (7) Operational Readiness Float (ORF) Reserve Forces.

Air Force

Within the Department of the Air Force the Total Force Policy is applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing active USAF, Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) forces. To optimize Total Force Capabilities, the structure of Guard and Reserve units will be as similar as possible to comparable active USAF units. An integrated approach is used in equipping, supporting and exercising active and reserve units. To assure the proper composition of the total force, ANG and AFRES structure and programs are continually reviewed as an integral part of the HQ USAF Planning, Programming and Budgeting process. These reviews continue through the Air Staff Board Structure with full participation of representatives from the Guard and Reserve.

STATUS OF GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. How broad is Reserve component participation in joint exercises? What was the level of Reserve participation in BRIGHT STAR 82, for example?

Answer. We try to involve as many Reserve and Guard units as possible in our joint exercises. Naturally the type, size, and timing of the exercise along with available funding, determines the level of Reserve participation. In BRIGHT STAR 82, the Air National Guard's 252nd Combat Communications Group from Tacoma, Washington provided communications support for the exercise, Air Force Reserve aircrews flew many of the deploying and redeploying MAC missions, while approximately 33 percent of all air refueling was accomplished by Air Reserve Forces. Additionally, several Guard and Reserve units provided intra theater airlift for resupply missions and eleven Naval Reservists, primarily from the Pacific Command, participated.

Question. How extensive is Reserve Component participation in the annual Reforger exercise?

Answer. Two to three thousand members of the Army Reserve and National Guard have participated in each of the last three Reforger exercises. During Reforger 81, 2,025 of the 15,727 CONUS forces deploying to Europe were Army and National Guard Reservists. This represents approximately thirty Reserve Component units participating in each Reforger with no unit participating more than once every three years. Though basically an Army exercise, approximately 300 Force Reserve people participated. [Deleted] units and over [deleted] reservists are scheduled to deploy to Europe during Reforger 82. Navy and Marine forces normally do not participate in Reforger Exercises.

Question. General Peat, what recent improvements in the readiness of Reserve units lead you to conclude that we have "turned the corner" in improving Reserve component readiness?

Answer. The comment "turned the corner" referred to the more favorable budget actions in recent years. There have been substantial increases in personnel funding, particularly for Army Reserve components, and some increased funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M). These increases and, inter alia, the attention given the Guard and Reserve by hearings such as these, reflect the much needed added emphasis in this area, which if continued, should certainly foster a rise in the readiness level of the Guard and Reserve Forces.

Question. General Peat, for the record please provide the readiness indicators of the various Guard and Reserve units for the last five fiscal years.

Answer. In April 1980 the Readiness reporting system was changed from the FORSTAT system to the UNITREP system. The ratings in those two systems do not correlate. Additionally, the FORSTAT system ratings were not uniform between Services (one reason for system conversion), which further reduces their usefulness for comparison purposes. Consequently, the UNITREP figures for 1980 and 1981 are submitted on the attached charts.

READINESS SUMMARY OF SELECTED NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

[As of Oct. 1, 1980]

Unit type	End fiscal year 1981 program	Total number combat rated	Combat readiness ratings ¹				Reason not fully ready ²					
			C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	P	S	R	T	M/N	X
Strategic:												
Air Refueling Squadrons....	16	16										
Air Defense Squadrons....	10	8										
General purpose:												
Land:												
Army divisions.....	8	8										
Army brigades and regiments.....	28	28										
Marine divisions.....	1	1										
Naval:												
Destroyers.....	5	8	[Deleted.]									
Minesweepers.....	22	15										
Amphibious ships.....	6	1										
Air: ⁴												
Navy squadrons ⁴	41	43										
Marine squadrons ⁴	15	15										
Air Force squadrons ⁴	62	59										
Tactical airlift squadrons.....	36	33										
Asso. military airlift wings.....	6	6										

¹ Combat readiness ratings: C-1—Fully ready, C-2—Substantially ready, C-3—Marginally ready, and C-4 Not ready.

² Reasons not fully ready: P—Personnel, S—Equipment/supplies on hand, R—Equipment readiness, T—Training, M/N—Resource allocation by unified/specified commander (M) or cognizant service (N) does not permit a higher C-rating, and X—Commander's subjective judgment.

³ Does not include ships having activity codes for deactivating, conversion overhaul, or extended restricted availability.

⁴ Includes both fixed and rotary wing aircraft squadrons.

⁵ Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons include the following types: attack, fighter, reconnaissance, elec warfare, antisub, patrol, and tac support.

⁶ Air Force squadrons include: tac ftr, tac recon, tac air spt; opns and AS rsc/rcvy.

Note: Naval surface forces are C-4 when Reserve component not physically on board.

READINESS SUMMARY OF SELECTED NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

[As of Oct. 1, 1981]

Unit type	Total number rated	Current readiness ratings ¹					Reasons not fully ready ²					
		C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5	P	S	R	T	M/N	X
Strategic:												
Air refueling squadrons....	16											
Air defense squadrons....	7											
General purpose:												
Land:												
Army divisions.....	8											
Army brigades and regiments.....	29											
Marine divisions.....	1											
Naval:												
Destroyers.....	11	[Deleted.]										
Minesweepers.....	22											
Amphibious ships.....	2											
Air: ⁴												
Navy squadrons ⁴	44											
Marine squadrons ⁴	14											
Air Force squadrons ⁴	58											
Tactical airlift squadrons.....	34											
Associated military airlift wings.....	6											

¹ Combat readiness ratings: C-1—Fully ready, C-2—Substantially ready, C-3—Marginally ready, C-4—Not ready, and C-5—Service programmed not ready (reported for ships in overhaul, extended restricted availability, etc., and aircraft squadrons in conversion).

² Reasons not fully ready: P—Personnel, S—Equipment/supplies-on-hand, R—Equipment readiness, T—Training, M/N—Resource allocation by unified/specified commander (M) or cognizant service (N) does not permit a higher C-rating (N is reported with C-5, programmed not ready), and X—Commander's subjective judgment (X's used with C-1 ratings have been removed).

³ Includes both fixed and rotary wing aircraft squadrons.

⁴ Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons include the following types: attack, fighter, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, antisub, patrol, and tac support.

⁵ Air Force squadrons include: tac ftr, recon, and air spt; spec opns and AS rsc/rcvy.

Note: Naval surface forces are C-4 when Reserve component not physically on board.

Question. General Peat, you conclude your statement by saying that this country cannot go to war without the Reserves "as full and strong partners". Clearly, the Reserves are not "full and strong partners" right now. What efforts are the JCS taking to reverse this situation?

Answer. The JCS annually assess the Service programs in the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) and develop force level requirements in the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). In these documents, the JCS emphasize the total force concept, which demands a highly capable reserve component, and highlight the inadequacies in force structure, both active and reserve. While both active and reserve forces and projected capabilities are less than those required, the momentum generated by recent increased investment in the total force is encouraging and must be sustained.

The JCS, in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, plan the use of substantial Reserve forces in virtually all major contingency plans. This includes for example significant contribution of Reserve forces to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and the planned defense of our NATO allies.

Question. Within the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is there an office or division specifically concerned with Reserve problems?

Answer. There is no single designated office or division in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which is specifically concerned with Reserve problems. Reserve issues cover a wide gamut of problems which cross the lines of responsibility of several OJCS Directorates. There are nine Reserve Officers on active duty assigned to OJCS who provide Reserve representation in each Directorate.

Question. What role does the JCS play in the allocation of resources to the Reserve components during the Defense budget process?

Answer. JCS resource allocation activities throughout the entire Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) are based on the total force concept which includes all active and reserve components. A number of actions have been taken recently to enhance the role of the JCS in the development of the defense budget. Several of these involve the Defense Resources Board (DRB). This is the executive level group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, which oversees the entire process. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been made a permanent member of the DRB and participates in the periodic DRB deliberations which shape the defense budget. A change has also been made in the planning phase of PPBS which will contribute to enhancing the impact of joint Service priorities. The yearly submission of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) has been moved up 5 months. This JCS document provides strategy and force planning advice to the Secretary of Defense as an input to the planning process. Its earlier submission will allow the advice it contains to play a larger role in OSD development of the Defense Guidance. In addition to the changes enumerated above, the JCS will continue to issue their annual assessment of the Service Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) as a direct input to the programming and budgeting phase of the PPBS.

As previously noted, the JCS participation in resource allocation activities and the JCS advice on required force levels and capabilities is in the context of the total force, both active and reserve. Specific programming actions with respect to reserve forces are thus carried out within the framework of DRB decisions and JCS advice on total force requirements.

Senator HUMPHREY. The hearing is adjourned, subject to call.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

STATUS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVES

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREPAREDNESS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey.

Staff present: Michael B. Donley, David S. Lyles, and Anthony J. Principi, professional staff members; Richard D. Finn, research assistant; and Carol J. Rudolph, staff assistant.

Also present: George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Don Ingraham, assistant to Senator Quayle; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; and Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY, CHAIRMAN

Senator HUMPHREY. Good morning. We expect the hearing to remain open until approximately 11:30 a.m., at which time we will receive a classified summary of Reserve readiness.

The subcommittee has one outstanding business item which I will dispose of at this time.

Under Senate Rule 10, a majority vote is required for approval of all hearings held outside the District of Columbia. The chairman has proposed that the subcommittee approve a request for Reserve component hearings in the State of New Hampshire on or about January 20, 1982.

Without objection, I ask that members be polled and that the results be recorded by 5 p.m. this afternoon.

[The results of the poll of members follow:]

Senators Gordon J. Humphrey, Roger W. Jepsen, Carl Levin, and Henry M. Jackson voted yea and Senator Barry Goldwater voted no.

Senator HUMPHREY. We will now hear testimony from General Shoemaker, Major General Walker, and Major General Berkman, in that order.

General Shoemaker.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT M. SHOEMAKER, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to tell you I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss with you the status of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

This is a subject with which the U.S. Army Forces Command has been deeply concerned ever since the inception of the total forces concept more than 8 years ago. In fact, my headquarters was created in 1973 to give greater attention to the readiness of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in the total Army context.

The formal purpose of Forces Command is to prepare Army forces for mobilization and commitment in support of national policy.

I am pleased, therefore, to see that this subcommittee has scheduled these hearings on what we consider to be a critical matter, and I hope that the result will be a better appreciation of the role, status and needs of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve throughout the entire Congress.

TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

The Army is placing greater reliance on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in our overall military strategy than ever before. This is the result of the conscious decision of the Congress following the end of the war in Vietnam to reduce the size of the Active Army.

Hundreds of Active component units which would be required in wartime but are not needed on a day-to-day basis in peacetime were eliminated and their missions passed to Reserve component units. This restructuring of the Army resulted in what was labeled the total force concept, and it meant what the name implied.

In designing our force structure and assigning missions, the Army leadership looked at the total forces available—the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve and the Active forces. This has resulted in the National Guard and the Army Reserve assuming roles in the current Army strategy which are vastly different and far more important than what was the case 10 years ago. Many units will be performing wartime missions within hours and days of their callup. None will have the luxury of months of postmobilization preparations in the tradition of our historical experience.

No single component of the Army could fight a war on its own. Even the much-discussed Rapid Deployment Force-Army could not be deployed in any great numbers without the inclusion of selected Reserve component units to provide combat support and combat service support. We are vitally concerned, therefore, with the status of all those units.

STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Today there is great strength in the Army National Guard and the Reserve, but there are also shortcomings and needs. Together, they have over 600,000 soldiers; they have gained 74,000 members on their rolls in the past 2 years. The planning for their employment is much more integrated than it has ever been before in our history, and today every one of the several thousand Army National Guard and Reserve units has a specific wartime mission. They know who their boss will be. They know in what theater their principal contingency is, and they know what they have to do in peacetime to prepare for their wartime role.

In addition to these strengths, there are serious shortcomings and needs of these forces.

In the situation in the world today and the role that the Reserve components play in the total Army, the shortcomings are serious and need correction.

In my prepared statement I have tried to spell out in realistic terms how we have organized this total Army to go to war and how we are planning to mobilize the forces.

I have also given a concise report on the status of the Reserve components in the areas of personnel, equipment and training, and of the various ongoing programs which integrate Reserve component units into the total Army.

That statement points out that while we are making excellent progress in the personnel and training areas, the equipment situation is very serious. We will need your support in funding the programs necessary to modernize and fully equip the total Army.

[Prepared statement of General Shoemaker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. R. M. SHOEMAKER, COMMANDING GENERAL,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee on Preparedness, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the state of the Army Reserve Components. I will begin by setting the tone for my remarks. The leadership of the Army is unequivocally committed to the one Army, total force concept. We have to be. It is simply not a part of our national heritage to have, in peacetime, a standing Army large enough to answer the nation's military needs in today's uncertain world. More than that, however, an Active force of the size required would be prohibitively expensive—an inefficient use of scarce national resources.

The implementation of the total force concept is readily apparent in Army policies. Active divisions are under-structured, the missing forces coming from round-out, Reserve units which join their active sponsor commands upon mobilization. For example, four Army divisions have two active brigades with a third brigade in the Army National Guard. Other divisions are rounded out by Reserve Component battalions to full wartime strength.

Overall, the Reserve Components contain 53 percent of the combat forces, 55 percent of the combat support capability and 65 percent of combat service support capability of the total Army. The Reserve Components bear the brunt of the stateside post mobilization training mission; all of the Army's training divisions and brigades are USAR commands.

It is important to note that the necessity for Reserve Component units and the specific role of each unit flow from the national and Army contingency plans. These plans establish the wartime mission for each unit and provide the basis for detailed mobilization and deployment plans. Our most demanding contingency would be the full reinforcement of NATO, but there are other equally important, though somewhat smaller Army contingency force packages, which must be prepared to deploy to any part of the world where national interests require them. There are numerous Reserve Component units in the Army portion of the Rapid Deployment Force. Other Reserve Component units have primary contingency tasks in Northeast Asia, Alaska and in the Caribbean Basin. The management program which assigns the primary wartime mission to each unit of the force is called Capstone.

The Capstone program lists the date at which each unit must be ready to deploy, or to perform its wartime job in Conus (some units become part of the Conus base). Many RC units will be needed quickly. For example: 347 units, both Army Reserve and National Guard, would deploy in the first 30 days in a NATO contingency. Other units will be at work in the Conus infrastructure in the first week doing such jobs as operating sea ports, repairing equipment, moving ammunition, and expanding the training base to accept draftees. During full mobilization, essentially all the several thousand units of the Army Reserve Components will be mobilized in the first week. Some units will move to their wartime jobs directly from their home stations, the several thousand Armories and Reserve Centers scattered across America. However, most units will move to one of the more than 50 mobilization stations where they will be "topped-off"

with people and equipment and undergo final training before their deployment date. The principal early source of individual fillers for deploying units will be the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Many members of the Retired Reserve will also be called to augment the Conus operating and training base of the Army. A substantial quantity of equipment will also be required to bring all units of the Army to wartime levels as well as to meet the needs of the expanding training base and to provide replacement equipment to the overseas theaters of war.

The readiness condition of the Army Guard and USAR troop units, like Active Component units, is measured periodically by a Unit Status Report (USR). The USR is a snapshot of the unit's condition on the cut-off date measuring its status in personnel, equipment and training. USR data is very important to the Army for resource management purposes, but USR information by itself does not tell whether the Army as a force is ready. What we really need to know is what the condition of each unit will be at the time it is scheduled to be transported overseas. Calculating and managing "force readiness" is a very complex and tedious business. We need to know the status of the units after they have received their share of the IRR, and their share of equipment left behind by units which will deploy overseas to pick up prepositioned sets of equipment (POMCUS), and have undergone their final training.

In managing force readiness, first things must be done first. A unit's deployment date determines its readiness priority for resources. Units such as those in Germany which are deployed overseas in peacetime have top claim on resources. Next, we look to those units which must deploy from the United States very quickly with minimal preparatory time. Other units are provided resources in the general priority of their deployment sequence.

The first resource I will discuss is people. One of the top success stories of the Army in the past 2 years has been the rapid and substantial increase in the strength of the Reserve Component troop units. The table below compares their strength at the ends of fiscal years 1979, 1980, and 1981:

TROOP STRENGTH

	1979	1980	1981	2-yr gain
Army National Guard.....	346,974	369,492	390,659	43,685
U.S. Army Reserve.....	190,010	205,484	220,122	30,112
Total.....	536,984	574,976	610,781	73,797

Actually, in both fiscal year 1980 and 1981 the RC units end strength was substantially above the original program. We appreciate the help of the Congress and OSD in allowing us to reprogram resources which permitted us to exploit success. The sharp increase in troop strength results from success in recruiting and retention. Both are the marks of a healthy force. No one wants to join or stay in a bum outfit.

But even though RC units have achieved a dramatic increase in strength they are still about 76,000 short of the current peacetime goal and about 125,000 short of the full wartime levels of all units. In this fiscal year we expect to add another 50,000 soldiers to their rolls—this is about all our training base can accept and still continue an orderly and steady buildup.

Within OSD and Department of the Army considerable attention is being given to ways to buildup the IRR to required levels. From my perspective in the field, I believe this can be done best by:

Increasing the service commitment of volunteers into the active force from the current 6 years to 8 or more years. For example: If the total commitment were 8 years a soldier who leaves the Active force after an initial 3 years term of service would be committed to 5 years in the IRR or RC troop unit instead of the 3 years under current law.

Continuing incentives to attract soldiers who leave the service after completion of their initial military service obligation to join or remain in the IRR (if they do not go to RC troop units).

There are, of course, some soft spots in specific skill specialties in RC troop units. But overall the ability of the units to increase their strength is a big plus.

We should continue the programs which have been responsible for this success.

Unfortunately, the equipment posture of RC units and the prospects for achieving full wartime levels are not as bright as the personnel picture. The majority of the major units of the Army Guard and USAR report C4 (not ready) on their Unit Status Reports (USR). There are two principal reasons for this:

Much of the equipment now in POMCUS overseas has been "borrowed" from RC units—in some cases actually withdrawn and shipped to Europe, but usually moved to POMCUS instead of being issued to RC units.

The Army has not been permitted to procure sufficient equipment to fill its Authorized Acquisition Objectives (AAO).

If the Army equipment AAO were on hand it would theoretically be possible to top-off all RC units by redistributing equipment left behind by units which fall in on POMCUS. Unfortunately, the AAO is not complete. Even so, planning for the securing, inventorying, classifying, repairing, and distributing of POMCUS residual equipment is perhaps the toughest and most challenging job of my command in preparing for mobilization. We have been working intently on this task for over two years. Several thousand different kinds of equipment are involved with many more thousands of associated repair parts and special tools. Almost all RC units will need infusions of equipment upon mobilization (many Active units will also). Our planning for this massive redistribution will fill units in deployment sequence. Shortages will be pushed towards the rear of the line. Equipment for the training base must be provided to provide for balanced performance of all Army missions.

It is impossible for my command (and extremely difficult for DA staff officers) to calculate the bottom line shortfall of Army equipment. (It depends upon such variables as wartime loss rates, war reserve stockage levels, materiel furnished to allies, etc.). Suffice it to say that our mobilization planning and work on the equipment distribution problems have shown substantial shortfalls in such common items as armored carriers, trucks, radio sets, etc. Of course, the Congress is aware of the modernization aspect and that much of the equipment in RC units is not as capable as the new equipment being procured in the 1980's.

One reason I wanted to outline the complex redistribution problem causes by POMCUS and the AAO shortfall is so that it will be understood that the total Army is short equipment. It is not a phenomenon confined to RC units. We must resist the temptation to try to solve Army equipment problems by focusing solely on the peacetime equipment status of the Army Guard and the USAR. While the Army modernizes in the 1980's there will be continuous and massive migration as equipment moves from overseas to Conus and between the Army Guard, USAR and Active units in Conus. The management of this extraordinarily complex undertaking is a real challenge. Army planners must be free to manage Army assets in a one-Army context in the most intelligent way. The Congress can help most by continuing to support total Army equipment needs.

Turning to training I can tell you that units of the Army Guard and the USAR are training more effectively than at any time in their history. Evaluation reports during Annual Training as well as my own observations bear out that statement. There are a number of reasons: strength is up, NCO's are stronger, training support materiel is better, and all units have a specific wartime mission toward which to point and against which to measure their progress.

There are several specific programs which contribute to the integration of AC and RC units and numerous healthy mutual support activities among the components.

CAPSTONE

I have already outlined this program which assigns a wartime mission to all Army units. Capstone is our foundation planning tool. It makes possible sound mobilization planning and training partnerships to develop wartime team work.

TRAINING PARTNERSHIPS

Thousands of Guard, USAR, and Active Army units are linked in continuing partnerships for training. For example: RC divisions and combat brigades are linked permanently with an Active division or brigade. RC Roundout units have a special and very close linkage with their AC parents. And there is continuing activity in the various Capstone packages as units which will fight together arrange to train together.

DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

A particularly valuable program in which units that deploy overseas early are able periodically to perform annual training overseas with their wartime partners.

JOINT EXERCISES

There is substantial and growing RC unit participation in both Conus and overseas joint exercises. These are especially important to units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force as well as to early deployers.

Even though RC training is better than ever before, the early and integrated commitment of RC units demands that we do even more in the training and readiness fields. In the next few years the Army plans to increase the number of full time soldiers in Army Guard and USAR units. The purpose is to improve logistical and administrative readiness and to provide better training support so that the drilling Reservist leaders will be able to focus their attention on training and readiness for the wartime mission.

In summary, our personnel status is improving and we know the programs needed to achieve full manning in a few years. The most serious problem is the Army's equipment shortage. We will need the full support of the Congress to fund programs to modernize and to fully equip the Army to keep pace with the threat we face.

Both manning and equipment RC units receive attention in the Army Plan for the next 5 years. Projected personnel strength in the Reserve Components is programmed to equal 100 percent of wartime requirements by end of fiscal year 1987. Over the same period, selected reserve units will begin to receive updated equipment. However, many of the items going to the reserves will be equipment displaced from Active units by modernization items.

In conclusion, the capability of the Army to accomplish assigned missions is in large measure dependent on the Reserve Components. The capability and readiness of these members of the Army team is receiving more attention by the Army than at any peacetime period in the history of our country.

General SHOEMAKER. I believe now, Mr. Chairman, that General Walker is prepared with a statement on the Army National Guard, to be followed by General Berkman, if that is your pleasure.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. EMMETT H. WALKER, JR., USA,
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have submitted a written statement that I will ask be made a part of the record, and I have a brief oral statement that I would like to make.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine.

General WALKER. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you this morning to describe the readiness posture of the Army National Guard.

At the outset, I want to express our appreciation, the Guard's appreciation, for your continued interest in the status of the Army National Guard. I want to express our appreciation for what you have done for us in the past, and I am confident that you will support us in those actions necessary to insure a strong National Guard responsive to the defense of this Nation.

As General Shoemaker has pointed out, every National Guard Unit has a valid total Army mobilization wartime mission. The wartime structure strength and the peacetime authorized strength of the Army National Guard are projected to continue to rise. An increasing number of our units are designated as high priority because of the essential

combat and logistical support that they provide early on upon mobilization and deployment.

The Army National Guard must be ready to go to war. The readiness of individuals and units is required if we are to accomplish the mission of the total force. The Army National Guard can meet these readiness requirements if given sufficient, training opportunity and facilities, all of which, of course, as you know, require funding.

I am confident, Mr. Chairman, that the Army National Guard, given the required resources, can, as it always has, without a doubt, accomplish the peacetime and wartime missions.

Thank you, sir. This ends my statement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of General Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. EMMETT H. WALKER, JR., DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to describe the current readiness posture of the Army National Guard (ARNG). At the onset, I want to express our appreciation for your continuing interest in the status of the ARNG. I am confident that we will have your support in those actions necessary to ensure a strong ARNG, responsive to its role in the defense of our nation. Every ARNG unit has a valid Total Army mobilization mission. The wartime structure strength and peacetime authorized strength for the Selected Reserve are projected to rise. An increasing number of ARNG units are of high priority because of essential combat and logistical support needed early upon mobilization and deployment. The ARNG must be ready to go to war—today and tomorrow. Readiness of individuals and units is required for the mission accomplishment of the total force. ARNG units can meet readiness requirements given sufficient resources of personnel, equipment, training opportunities, and facilities—all of which require funding. The remainder of this statement will address the current status of the ARNG force and what we are doing to meet the demands of the present and to plan for the future.

On a unit basis, the ARNG provides 33 percent of the combat divisions, nearly 50 percent of the infantry, armor, and field artillery battalions, 57 percent of the armored cavalry regiments, and nearly 30 percent of the combat service support units in the Total Army. Further, the Army National Guard represents approximately 60 percent of the total strength of the Reserve Components. There is a continual review of missions and resources within the ARNG to ensure that these resources are organized in the most effective manner. This past year was characterized by organizational changes to selected elements of the ARNG force structure to meet Total Army requirements. I will highlight the most significant of these.

An additional armor brigade was activated in the Kentucky Army National Guard. This brigade was formed by a consolidation of existing combat and combat support elements, permitting the Army to add combat power at minimum cost and with minimal personnel turbulence. Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense (NBC) companies were added to the 50th Armored Division in New Jersey and the 49th Armored Division in Texas. A combat support aviation company was activated in Hawaii as part of the 29th Infantry Brigade as a roundout to the 25th Division. In addition, activations in the ARNG took place which increased the capability of the Total Army by a medical group headquarters and medical detachment, two ordnance battalion headquarters and eight ordnance companies or detachments, a signal battalion headquarters and two signal companies, six transportation companies and detachments, and four maintenance companies.

In fiscal year 1982, the ARNG will continue its structure modernization efforts consistent with Total Army requirements and resource availability. Significant force structure actions programed for fiscal year 1982 are the activation of an air traffic control headquarters, a medical battalion headquarters, and an ammunition battalion headquarters with three conventional ammunition companies. Military intelligence aerial surveillance organizations will be reorganized to form a combat electronic warfare intelligence aerial exploitation battalion.

Also programmed for activation in fiscal year 1982 are a supply and service battalion headquarters, a signal company, a medical clearing company, a military police company, and two engineer detachments, all in Guam.

Looking next at manning the force, the ARNG has made significant gains since fiscal year 1978 when assigned strength decline to a low of 344,000. Reversal of this downward trend occurred late in fiscal year 1979 and the upswing has continued into the 1980's. With support from the Congress and the nation, the wartime strength of 455,300 will be reached in fiscal year 1986. As of the end of fiscal year 1981, the ARNG is 88 percent of wartime required and 92 percent of peacetime authorized with a total assigned strength of 390,659. This includes 38,364 officers and warrant officers and 352,295 enlisted personnel. Strength is at the highest level since fiscal year 1976. Aggressive recruiting and retention programs, incentive programs, and flexible enlistment and training options, aided by the state of the economy and the world situation, all attributed to the improvements in manning levels. Central to these successes is the professional Full-Time Recruiting Force, although members of the Guard at every level contributed to the overall strength improvement. The enlistment incentives and improved enlistment options also aided in fiscal year 1981 recruiting. The split training option, for example, contributed significantly to the increase in accessions of high school seniors. Fiscal year 1982 should see the high school senior and graduate level rise to 65 percent of nonprior service accessions. Another area which has received special attention is that of physician accessions. Currently, the ARNG has 50 percent of its 1,235 authorized physicians. The activation in fiscal year 1982 of the 35-member medical recruiting force is expected to reduce this shortage. The ARNG is continuing to emphasize Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) in processing personnel. A total of 46,003 ARNG applicants were processed at AFEES during fiscal year 1981, as compared to 42,109 during fiscal year 1980.

The Full-Time Attrition and Retention Force was activated in fiscal year 1981 with the placement in the States of 79 personnel dedicated to retention. One-hundred seventy-nine additional retention personnel are scheduled to join units in fiscal year 1982. These personnel are tasked to reduce losses of individuals prior to expiration of term of service (ETS), the most serious retention problem facing the ARNG today. In fiscal year 1981, 74,186 individuals left the Guard; of these, 50,943 left prior to ETS.

To provide the materiel resources necessary to support the ARNG is a challenge even greater than that of manning the force. During fiscal year 1981, the status of ARNG equipment was slightly improved. In order to meet full wartime mobilization requirements, the ARNG needed an equipment inventory valued at \$11.8 billion. Equipment on hand is valued at \$8.1 billion, leaving a shortfall of \$3.7 billion from the wartime equipment requirement. In other terms, on hand assets meet 69 percent of the wartime requirement.

It is important to understand that these figures do not represent the cost of providing modern equipment. While most of the equipment on hand in the ARNG is deployable and supportable, some of it is old and significantly less capable than the equipment found in the Active Component. For example, some of the ARNG signal units are equipped with older generation communications equipment that will not fully interface with the newer Army systems. The only air defense capability for the eight ARNG divisions is the 30-year old 40mm "Duster," which has become progressively more difficult to maintain due to age and nonavailability of spare parts. Diagnostic test and maintenance equipment in ARNG maintenance units are designed to support older equipment and cannot accommodate new equipment such as the TOW and M1 tank. In addition to the old equipment in the ARNG inventory, many items are being carried as authorized substitutes, another area that adversely impacts upon training and would impact upon operational effectiveness in the event of mobilization. As an example, ¼ ton jeeps are being substituted for TOW antitank weapon system carriers.

Delays in filling unit equipment shortages and in modernizing assets on hand have severely restricted improvement of materiel readiness, and in some cases, adversely impacted on training effectiveness. This is most significant during joint Active/ARNG exercises where ARNG equipment is incompatible with Active Component equipment. This could have a direct impact on the ability of the ARNG to respond quickly to a national emergency. In the event of war, the ARNG would simply have to fight with the equipment it has on hand, irrespective of age or effectiveness. In addition, deployment of ARNG units with equipment

not compatible with that found in the gaining command would cause severe operational and support problems.

Logistics management procedures in the ARNG respond to these problems. ARNG equipment requirements are included in the Army Acquisition Objective. Issues from the supply system are made in accordance with established Total Army priorities, ensuring that both mobilization readiness and unit training programs are efficiently supported. Priority for issue of the most modern equipment goes to the highest priority, earliest deploying units. Although significant shortages exist, wherever possible, units are provided with sufficient equipment assets to conduct a meaningful training program, regardless of deployment schedules. Much of the heavy tracked equipment assigned to ARNG units is positioned at designated mobilization and training sites. This equipment is available for ARNG use during inactive duty training and annual training at those locations. Many Active Component and other Reserve Component units are also supported by ARNG equipment during various training exercises. The concept of positioning unit equipment at designated mobilization and training sites is cost effective and supports both training and mobilization requirements.

The ARNG is modernizing its logistics management capability on a limited basis, with the eight ARNG divisions, 15 separate combat brigades, and three roundout brigades, currently operating the Division Logistics System (DLOGS). This automated system uses UNIVAC 1005 equipment which is antiquated and difficult to maintain. The UNIVAC 1005 could probably not be supported in the deployed environment. Extension of the DLOGS to the four remaining brigades has been deferred indefinitely due to the lack of computer hardware. Looking toward modernization, one nondivisional direct support unit has received the new Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS3). This system automates routine supply management and provides constant inventory visibility. These systems will be extended to an additional 48 ARNG Direct Support/General Support (DS/GS) units during fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983. Replacement of the DLOGS UNIVAC 1005 with the DAS3 system is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1987.

Operational readiness rates for most equipment are comparable to those of the Active Army. However, the increasing shortfalls in stock funded repair parts have forced a reduced stockage of repair parts under control of the United States Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO), resulting in increased time from order to shipment, and a reduced capability to support mobilization.

Aviation support deserves special mention. The ARNG Aviation Logistics Program has proved its effectiveness by exceeding the Department of the Army operational readiness rate for the past 6 years. This is especially significant when consideration is given to the varied aircraft systems supported by the ARNG maintenance program. At present, the Army National Guard is authorized a total of 2,735 aircraft, including a 10 percent operational readiness float. The bulk of the fleet is comprised of utility, observation, and attack aircraft. Of the 2,578 aircraft on hand, only 1,814 are first-time aircraft comparable to those found in the Active Component. For example, of the 409 attack helicopters authorized, only 25 are the fully modernized AH-1S TOW Cobras. The remaining attack aircraft are older aircraft possessing limited mission capability.

The aviation fleet age and mix have improved somewhat since the beginning of fiscal year 1981 when the ARNG had six AH-1S attack helicopters on hand. During fiscal year 1981, 7 AH-1S modified "TOW Cobra" attack helicopters were transferred from the Active Component into the ARNG aircraft inventory. In addition, 12 newly produced, fully modernized AH-1S aircraft were received directly from the factory. These 12 aircraft were the first new AH-1S aircraft to be produced for, and issued to, the ARNG. During fiscal year 1982, 10 additional AH-1S aircraft are to be received. The following year an additional 17 aircraft are scheduled to be transferred from the Active Component. Receipt of these aircraft will provide eight of the ARNG attack helicopter companies with the resources necessary to accomplish mission-related training. However, many other units will not have the AH-1S system and must continue to train with nondeployable aircraft. An additional problem faced by the ARNG is the introduction of new aircraft into the Active Component without introduction of the same equipment into the ARNG. A limited number of new aircraft are required to train high priority maintenance units to ensure that they can support the AC in the event of mobilization.

There are several other key logistics issues I want to describe before leaving this subject. Despite a significant funding increase in fiscal year 1982, the orga-

nizational clothing and equipment program continues as a major problem area. Procurement from the Army stock fund is the single source for specific unit support items such as chemical defense equipment, medical field sets, tool and test sets, fire direction sets, winter clothing, and camouflage screens. The adequacy of stock fund support is critical to unit mobilization and deployment readiness. At the current programmed rate of support, the ARNG clothing and equipment shortages, which totaled over \$518 million in fiscal year 1981, will not be filled until fiscal year 1987. Problems in this area are compounded by budget constraint, rapid cost growth, and increased sophistication in authorized items of equipment. Of special concern is chemical defense equipment. The shortages in chemical defense equipment have impact on both training and mobilization readiness. At present about 10 percent of our total requirement of \$102 million in chemical defense equipment is on hand or on requisition. The availability of this equipment will improve gradually in the fiscal year 1983 to fiscal year 1988 timeframe, with priority of issue to early deploying units.

As a participant in the Army's Force Modernization program, 34 items or weapons systems are planned for introduction into the ARNG during fiscal year 1984 through fiscal year 1988. The number of systems programmed for introduction into the ARNG has doubled since last year. They range from the M1 tank to personal armor systems for ground troops. Growth in the ARNG force modernization program can be expected to continue with a gradual modernization of many items in the equipment inventory.

The final issue is the shortage of full-time technicians. The shortage impacts on the ability of the ARNG to meet its readiness goals. At present, we have 80 percent of our required 35,321 technicians, with maintenance technicians the critical shortfall. Repeated reductions in civilian end strength is the primary cause of the absence of these essential personnel.

With the organizations, manning, and material resources described previously, training rounds out the readiness picture. The core of the ARNG training program is the training assembly. Each member of the Guard is scheduled for 48 training assemblies. In addition to these assemblies are a number of innovative, highly productive training programs; I will highlight the most significant of these.

The Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Partnership Program, which includes all ARNG divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments was implemented in 1980 to solidify the mutual support relationship already established. The Partnership Program is a year-round effort whereby AC units provide training support, evaluation, and assistance to their designated ARNG partner units. Another program is Affiliation Training which continues to be an outstanding vehicle for improving the readiness of selected ARNG units through dedicated support by AC units. This program is composed of three elements. The first is Roundout, wherein ARNG units are designated to raise AC divisions short units to desired structure. The ARNG has four brigades and six battalions designated as round out affiliates. The second program, Augmentation, identifies ARNG units which will increase the combat power of AC divisions or brigades that have a standard configuration. The ARNG has five brigades designated as augmentation affiliates. The last program is Mobilization and Deployment Capability Improvement (MDCI). In this program, ARNG units that require dedicated AC assistance to meet mobilization or deployment schedules are affiliated to improve their readiness condition. ARNG units in this category do not deploy with the AC sponsors. The ARNG presently has 39 battalions and 71 company-size units designated as MDCI affiliates. During the past year, this program has been expanded with the addition of eight ARNG battalions and 55 company/detachment size units. These units were selected because they are scheduled for early deployment in the event of mobilization.

Department of the Army has developed procedures which officially establish a direct link between all Army units and their wartime chain of command. This initiative, the Army Capstone program, is designed of a force structure designed to meet a particular contingency mission. Under Capstone, the wartime chain of command, probable wartime mission, and probable area of deployment are designated for each unit. Training readiness improvements are being implemented which are designated to build on Capstone. For example, in 1982, 108 ARNG units will participate in approximately 2 weeks of intensive training with overseas commands. This realistic deployment training is the most effective way to fully expose Guard units to their NATO mission during a 2-week

training period. This type of training follows the total Army policy of providing Guard soldiers realistic, mission-oriented training, performed in the geographic area of probable employment with AC units. Further, the success attained by ARNG units in responding to mission requirements, immediately upon arrival in an overseas area, is a vivid example to the AC gaining commands and NATO allies of the operational effectiveness of ARNG units. This program provides opportunities for exercising assembly, movement/deployment, employment, maneuver capabilities, plus providing for exercise of command and control procedures. This is the total Army in action. In coordination with the AC, we have developed a 5-year schedule for participation of ARNG units in overseas deployment training.

ARNG participation in Joint Training Exercises (JTX) continues to provide units with training opportunities that are not normally available in a unit training environment. ARNG combat, combat support, and combat service support units are tasked to perform realistic missions alongside their active counterparts in a joint service environment that challenges them to produce under realistic and stressful conditions. During fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981, the ARNG deployed a complete battalion to Europe, where they drew POMCUS stocks and participated in JTX REFORGER. The success of this exercise proved the capability of the ARNG to respond to its deployment mission direct from home station. In coordination with AC, ARNG has developed a 5-year exercise schedule for participation of major ARNG units in the JCS joint exercise program.

The activities I have described supplement the local training of individual soldiers, leaders, staffs, and units. Increased use of local training sites will take full advantage of training devices and techniques such as scaled mini-ranges. Travel time reductions plus improved performance oriented training should provide enhanced readiness and improve retention and recruiting. Where local training is not possible or cost effective, travel funds are necessary to move these units to appropriate training sites. An on-going Training Site Requirements Study (TSRS) is being conducted to determine the types of facilities necessary for expanded use of training sites. The ARNG is working with other Army agencies in an effort to ensure that facilities constructed at ARNG training sites are in concert with the multi-use concept.

Before leaving the subject of training, I want to describe our nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training objectives and the key personnel upgrade program. Improved NBC defense training was a specific goal during fiscal year 1981. Action was taken early in fiscal year 1981 to accelerate fill of unit level NBC positions, resulting in 85 percent, officer and enlisted averaged, of the chemical specialist positions filled at the end of fiscal year 1981. Concurrent with supporting chemical defense training, there is a requirement to provide contingency chemical defense equipment (CDE) for high priority units. The ARNG goal is to provide contingency items by fiscal year 1983 for all early deploying units and to all personnel by fiscal year 1985. The key personnel upgrade program called Keep Up (KPUP), provides the opportunity for selected ARNG officers and NCOs to train with an AC counterpart for the purpose of improving the individual's military skills and the training readiness of their units. This program was initiated this past fiscal year with 200 personnel participating. An additional 500 personnel will be scheduled for this training in fiscal year 1982. Our objective is to have approximately 2,000 personnel training under this program.

Related to training and overall unit readiness is mobilization preparedness. It is our responsibility to produce effectively manned, trained, and equipped units prepared for mobilization. ARNG units now assigned POMCUS and are included in the Rapid Deployment Force and are being considered for direct deployment. This is in addition to our providing numerous essential forces to support the major war plans of the Army. This continued and increased reliance on the ARNG has underscored the need to streamline the mobilization process, increase mobilization awareness and improve response capabilities.

To meet these challenges, the ARNG has actively participated in the development of new mobilization planning guidance and is in the process of reorganizing the State Area Commands (STARC) for more effective execution of both pre- and post-mobilization missions. Various exercises have been conducted or are scheduled to evaluate mobilization readiness. One such exercise is the Readiness for Mobilization Evaluation (REMOBE). REMOBE is conducted by the STARC for selected high priority units in each State. Major objectives of the exercise are unit

capability, mobilization planning, readiness condition, and impact of readiness improvements. During fiscal year 1981, 22 ARNG units participated in these exercises and additional participation is planned for fiscal year 1982. A second exercise is the Mobilization Deployment Exercise (MODEX), also conducted by the STARC. It is designed to enhance the overseas deployment training program. Selected ARNG units deploying overseas complete a mobilization capability evaluation and certification for deployment prior to departure. During fiscal year 1981, 12 ARNG units tested this program for feasibility and impact. The results were overwhelmingly positive and all units scheduled for overseas deployments during fiscal year 1982 will be encouraged to conduct a MODEX. Further, the JCS biennial mobilization exercise (MOBEX) is in the initial planning stages. The primary thrust of this exercise for the ARNG is expanded participation of the STARC, unit participation at the mobilization stations and an evaluation of mobilization plans and execution capability.

I have provided an overview of the readiness posture of the ARNG. We have come a long way in a short period toward reaching our wartime goals. There is still much to be done and I again solicit your support in continuing this momentum. I thank you for the opportunity to make this presentation and welcome your questions.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM R. BERKMAN, USAR, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General BERKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am Bill Berkman, Chief of the Army Reserve. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and the attention this committee is providing us on very important matters affecting the total Army and the Army Reserve and the Army Reserve components.

I have prepared a statement that I would also like to submit for the record, and I have a brief presentation to make, if I may.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

General BERKMAN. As I indicated, I welcome this opportunity to provide information on the Army Reserve. The mission of the Army Reserve is twofold, to provide units capable of performing wartime missions, plus additional pretrained individuals to be available as fillers, replacements and a cadre for new units.

The Army Reserve consists of over 437,000 men and women, with 221,000 in the troop program units, about 7,000 individual mobilization augmentees, and the balance in the Individual Ready Reserve—all essential parts of the total Army.

The Army Reserve troop program units contributed approximately 14 percent of the Army's nondivisional combat and special theater force structure, 33 percent of the tactical support increment of the total Army, and 25 percent of the general support increment of the total Army.

The Army Reserve unit structure is not a mirror image of the Active component or the Army National Guard. On the contrary, Army Reserve units complement and support the other components of the total Army. Consequently, as you have heard, there are many early-deploying units in the Army Reserve.

Army Reserve units are included in the high priority Army assets scheduled for NATO and Korea. The Army Reserve contributes a significant number of units as part of the Army's portion of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. One-half of the deployable Army Reserve units would be committed within 30 days of mobilization; another 37 percent would deploy between 30 and 60 days after mobiliza-

tion; and by M plus 90 almost all of the Army Reserve deployable units would be deployed.

Unit readiness is an amalgam of personnel, equipment and training. Even though Army Reserve troop program unit strength has increased dramatically since 1978, the Army Reserve is still more than 50,000 short of its mobilization and force structure goal for the troop program units; however, we are programming to substantially attain this goal by fiscal year 1987.

The Army Reserve troop program unit strength gains since 1978—and, incidentally, the end strength of the troop program units in 1978 was 186,000—currently that end strength exceeds 221,000. That dramatic increase is attributable to improved retention in the units as well as the attainment of recruiting objectives.

The Selected Reserve incentive program which Congress approved for implementation in fiscal year 1979 has been important to Army Reserve recruiting and retention.

A program with exceptional potential to improve unit readiness is the fulltime manning program. Under this program, fulltime unit personnel will serve on active duty with Army Reserve units, performing training, maintenance and logistical and administrative duties.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

In addition to the personnel assigned to the troop program unit of the Army Reserve, a second critical category of personnel is the Individual Ready Reserve. This pretrained manpower source is essential to mobilization plans.

Past attempts to increase IRR strength, Individual Ready Reserve strength, have been marginally effective. Additional initiatives are contemplated, such as enhanced reenlistment bonuses, direct enlistment into the IRR, 2-year extension of the present 6-year military obligation—all intended to reduce the Individual Ready Reserve manpower shortage.

Equipment shortages are a major inhibitor of Army Reserve unit readiness. As of June 1981, the Army Reserve had, on hand, approximately 40 percent of its wartime required equipment assets and approximately 65 percent of its peacetime equipment assets. These figures were computed on a dollar value basis.

The wartime equipment shortages for the Army Reserve approximate \$4.3 billion, and peacetime reportable equipment shortages total approximately \$1.4 billion.

Some steps are being taken with respect to the equipment shortages. For example, the fiscal year 1982 budget does provide increases for specialized clothing and chemical protective equipment and for major end items for those units that have been identified as the Army's part of the Rapid Deployment Force. This represents progress, but it still is not sufficient to satisfy all of the readiness requirements.

Training, both individual and collective, is an essential element of full mobilization readiness. A major inhibitor of training readiness is a lack of funds to provide annually, appropriate active-duty training for members not only of the Army Reserve units but also members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

The equipment shortages constitute an inhibitor of the required training as well.

In summary, the Army Reserve has made notable improvements in strength of troop program units. Equipment shortages are receiving attention; however, many Army Reserve units are still inhibited in achieving their full capabilities and readiness requirements because of shortages in personnel, equipment and training.

The Army Reserve is an essential element of the total Army. Units and personnel of the Army Reserve must be ready to perform their mission.

Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of General Berkman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM R. BERKMAN, CHIEF,
ARMY RESERVE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to provide information on the status of the Army Reserve. The mission of the Army Reserve is to provide units capable of performing wartime missions and in addition pre-trained individuals to be assigned as fillers, replacements and cadre for new units. The Army Reserve consists currently of more than 437,000 men and women with 221,200 in troop program units, 7,216 Individual Mobilization Augmentees and the balance in the Individual Ready Reserve—all essential parts of the Total Army.

The Army Reserve troop program units presently represent 14 percent of the Army's non-divisional combat structure and Special Theater forces, 33 percent of the tactical support, and 25 percent of the general support forces.

FIGURE 1

ARMY RESERVE TROOP PROGRAM UNIT CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL ARMY WARTIME UNIT STRUCTURE



Examples of the Army Reserve contribution to the Total Army are 100 percent of the training divisions and brigades, 86 percent of the Army's petroleum supply companies, 97 percent of civil affairs units, 54 percent of conventional ammunition companies, and 50 percent of Army medical units. The Army Reserve is a principal source of psychological operations resources and contains a significant portion of the Army's logistic-over-the-shore (LOTS) capability. Other examples of the contribution of the Army Reserve units to Army's fiscal year 1981 structure are indicated in figure 2.

FIGURE 2.—Examples of U.S. Army Reserve units as a percent of the total Army unit structure¹

Type unit:	Percent
Training division.....	100
Training brigades.....	100
Civil affairs.....	97
Light equipment maintenance companies.....	68
Field Service companies.....	62
Army Security Agency.....	56
Conventional ammunition companies.....	54
Medical ²	44
Supply and service companies.....	39
Special Forces.....	33
Pathfinder.....	30
Truck companies.....	30
Combat engineer battalions.....	24
Heavy equipment maintenance companies.....	15
Aviation.....	13
Separate brigades.....	10
Field artillery battalions.....	9
Infantry battalions ²	7
Mechanized infantry battalions ²	2
Tank battalions.....	2

¹ Current structure as of Jan. 2, 1981.

² Includes organic and separate elements.

Army Reserve units are included in the high priority Army assets for NATO and Korea. In addition, the Army Reserve contributes units as part of the Army's portion of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. They include Quartermaster, Transportation, Medical and Ordnance units. Nearly all of these units have a NATO or Korean mission in addition to being identified for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Type units in the Army Reserve are shown in figure 3.

FIGURE 3

TYPE US ARMY RESERVE UNITS

DIVISIONAL FORCE INCREMENT	TACTICAL SUPPORT INCREMENT		GENERAL SUPPORT INCREMENT
INFANTRY BATTALION	WELL DRILLING	MEDICAL	TRAINING DIVISIONS
TANK BATTALION	WATER SUPPLY	AMMUNITION	TRAINING BRIGADES
ENGINEER BRIDGE COMPANY	TRANSPORTATION	CHEMICAL	GARRISONS
	CIVIL AFFAIRS	SIGNAL	HOSPITALS
	QUARTERMASTER	ENGINEER	RAILWAY
	PSYCHOLOGICAL	FINANCE	RECEPTION STATIONS
	OPERATIONS	AVIATION	TRANSPORTATION
NON-DIVISIONAL COMBAT AND SPECIAL THEATER FORCE INCREMENT	MAINTENANCE	AMBULANCE	COMMANDS
	FIREFIGHTING	MILITARY	SCHOOLS
	JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL	POLICE	CIVIL PREPAREDNESS
	GRAVES	PETROLEUM	SUPPORT
	REGISTRATION	SUPPLY	DETACHMENTS
SPECIAL FORCES	PORT CONSTRUCTION	INTELLIGENCE	MANEUVER AREA
PATHFINDER			COMMANDS
ARTILLERY			MANEUVER TRAINING
ENGINEER			COMMANDS
AVIATION			

The Army Reserve unit structure is not a mirror image of the Active Component. On the contrary, the deploying Army Reserve units are important to the Active Component structure they support. Consequently, there are early deploying units in the Army Reserve. One-half of the deployable Army Reserve units will be committed within 30 days of mobilization. Some of these units have deployment dates so early that they must deploy direct from their home stations instead of reporting first to a mobilization station. Thirty-seven percent of Army Reserve units will deploy between 30 and 60 days after mobilization, and practically all will be deployed within 90 days of mobilization.

Unit readiness is an amalgam of personnel, equipment and training. Even though the Army Reserve has increased dramatically in strength since late 1978, the USAR is still short of its mobilization force structure goal by more than 50,000 as we begin this fiscal year. However, we are programing to substantially attain that goal by fiscal year 1987.

Equipment shortages are a major inhibitor of unit readiness in the Army Reserve. Critical items such as aircraft, landing craft vehicles or major support end-items will require time to be produced. The same is true for repair parts.

Modernization is also linked directly with equipment shortages and preparedness. Historically, as a matter of policy, the Army's Reserve Components have been equipped with the older equipment made available when more modern equipment is provided to the Active Component. Often the less modern equipment in the Reserve Components is accompanied by a shortage of support equipment and repair parts.

The consequences of this situation may be incompatibility of equipment between the components as well as cost increases and complexity of maintenance and other logistics considerations. Because the Army Reserve frequently has older equipment, Reserve personnel may not receive regular training on the equipment which predominates in the Active Army inventory. As a result, our combat service support personnel may not be fully prepared to repair and service the equipment found now in Active Component units and in future modernization programs.

Steps have been taken to overcome both equipment shortages and modernization challenges. The fiscal year 1982 budget calls for 550 new trucks and forklifts for the Army Reserve, and another 850 vehicles are planned for the fiscal year 1983 budget. In 1982, we expect to procure computer systems for the Decentralized Army Service Support System, which will provide Automated Data Processing capability to Army Reserve combat service units. Minor amounts of other equipment will be procured in fiscal year 1982, in addition to significant steps to provide specialized clothing and chemical protective equipment for those Army Reserve units identified for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. These represent progress, but it is not enough.

The Army Reserve has made notable improvements in strength. However, achievement of the full capabilities of many Army Reserve units is inhibited by shortages in personnel, equipment and in training. I will address each of these areas separately and their impact on the mobilization readiness of the Army Reserve. I will also attempt to answer some specific questions which have been raised by this committee.

PERSONNEL

Commencing in fiscal year 1979, the Army Reserve troop program units began a recovery from a precipitous strength decline in earlier years. Strength gains over fiscal years 1979, 1980 and 1981 were in excess of 4,200, 12,600 and 17,400, respectively. This significant turnaround can in large part be attributed to improved retention in units, as well as meeting recruiting objectives. The Selected Reserve Incentives Program, which Congress approved for implementation in fiscal year 1979, was important to Army Reserve recruiting. Attainment of the programmed strength increases to meet the unit wartime personnel requirements by fiscal year 1987 is dependent upon continued Congressional support of the recruiting and retention incentives of the Selected Reserve Incentives Program. Table I presents the Army Reserve unit strength accomplishments, programs and wartime requirements:

TABLE I.—SELECTED RESERVE UNIT (USAR) STRENGTHS

	[In thousands, fiscal years ¹]			
	1981	1983	1985	1987
Wartime requirements ¹	295.2	287.4	295.0	303.0
Actual ²	220.1			
Program		251.7	277.7	300.9
Shortage	-75.1	-35.7	-17.3	

¹ Wartime requirements from November TAA-87.

² Includes training pipeline.

The Selected Reserve Incentives Program is important to improving the quality of the non-prior service accessions. Table II depicts the Army Reserve unit accessions by mental category IV and non-high school graduates over the last 3 years.

TABLE II.—SELECTED RESERVE UNIT ACCESSIONS, MENTAL CATEGORY IV/NONHIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
[Fiscal years]

	1979	Percent ¹	1980	Percent ¹	1981	Percent
Nonprior service mental category IV:						
(Male).....	3,388	15.8	3,283	12.7	4,913	22.2
(Female).....	0		1,013	3.9	2,518	25.8
Prior service mental category IV.....	2,609	7.9	2,439	7.2	3,162	9.1
Nonprior service nonhigh school graduate:						
(Male).....	11,376	53.2	9,163	35.3	9,952	45.0
(Female).....	0		2,777	10.7	2,347	24.0
Prior service nonhigh school graduate.....	3,949	11.9	4,239	12.6	4,136	11.9

¹ Renorming of fiscal year 1979 and 1980 would reflect much higher percentages, so that there would be little or no increase in fiscal year 1981.

Improvements in the mental category and high school graduates categories of non-prior accessions will be monitored closely.

A program with exceptional potential to improve readiness in units is the full-time manning program. These additional full-time unit personnel will be on active duty with units in training, maintenance, logistics and administration. Consequently approval for additional full-time personnel has been requested as the units strength increases toward meeting the wartime requirements in fiscal year 1987.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL

In September 1978 The Surgeon General was assigned the mission of recruiting for Army Reserve Medical Department (AMEDD) officers, less the Army Nurse Corps, which is the responsibility of the US Army Recruiting Command. The Reserve Component health professions officer shortages were primarily in the Medical Corps. Due to the severity and the immediacy of the problem, emphasis was placed on the recruitment of physicians. During fiscal year 1981, The Surgeon General's Reserve Forces, entire recruiting operations network became operational with 45 recruiters in the field. During the fiscal year, 593 applications were submitted and 579 applications forwarded. A total of 656 appointments occurred during fiscal year 1981. Of this total, 90.5 percent were assigned to troop program units and 9.5 percent were assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve. End of fiscal year 1981 the Army Reserve Medical Corps unit strength totaled 1,054—a 31.5 percent of requirements and an increase of 4.1 percent over the previous fiscal year. During fiscal year 1981 approximately 1,050 Army Nurse Corps accessions were recruited. End of fiscal year 1981, the Army Reserve Nurse Corps unit strength totaled 3,610—a 63.4 percent of requirements and a 6.6 percent increase over the previous fiscal year. Medical enlisted strength assigned to troop program units increased to 22,905. The figure represents 76.6 percent of requirements and a growth of 7.1 percent over the previous fiscal year.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

In addition to the personnel assigned to Army Reserve units, a second critical category of personnel is the Individual Ready Reserve. This pretrained manpower source is critical to mobilization plans. Attempts in the past to increase the end strengths in this area have been marginally effective. An enhanced Individual Ready Reserve reenlistment bonus, direct enlistment in the Individual Ready Reserve, and an extended military service obligation from the present six years to eight years are expected to reduce the Individual Ready Reserve manpower shortages.

EQUIPMENT

As of June 1981, the Army Reserve had on hand approximately 40 percent of the dollar value of wartime equipment assets and approximately 65 percent of the dollar value of peacetime equipment assets on hand. The dollar value of wartime equipment shortages total approximately \$4.3 billion dollars, which covers the cost of the latest TOE reportable equipment except for tanks (M60 tank costs were used in lieu of M1 tank costs). Peacetime reportable equipment shortages

total \$1.4 billion. Some significant examples of equipment shortages in the Army Reserve and dollar amounts are contained in Table III.

TABLE III.—USAR SELECTED EQUIPMENT STATUS

[Dollar amounts in thousands of dollars]

Item	Short	Cost to cover shortage
Aircraft:		
A. U-21A.....	24	1 \$8,372.3
B. CH-47C ¹	48	200,854.9
C. UH-60A.....	141	321,790.2
Tactical ADPE:		
A. DAS3 ²	119	86,541.0
D. DLED ³	671	43,615.0
Tanks	1,233	1,167,611.5
Trucks:		
A. 1/4 ton.....	1,803	18,778.0
B. 1 1/4 ton.....	1,293	8,795.1
C. 5 ton.....	2,183	105,844.5
D. 22 1/2 ton.....	175	24,473.2
Artillery	229	45,944.7
Carriers	1,678	164,837.3
Total		2,197,457.7

¹ Cost of U-21A, which is no longer in production. Replacement cost will be higher.

² 49 CH-47A models on hand to be replaced.

³ Decentralized automated service support system.

⁴ Division level data entry device.

⁵ Cost of M-60A3 tanks. If M-1 tank costs were used, the cost to cover shortage is \$2,932,000,000.

TRAINING

Training, both collective and individual, is an essential ingredient to achieve full mobilization readiness. Major inhibitors to achieving optimum training readiness are insufficient funds to place Reserve Component members on duty for training for both selected Reserve units and IRR members. Another inhibitor is the lack of proper equipment in sufficient amounts to train on during peacetime. Provision of adequate resources in these areas to the Reserve Components not only will enhance training readiness but will also result in improved retention. Meaningful, stimulating and challenging training is critical to overall mobilization preparedness.

Time is a critical resource in Army Reserve training since we train once a month and two weeks during the summer. Critical training time is often lost because equipment must be shared by two or more units. More training devices and simulators are needed to offset ammunition, fuel and travel constraints and to increase the efficiency of available training space and ranges. The travel restrictions imposed in fiscal year 1980 are illustrative. The constraints had a direct and adverse impact on training and readiness. Last minute changes due to restrictions impacted adversely on both inactive duty training and annual training. Over 150 units (10,000 personnel) scheduled to conduct realistic hands-on training at selected sites during annual training were prevented from doing so because of travel restrictions.

New Equipment Training must continue to be accelerated for the Reserve Components, particularly for RC Maintenance Units. Currently, in the area of the new M-1 ABRAMS Tank, the USAR does not have these tanks or training devices in sufficient quantities to train in peacetime. Yet upon mobilization, they will be required to maintain such. The combat sustainment capability on the Army is already sorely impaired.

The training of individuals in the Active Army service schools must continue to be refined to insure that essential subjects are presented to Reserve Component soldiers.

Manpower authorizations for the Army school system must be maintained at adequate levels to insure a continuous update of instruction. Currency of course materials is particularly critical to the Reserve Component soldier since many new accessions have not had extended periods of active duty. The magnitude of the shortfall of pretrained manpower is demonstrated by the declining strength of the Individual Ready Reserve, which will provide replacements for

Active Component and Reserve Component units. There is a continuing need to insure that members of the Individual Ready Reserve receive structured program of instruction and provide reinforcement training. Current levels of funding prevent training of all Individual Ready Reserve members.

MOBILIZATION READINESS

The capability for rapid and efficient mobilization of the Reserve Components is an important aspect of the Total Army. MOBEX 80, the most recent in a series of mobilization exercises, tested mobilization procedures and identified areas and issues for further review to enhance mobilization capabilities.

The Mobilization Personnel System (MOBPERS) was tested in MOBEX 80. MOBPERS is a system that prepositions information at mobilization stations during peacetime. The data are used to determine the personnel status of Army Reserve units scheduled to mobilize at each station. MOBPERS also maintains current requirements for each unit to bring it to wartime strength by individual skill and grade and identities unit and individual Ready Reserves skills that will be available at the station upon mobilization. Development of a standard automated personnel system for the Army Reserve (SIDPERS-Army Reserve) and several support information systems are also underway. These systems will serve peacetime needs as well as provide required capacity to handle the massive data surge that will occur upon mobilization.

Mobilization planning responsibility and decentralized mobilization management have been assigned to the nine Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR's).

Increased manpower for mobilization planning is being accomplished through establishment of positions throughout the Army in which members of the Army Reserve will serve.

A Mobilization and Plans Office has been established at Office of the Chief, Army Reserve to help integrate the increased mobilization planning and activities at all levels.

The timely and effective mobilization of the Army Reserve demands increased automated information systems and modern automated data processing equipment in the hands of Army Reserve units. Although 106 Army Reserve units are authorized some type of automatic data processing equipment, only five units have computers for their use. In fiscal year 1982 it is planned that Army Reserve will start receiving the Decentralized Automated Service Support System (DAS³) equipment as part of the Army's effort to provide modern tactical ADPE support system to both Active and Reserve Components. The U.S. Army Forces Command is also developing a comprehensive management information system concept which will support mobilization planning and execution for Army Reserve units. (\$2.3 million of the fiscal year 1982 Operation & Maintenance, Army Reserve budget request supports ADP improvement.)

STRUCTURE AND EXPANSION

The Army Reserve has never been more important to our country than it is today. The reliability of the Reserve as a responsive, capable, and ready force able to meet its deployment and employment mission has become a critical issue with increasing responsibility on the Army Reserve to be a vital element of the "total force".

Along with the increased reliance on the Army Reserve to support the total force comes required additions and alterations to the Reserve force structure. For example, the budget supports activation of two combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalions, each of which will support one National Guard division. These units have a full-range capability to include deception, jamming, photo and electronic signal analysis, as well as other activities. Three more are planned for activation in fiscal year 1983. Additionally, ten CEWI companies are budgeted for activities in fiscal year 1982 and 1983 for support of brigade and corps elements.

Improvements in the Army's chemical warfare capabilities will require activation of two nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) defense companies, one smoke generator battalion headquarters and two smoke generator companies in fiscal year 1982. Three additional NBC defense companies, two additional smoke generator companies, three decontamination detachments and 13 other various NBC detachment-sized elements are scheduled for fiscal year 1983.

Modernization and structure changes are planned to accommodate new doctrine and new weapons systems, but every effort will be made to minimize the disruptive effects of organizational turbulence.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY RESERVE PROGRAM

There is an important linkage between Army Reserve military construction program and Army Reserve preparedness. Preparedness for our wartime mission is directly related to our success in manning, training and equipping the force. Of equal importance is the task of providing facilities that will support our personnel structure, training and equipment requirements. We are making major progress toward this objective. For example, U.S. Army Forces Command is assessing the Army's requirements for training areas, ranges, and Reserve Component weekend training sites. This assessment will insure maximum utilization of existing facilities and serve as a basis for subsequent programming of these type of requirements. A similar effort has been initiated by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve to insure maximum utilization of the three hundred plus indoor ranges currently in our Reserve centers to permit maximum development of marksmanship.

Further, as we modernize the Army with new weapon systems, it is extremely important that we plan in detail for procurement of new equipment redistribution. Equipment distribution/redistribution planning, which is currently underway, will be the cornerstone for planning and construction of storage facilities to accommodate the distribution of both existing and new equipment. Planning for equipment storage facilities must consider training and mobilization requirements. To this end, we are systematically reviewing our projects to insure programming and construction support these needs.

The major portion of our construction program is oriented toward construction of new centers and expansion of existing facilities. This we believe is extremely important for achieving preparedness. Our citizen-soldier goes to drill once a month. This citizen-soldier must be given an adequate facility for his short training period at home station. A facility designed toward maximum learning in a short period of time is a must. It must be designed with flexibility to accommodate numerous modes of training associated with the various units assigned to a particular center or new units which may subsequently use the facility. We are currently exploring module design concepts which will, when perfected, increase the flexibility of our centers. Upon mobilization, these facilities will become assets available for a multitude of defense needs such as civil defense headquarters, communication centers, selective service headquarters, or Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations. Planning for post-mobilization use of our facilities is being studied, and planned for.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

At this time I will answer specific questions which were asked by your committee after Dr. Philbin's address on December 1, 1981. Some of the information requested can only be addressed in executive session due to its sensitivity and classification.

HOW SHOULD READINESS OF USAR, TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS, BE JUDGED?

A system of describing status of Active and Reserve Component units is in being and is administered under the guidelines established in AR 220-1. The status of Army Reserve units is reported twice each year as of the end of April and October. Six separate areas affecting readiness are reported upon using criteria set out in the regulation. Those areas judged are: personnel strength, MOS qualification, senior grade strength, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. A rating of C1, C2, C3 or C4 is given to each of the rated items. A final C rating is then calculated to assess the overall status of a unit utilizing the C ratings gained for each of the six areas.

A point to remember is that a C rating for a given unit is only a snapshot at a given time of the status of that unit. Also, a Reserve Component unit can only be expected to achieve a C rating that is equivalent to its ALO (authorized level of organization); i.e., if a unit is ALO-3 then its highest expected C rating is C-3. Many Army Reserve units are organized at ALO-2 or ALO-3; therefore, a large number of USAR units have C ratings of C-3 or lower because of low equipment readiness.

Actual C ratings are classified; however, I am prepared to discuss the readiness of the Army Reserve in executive session if the committee so desires.

The current readiness rating system is useful as a management tool to describe Army Reserve unit status. However, readiness ratings do not describe the full circumstances of a unit's capability to meet its mission requirement because of the post-mobilization filling of personnel and equipment that will be done prior to deployment and employment.

HOW DO SHORTFALLS AFFECT READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY OF US FORCES?

Dr. Edward Philbin, in his recent address before this committee, very succinctly described the effect of shortages on readiness and sustainability when he stated: "... When viewed statistically, within the framework of the unit readiness reporting system ... the Reserve Component figures are sobering." To specifically state the amount of affect that shortages have on readiness is difficult if not impossible to do since the shortages vary from unit to unit. Because shortages vary in each of the six readiness rating areas previously mentioned, only a generalized statement can be made on the effect of shortages on readiness and sustainability. Shortages, whether they be personnel, equipment, or training related, materially affect the readiness/sustainability of the USAR. The seriousness of the shortages can be addressed in executive session if the committee desires.

In spite of recent gains in USAR personnel strength and some additional equipment, statistically there has been little improvement this last year in the readiness/sustainability status of Army Reserve units.

HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO FILL EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES IN THE RESERVE?

Equipment projection for the Army Reserve is not a function of this Agency. The Army Reserve equipment status is dependent on the Total Army program executed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition.

WHAT OTHER PROCUREMENT POLICIES COULD BE PURSUED?

Identifying funds within the Army appropriation to be specifically targeted for Army Reserve equipment is an alternate procurement policy that would support the Army modernization program and in fact result in improved Reserve Component equipment status. This alternative is similar to what is being accomplished with the Congressionally-directed fiscal year 1981 budget procurement for the Army Reserve.

WHAT CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE ACTIVE COMPONENT?

Considering the current threat and our present global strategy, the Army Reserve as a responsive, capable, ready force able to meet its deployment and employment schedules, must be a viable part of the "total force". One component cannot meet this global commitment. As I view the current force structure, I see no structure that should be transferred back to the Active Component.

SHORTCOMINGS

Senator HUMPHREY. General Shoemaker, in your abbreviated statement you say the following:

Given the world situation today and the role the Reserve components play in the total Army, shortcomings are serious and need correction.

Will you tick those off for us and tell us what progress has been made, and what the plans are to overcome these problems?

General SHOEMAKER. As I pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the most serious problem that I see is equipment. Today it is true that the combined strength of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve is about 75,000 people short of their peacetime authorization. The per-

sonnel picture has been improving steadily, however, and I expect that we will gain about 50,000 more in the coming year.

I think the health of the force and the environment in our units now, plus the Selected Reserve incentive program, will all contribute to a substantial increase. Given the status of the training base and the orderly buildup, I think we're in a good position with people if we follow through, and OSD and the Congress continue to support the incentives and to increase the full-time manning in our units, an essential part of our budget request.

On the equipment side, while the Department of the Army, the people who must manage the total Army equipment—and I want to interject to say that assets the Army has on hand for the total force must be centrally managed at the Department of the Army—recognizes the problem but, over the near term I just don't see a rapid increase in equipment.

Now, it is important to understand that it is not simply a problem that the Army does not have enough equipment, although that is true, but it is also the effect that POMCUS has on the condition of our Army National Guard and Reserve units, and Active units as well, that are in the United States.

In general, there has been no additional equipment purchased to replace the substantial amounts that are now prepositioned overseas in Europe. That equipment has been obtained by "borrowing" from units in the United States, Active, Guard, and Reserve. In some cases, the equipment has actually been taken away and shipped. In more instances the equipment has not been delivered to the Guard and Reserve but has been sent to the prepositioned stockpiles in Europe. So, that is an important factor in looking at the condition of the equipment in our Guard and Reserve units today.

[Additional information follows:]

Beginning in fiscal year 1981, the Army's procurement budget was increased to provide equipment needed to fill POMCUS. This increase will procure some of the shortages that exist in the Army today. While CONUS peacetime unit readiness equipment ratings will not improve due to equipment diversions to POMCUS, wartime capability to fight in Europe will improve directly proportional to the improvement in the overall Army equipment status. As the number of units and the amount of equipment in POMCUS increases, the quantity of equipment that will be available in CONUS for redistribution when the POMCUS units deploy also increases. Therefore, while POMCUS decreases peacetime equipment availability in CONUS units, wartime capability for Europe increases.

Senator HUMPHREY. If we were to mobilize tomorrow, what practical problems would you anticipate?

General SHOEMAKER. Our approach to that problem is to send fully capable units, Guard, Reserve, and Active, overseas as quickly as ships and aircraft can carry them until the well runs dry.

Now, we would do this by using the IRR. There are roughly 200,000 members of the IRR. We have preplanned now and we know where we want all those people to go in the first 72 hours. They will go to mobilization stations in which their skills and grades will match, as best we can do it, the shortfalls in the Active, the Guard and the Reserve units which will assemble at the same station.

We have detailed plans to do precisely the same thing with equipment. The large groups of equipment that will become available for

distribution to units that are short will be equipment left behind by units deploying overseas to fall in on prepositioned equipment in Europe.

Calculating the asset match of all this equipment and the people is an enormously complex management process. It is the toughest mission of my command. We have been working intently on this for 2 or 3 years. We are well along in the process of doing this sort of calculation, but it is a very complicated undertaking and the train moves every day, as the conditions of our units change, as the condition of the POMCUS sets changes, and as our various calculations as to the size and ramp of the training base buildup change as we refine our plan.

I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we do have plans to use the assets that will become available to fill units in the priority in which they will go overseas, so that shortages will be pushed as far to the rear as possible.

The planning and general methodology I have just described are most sophisticated with the rapid deployment force units. Roughly, I devote half a day each month to reassessing any change in the status of the rapid deployment force units, including the Guard and the Reserve. We identify where we will get people and equipment that will be required very quickly, in hours and days, to "top off" those units. So, that management process is in being, but this should not obscure the fact that there is still a shortage of assets and eventually we will not be able to provide completely full units, and we will not be able to develop the full strength of the structure of the Army today.

Senator HUMPHREY. When do those problems come into play? On the one hand, we consistently hear about shortfalls in personnel and equipment. On the other hand, we seem to be assured, "Don't worry, everything is under control." At what point do these problems begin to hurt, and what will be those problems?

Start with a scenario of mobilization day and when you will start to have some problems and what the indications of those problems will be in regard to the outcome of a conflict.

General SHOEMAKER. The problem starts instantly, sir. If the Guard and the Reserve and the Active units in the United States were all ready today; that is, had all their equipment and the right number of people, we would not have to enter into the extremely complex and serious management process that I described. If that were the case, essentially our problem in sending trained forces overseas, would purely be the transportation problem. The fact that there is a shortfall, the fact that we borrow equipment to put in POMCUS, complicates the process of mobilizing and going to war.

Now, having said that the process is complicated, I can't precisely quantify and say for example on day 63 we will run out of a type unit. Calculations start at our 53 mobilization stations which are the central management nodes; where we do the matching of the people of the Individual Ready Reserve and the equipment assets.

The planning process is decentralized and we have not yet completed a full run-through of distributing all the assets of the Army so that I can give you a precise answer to your question.

Senator HUMPHREY. As an academic exercise, say it is the end of the first week of mobilization for a European scenario, is everything OK in the first week?

General SHOEMAKER. Let us talk, if we may, of the first week after the decision to mobilize and to deploy. The first thing that we would do to reinforce Europe would be to send units to fall in on pre-positioned sets of equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have enough people and enough equipment for that phase?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, we have enough equipment with some top-off management and we would distribute people available from the training base. The answer to that is essentially yes. However, I should point out that the pre-positioned sets of equipment are all not entirely full at this moment, so even that would be complicated.

EQUIPMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. That is one problem right off the bat. What are the troops going to use in the way of equipment if it is not there the first week?

General SHOEMAKER. They will have to take it with them; it will have to go on planes and ships. We calculate this monthly. We know what that is.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have that in stock?

General SHOEMAKER. We have it, yes. The general answer to that is "yes."

Let us take the 1st Division at Fort Riley: all of their POMCUS sets are not full, most are but there are some items short. Those items are identified periodically and the unit must make plans to take that equipment from assets that they have at Fort Riley.

The impact on mobilization means the assets will not then be available for passing on to the Guard and Reserves, so there is a ripple effect.

Senator HUMPHREY. Those assets are there to make up the shortfall in POMCUS?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, for the early deploying units. It is a question of priority. We would indeed do that, that is, fill the early deploying units to make up for the POMCUS shortages.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us run through the first couple of months so that I can see where the problems begin to come in and what their implications are.

General SHOEMAKER. In general, to repeat, the early units to go are those who will fall in on pre-positioned sets of equipment. Other units will begin to go as well.

From the Guard and the Reserve they will largely be combat service support units that will establish very quickly the logistics infrastructure in the theater—transportation units, supply and service units, maintenance units, medical units, those kinds of units.

In our management process of readying units, the priority in their peacetime state is that if assets are available to us to fill those units that will deploy with equipment so that we will have the least amount of management actions to prepare them when they deploy.

Again, by using the equipment left behind by units that deploy, we will give priority if a jeep or a radio or something is required in one of those early deploying units. Our priority plan will be to get that jeep, radio, or whatever the equipment is to the unit so that it can move with it when it deploys during the first month.

TIMING OF PROBLEMS

Senator HUMPHREY. When do the problems begin to come in, what are the problems that are going to be faced by battlefield commanders because the Reserves and the Guard forces coming in after the outbreak of hostilities don't have the manpower or equipment or training to do what they are supposed to do? Where do the practical problems come in and when?

General SHOEMAKER. At the time when the problems come in, we would probably have some units that are not organized at a full war-time level in either people or equipment. They would be short selected items and we would be making adjustments to send the most capable units that we could to Europe.

They might be organized at lower levels. There might be substitute equipment that is not as capable as the first line that we would like to have in our early deploying units.

Senator HUMPHREY. After 2 months, the battlefield commanders are going to begin to receive reinforcements that are undermanned; is that part of the problem, units that are undermanned?

General SHOEMAKER. Probably either units that are undermanned or not as many individual replacements as the overseas commands might like. To put it another way, about that period I think our transportation assets would be more capable than the resources we had to send. Earlier I would think the opposite would be true.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it correct that under a European mobilization scenario we would be in reasonably good shape, notwithstanding the shortfalls of personnel and equipment and training in the Reserve and the Guard forces; is that about right?

General SHOEMAKER. As a general statement, the shortages would have been pushed back and we would be in pretty good shape up to that point.

Senator HUMPHREY. After that, we begin to have problems with insufficient manpower replacements and equipment; is that correct?

General SHOEMAKER. That is correct. It would be true of the manpower until, of course, individuals who would be conscripted could be trained and gotten over there. There would be 2 or 3 months and then we would be able to achieve the manning.

Equipment, I think, would be much more difficult because of the longer lead times to procure additional equipment.

COMMAND CONCERNS

Senator HUMPHREY. General Berkman, what are your concerns? If you were placed on the spot tomorrow and asked to produce under a mobilization scenario, a serious one, a conflict, what are the things that would worry you the most about being able to discharge your responsibilities?

General BERKMAN. As I mentioned, the mission of the Army Reserve is to provide units capable of performing their wartime mission; the kinds of things that General Shoemaker has been discussing impact directly on that capability, that is, compatible equipment with that portion of the total Army that will be supported, and either having that equipment on hand or a system that will provide that equipment in order for those units to meet their deployment schedules is of great interest and concern, obviously.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you simplify that?

General BERKMAN. Every unit is organized on a table of organization and equipment. It indicates the personnel and the equipment required to perform its wartime missions.

In a peacetime setting, there is a certain minimum essential level of equipment necessary to accomplish the training of the personnel in order that they can function as a unit, but upon mobilization and deployment the unit will need all of the equipment available. Whether that equipment is on hand or there is a system in place that will get that, marry it, link that equipment and unit together, in time to meet the deployment schedules to fit into the war plans, is of great concern. That is on the equipment side.

On the training side, as I mentioned, unit readiness is an amalgam of personnel, training and equipment. We need the requisite numbers of personnel, members of that unit, in order to get the training required in order to be able to perform a wartime mission.

Resources both to support that training and bring the kind of people we need in the unit, and resources and management of the equipment are a portion of the equation. All of those things ultimately come together, are required in order to achieve a unit capable of performing its wartime mission.

Senator HUMPHREY. In your command, what are you called upon to do in the first month of mobilization?

General BERKMAN. The Army Reserve is commanded by General Shoemaker, Army Forces Command. My position on the Army Staff is Chief of the Army Reserve, in addition to being appropriations director for those three appropriations that directly support the Army Reserve—RPA, OMA and military construction, not major end items' procurement, which is provided from "other procurement, Army."

I am the appropriations director and adviser by statute to the Chief of Staff of the Army in connection with matters relating to the Army Reserve. I participate in the decisions, but do not make all the decisions, affecting the Army Reserve.

So, when you ask the question about my command, I am not a commander of the Army Reserve. That is General Shoemaker.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are the Chief of the Army Reserve. What responsibilities does that encompass?

General BERKMAN. As I mentioned, my responsibilities are appropriations director, participation with the Army staff in policies affecting the Army Reserve, and participation with the Army Staff in the development of budget plans and programs affecting the Army Reserve, and then advising.

I am monitoring all matters affecting the Army Reserve.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you held accountable for the readiness of the Reserve, or not?

General BERKMAN. I think to the extent that I am a member of the Army staff and the Army staff is accountable for the Army Reserve, I share in that accountability, but the command lines of the Army Reserve run down through forces command to the Army Reserve structure in the field.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Walker, what concerns you about the first month of mobilization and the responsibilities you would have?

General WALKER. I am the Director of the Army National Guard. As such, I have the same responsibilities for the Army National Guard that General Shoemaker has for the Army Reserve.

First, I must tell you that I am confident, without any doubt, that we can mobilize our troops. We might not do it by the books, but we will get the troops mobilized. The problems that you ask me about have already been expressed. Equipment is the main problem. It used to be strength. We think we have turned the strength problem around.

I am very confident that progress will continue through the next year, through the next several years.

Our big problem, again, goes right back to equipment. We have got to give these troops training opportunities to prepare for mobilization and deployment. That is what we are working for. We are taking our troops through deployment training.

You had a unit from New Hampshire, from Manchester, an artillery unit, that went through deployment training, and deployed to Europe. This gives them the opportunity to see the unit they are going to work in and to train with that command.

The problems, as I see them, are mainly with the equipment. We have already hashed over that pretty well.

Senator HUMPHREY. So, you folks understand it clearly, but I don't. Sooner or later we are going to get to the bottom of this thing. Where do the problems come in? On the one hand, you fellows come here all gung ho, saying:

We can mobilize; we can do anything; we don't even need appropriations next year; we can do anything you want us to do, with no money, no equipment, no personnel.

Where do the problems come in? I know they are there but I have not been able to get you to tell me where they are.

General WALKER. Let us take the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) units. I can report to you today that with regard to the equipment problem some of them are not substantially ready. We have put an intensively manned force out there. Within the intensively manned force are the early deploying units. Further, we have intensively managed the logistics part of the force, and we are giving those units the equipment needed.

What General Shoemaker has difficulty with is that I can't tell you exactly the day my units will not have equipment. My units are on mobilization before General Shoemaker's units. It is hard to sit here and tell you on day 45, or something like that, that we are going to run out of equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are responsible to General Shoemaker to make sure the Guard comes through as planned. Where do you worry about not being able to come through as planned? Where do your problems come in? General Shoemaker is counting on you to make sure

the Guard comes in as planned on paper. Where do the problems come in? Where can you not produce according to the plan?

General WALKER. That is what I am saying; I can't tell you the exact day that my units will not have equipment. We can try to furnish that for the record later, if you will give me that opportunity.

Senator HUMPHREY. Maybe we are starting to tackle this problem from the wrong end of things. Maybe I should have some theater commanders here and ask them what their concerns are with regard to reinforcement. That is the bottom line with regard to the Reserve and National Guard, is it not, whether or not they can be counted upon to provide these reinforcements?

In fact, it is more than that today; it is not whether or not they can be counted upon to provide frontline troops almost immediately.

What I am trying to get to here is what are our problems in that respect. I appreciate your willingness to excell under conditions of difficulty and underfunding and shortfalls of all kinds, but we will never make any progress in convincing the other Members of Congress that the Reserve and the Guard need greater funding and more attention if we don't define the problem in real terms—dead Americans, lost wars, things like that. That is what I am trying to get to.

General WALKER. Are we looking for a dollar figure to measure that?

[Additional information follows:]

NGB EQUIPMENT

Equipment shortages impacting on Army National Guard readiness are currently valued in excess of \$4.3 billion. This figure does not represent the cost of modernizing the force but will provide operational equipment of each type in appropriate numbers to meet the deployment criteria of [deleted]. At present [deleted] of all Army National Guard units are [deleted] with regard to equipment-on-hand, with the majority of these units at [deleted]. This means that although shortages exist, there is sufficient equipment on hand to meet Army deployment criteria. The status of the Rapid Deployment Force is substantially better with [deleted] meeting the equipment-on-hand deployment standard. Overall, among the over 500 Army National Guard high priority units, [deleted] meet deployment criteria. In these units, the most severe problem impacting on deployment status is lack of equipment.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. VINCENT M. RUSSO, USA, DIRECTOR, SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE; DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF/ LOGISTICS

General Russo. Perhaps some of this, Mr. Chairman, may get us into a closed session, but I think you are right when you mention that you need to get the other perspective besides that which comes from the unit here in Conus. Commanders-in-Chiefs do have a perspective which General Shoemaker does understand, but we were addressing the National Guard and Army Reserve units up to this point in time.

EQUIPMENT

There is a perspective which says that when you look at the total equipment capability that the Army has, we are short in that category. It is not so much or only the shortages that the units have here in

Conus, but it is the shortages to sustain those units once they get to the overseas theater.

As an example—and we can get into that in closed session—the level of war reserves that are on hand in Europe to support the forces that do deploy over there—General Shoemaker mentioned the forces that deploy on POMCUS. It is great to field those forces and to fight them, but unless they can be sustained for any period of time, worrying about the 60-day deployment forces is not going to do us very much good. I think it is that kind of thing that we have not really discussed up to this point in this testimony.

Perhaps we can go at that further during the closed session.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, we certainly shall.

General Berkman, half of the deployable Reserve units will be committed within 30 days of mobilization; is that correct?

General BERKMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you anticipate any problems with that one-half of the units that will be deployed within 30 days?

General BERKMAN. Yes, sir. If the units were to be deployed as they currently stand, with the equipment they have on hand, there would be serious problems. A management system is required that will provide the equipment before deployment, that those units need. In addition, the equipment that they have on hand now is not necessarily the most modern or compatible in all cases with the equipment that they will be supporting.

This is part of the serious problem in the equipment equation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us focus on that. That is a real problem. You are training people for the most part on weapons that aren't the same as they would be called upon to maintain in the field; is that right?

General BERKMAN. In some cases.

Senator HUMPHREY. How extensive is that problem?

General BERKMAN. If I may, I would like to provide that information for the record. That may get into the classified area.

[The information follows:]

EQUIPMENT COMPATIBILITY

The Army is programmed to field approximately 120 major new systems in the fiscal year 1981 through fiscal year 1986 time frame. With each piece of equipment comes a similar training problem in both operating and maintaining the new equipment. If the Reserve Components are not provided the same modernized equipment along with the necessary special tools, test equipment, and instruction to maintain these systems simultaneously with the Active Component, the problem compounds itself. When you consider that 70 percent of the Army's maintenance capability is within the Reserve Components, the extent of the problem is significant.

General BERKMAN. An example of the nature of the problem is the maintenance unit that may have the requirement of supporting new, more modernized equipment in the force, such as the M-1 tank.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the training?

General BERKMAN. This also includes the training. In order to be prepared to perform their wartime mission, they have to train on the system, as an example, the M-1 tank system, in order to provide required support.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are these people who will be deployed early? Just focus on this one small thing to begin with.

General BERKMAN. That would be an early deployment, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have some Reserve units that will be called upon to maintain an M-1 tank who have never turned a bolt on the M-1 tank; is that correct?

General SHOEMAKER. May I interject, Mr. Chairman, because it is my problem to try to solve that?

As the M-1 tank is deployed in Europe, and it will be in the years ahead, one of our key management problems is to identify each Army Guard or Reserve unit that will maintain the M-1 tank and make sure that they are trained on it.

There is a U.S. Army Reserve maintenance unit in San Antonio, Tex., for example, which we know now, because we know its wartime job will be supporting people in Europe who will have the M-1 tank. We have essentially three ways we can solve that problem in this country:

We can go to our DARCOM depots that have centers of excellence in maintaining tanks, or to the Army school system, or to an active troop installation that has the expertise and tanks.

In the case of the unit at San Antonio; Fort Hood, Tex., is the post where we have our first operational M-1 tank. The instructions are out and plans are being made to insure that the San Antonio units gets the specific instruction it needs on the M-1 tank through training at Fort Hood.

The process will involve a number of systems as the Army modernizes in the next decade, but the management process to figure out how the units will get that training is one of our major challenges. We understand the problem. We are working to tie it together.

If I may just make one further point: I can tell you that I am proud of RC units and the spirit out there. I also think we have identified the management problems, but the resources are still not there. I want you to know that there are serious problems on the production of equipment. I just wanted to make clear that we understand that problem. The solutions will be developed in a decentralized way.

Our management system will be able to spot check and be sure these problems are solved. There will be many of those kinds of challenges which will arise in the coming decade.

Senator HUMPHREY. We have some today. If we had to mobilize tomorrow, isn't it the case we have Reserves trained on one kind of equipment who are expected to maintain something else in the field tomorrow; is that the case, General Berkman?

General BERKMAN. Yes, I think that is the case.

TRAINING

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us stick to practicalities. What are the implications of some guy arriving in Europe expecting to maintain something he has probably never even seen?

General BERKMAN. That obviously is a problem, Mr. Chairman. It is the kind of problem that needs to be addressed along the lines that General Shoemaker indicated.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the implications, practical implications, of that kind of situation? We are going to have a lot of broken weapons that nobody knows how to fix; is that it?

General BERKMAN. I think the implications are serious.

Senator HUMPHREY. When a piece of equipment is missing, a field commander will be that much more pressed and the odds that we are going to lose a battle become greater. The odds that we are going to undertake certain casualties will become greater; isn't that correct?

General BERKMAN. As I indicated, that indeed is a problem that exists and needs attention.

Senator HUMPHREY. What it needs most of all is money; is that it?

General BERKMAN. When I say attention, it is management attention, as well as resources for the kind of equipment that is required and resources for the kind of training that is required, and resources to attract the kinds of people that are required, and to retain the people that are required.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is quite true; I agree with that.

What I am trying to do here is not compile a lot of record that nobody will ever read. I am trying to compile some testimony that can be used as a basis for getting more money for the Reserve and the Guard. Because of the willing spirit of our military people, we have a hell of a time compiling that kind of record. I am trying to help here. Let us try to focus on some other practical problems that we have today.

Let us take the Reserves for the moment. We have discussed the problems of inadequate training or unrealistic training because you don't have training in the weapons and equipment in some cases that you are expected to maintain.

What are other problems? Let us focus on the personnel shortages in the Reserves. That is improving. You have enormous shortages in the Ready Reserve, haven't you?

PERSONNEL

General BERKMAN. The approximate 200,000 in the Individual Ready Reserve is substantially short of what the wartime requirement is. I am not sure whether the figure is classified, Mr. Chairman, but the requirement is several fold greater than what currently is available.

Senator HUMPHREY. How early are these classes of Reserves called upon to mobilize?

General SHOEMAKER. If I may answer that assuming we have a full mobilization in which we mobilize the entire force we would like to see the entire IRR, essentially 200,000 people, distributed during the first 72 hours or at least during the first week.

Senator HUMPHREY. Within the first 30 days?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, within the first week.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you have a shortage of 200,000; is that right?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, but those calculations are for the period until people can be produced by a draft and the trained people to go into the forces, so they would all not be required the first week.

As a matter of fact, the numbers of the Individual Ready Reserve now coincide very closely to the needs of our units in the first week to top off Reserve, Guard, and Active units that are not at full strength in the United States.

That does not mean that the skills match perfectly, but in bulk numbers they are a fairly close mix.

Senator HUMPHREY. Again, I am trying to get down to practicalities here. What percentage of those 200,000 would be expected to mobilize to the theater, most of them, or are they anticipated to go into training roles?

General SHOEMAKER. Our planning now is that essentially most people of the Individual Ready Reserve will join units in the first week. That is why we plan to bring them forward to fill the holes.

If the artillery section is short a man or two, an individual from the IRR will fill that gap. That is when we plan to call them, the first week, to make up for the shortfall in the units.

Senator HUMPHREY. What percentage of that 200,000 will be expected to go into units that will be deployed to the theater?

General SHOEMAKER. The problem here is one of decision and distribution, which the Department of the Army must resolve. I think the best way to get the answer that will make it clear to you is that there will be a shortfall of individual replacements that will be required other than for topping off units. Others will be required to make up battle losses, et cetera; so, the Army would be faced with decisions, if troops are not available, either to do the terrible thing—break up units for replacements—or try to cope in other very unsatisfactory ways until people who are drafted could be trained and join the force.

Senator HUMPHREY. Again focusing on the first 30 days. What are the implications of this 200,000 shortfall in the Ready Reserve?

General SHOEMAKER. The shortfall would affect the overseas command in later months. Again, it depends on the assumption of what the requirements for replacements would be.

General BERKMAN. If I might add, although you have been speaking about the Individual Ready Reserve, we have a shortage still in the troop program units of the Selected Reserve of the Army Reserve. I mentioned in wartime requirement we are still in the neighborhood of 50,000 short. We are closer to peacetime authorized requirements, but that still remains in addition to equipment as an area that needs attention and support and resources.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I add to your question on training problems? We have said that to focus on equipment is absolutely right, because without equipment we will be deficient in training.

We also have problems in training facilities; that is, insufficient training facilities, an insufficient level of ammunition that we need for training purposes, and distances between the locations of units and training sites. These conditions detract from our opportunities for training.

Those are some of the problems that can be solved by improved facilities, improved simulators, and giving the Reserve components the kinds of simulators that are found in limited quantities in the Active Force.

Essentially, it comes back to the equipment deficiency which, then reduces the training capability. The equipment problem also impacts on recruitment, because many troops don't want to join a unit that does not have adequate equipment.

EQUIPMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us focus on the area of equipment. General Berkman, you say in your testimony that critical items such as aircraft, landing craft, vehicles or major support end items will require time to be produced. Obviously, there won't be time in the first few months. Are these items that will affect the outcome of the conflict in the first few months, or not?

General BERKMAN. I don't know that I am the one who can fully respond to the impact of whether they are war stoppers or affect the outcome of combat. It seems to me it would depend on the criticality of that unit and its mission.

Again, when we were discussing the problems of equipment, this is the nature of the problem of having insufficient equipment available for those units when they are called upon to perform their work or missions.

General SHOEMAKER. The answer to your question is, yes, from the force viewpoint. It obviously will affect them.

General RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, may I give some indication of the magnitude? Maybe it might help.

We procure to authorized acquisition objectives. Obviously, the 100-percent requirement would satisfy the needs of all of our forces. In order for us to procure the amounts to achieve 100 percent, which would satisfy not only Reserve components but also Active components, we are talking about procuring beyond that figure represented in our program for the next 5 years, some \$80 billion, that extra amount would rectify what is currently a shortfall in our program.

I won't give you the figures except in closed session, so that you can see what is in the program, but that gives you the magnitude of the deficiency in Active and Reserve components.

General WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that you might think we are running around this question. I don't want that feeling to exist here, because the Congress has been too good to us in the Guard to let this happen. You asked ~~a~~ while ago if we have a dollar figure. We estimate on major end items that the Guard alone is short about \$3.7 billion worth of equipment. We at the present time have much of the equipment we need for wartime, but my problem in answering your question of a few minutes ago is that I am equipping Guard units now, prior to mobilization.

Once mobilization occurs, then we bring up the problem that General Russo mentioned, that we have to support with equipment, troops who are already in combat, and those enroute to the battlefield. We have to sustain them. What we are working on now, prior to mobilization, is equipping troops today.

General BERKMAN. To complete the loop on a dollar figure—and I don't know how helpful a dollar figure is other than to give some idea of the magnitude—as I mentioned in my statement earlier, the shortage in the wartime equipment requirement of the Army Reserve in dollar value, is approximately \$4.3 billion. The shortage of authorized peacetime reportable equipment is \$1.4 billion on a dollar value basis.

Again, that gives you some idea of the magnitude of the problem. I would not want to be held to those precise figures.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand and those are helpful, but the most persuasive thing with Congress, in my opinion, is expert military testimony about the serious and possibly grave implications of these shortfalls. That is the information we need. Sooner or later we are going to get that information.

General SHOEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, I was delighted General Richardson of the Department of the Army mentioned that figure. That is the figure that I think is important. All of the other things we are talking about are management and redistribution functions.

So you must, I believe, continue to search for what the total Army requirements are, not just Guard and Reserve, because on mobilization day they are all mine. There is not enough equipment stacked up at the training base to train these people we plan to draft. If it is not on the shelf of the wholesalers, it must come from units. So, the dynamics of the equipment problem are one question: How do we use what we have? That is the job of our command and I am proud that we have methods to solve that problem.

But the bottom line is that there are not enough assests. So we will run out and the figure that General Richardson gave is one that takes in all the Army requirements, not just the unit requirements, the consumption factors, support to allies and, the prepositioned war reserve until the industrial base can crank up.

For the readiness bottom line figure you are seeking—and I am delighted you are seeking that figure—the figure that General Richardson gave of the total Army acquisition objectives is what we need to get in order to be able to do our full mission.

Senator HUMPHREY. I realize there are many aspects to this. We are at the moment, as you know, trying to focus on the Guard and the Reserve. We can focus on other areas and intend to in the future.

Let us talk about this shortfall of equipment in the Guard, General Walker. You have only some of your wartime needs?

General WALKER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the practical implications of that; where does the pinch come in and when?

General WALKER. When does it come in, sir? This is what I was getting to a minute ago. My problem today is trying to equip the Guard prior to mobilization with the authorized items. After the mobilization of troops, they come under General Shoemaker's command. At that time his problem becomes to fill units up to the requirements that they need for combat. I will have to give you the answer General Shoemaker gave a few minutes ago. I can't identify the date when we will have that problem. I am sorry. I just don't have that information.

General SHOEMAKER. Perhaps this will clarify that question. What I

believe the Guard and Reserve units need in peacetime is everything they need in order to be able to train efficiently. Also, the Army needs to have identified and packaged all the equipment they need to fight with after mobilization, and it must be a convenient place where it can be transported with the unit overseas.

So, of the needs of the Guard and the Reserve in peacetime, training is the overriding thing, but unless we take the second step and plan and know where the full equipment is that will bring them to wartime levels when they mobilize, they won't be fully ready.

It is the second step, that there are not now enough assets in the Army to perform. In general, most Guard and Reserve units have equipment with which to train, not across the board—there are shortages in modern equipment that we are talking about. There are also problems with communications equipment. There are problems in the intelligence field of equipment that we do not yet have.

There are others that could be named.

If you look at the Guard and the Reserve problem in those two aspects, one is to train efficiently in peacetime and the second thing is where is the equipment, and is it available, will they have it a week after they mobilize in time to put it on the trains and ships to go to war?

General WALKER. If you are looking for specifics, we can furnish you those specifics. We have no problem with that. We can get that for you.

[The information follows:]

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

To expand on what General Shoemaker just said, the equipment that the Army National Guard has on hand at the time of mobilization is all that we can depend on having for deployment. Except for those combat service support units which have POMCUS identified for them, I can identify no specific additional materiel resources which I know will be available to Army National Guard at the time of mobilization. At this time, the Army National Guard has [deleted] of its wartime equipment requirement. This approximates the [deleted] equipment level recommended in Army studies of Reserve Component training equipment minimums. This apparent success in meeting Army goals is deceptive. First the [deleted] of equipment on hand is an overall average based on dollar value. For some items, the fill is at 100 percent, while for others the fill is zero. Many items are filled at less than [deleted] of the required number. Second, much of the equipment included in the Army National Guard inventory is obsolete or incompatible with modern equipment. An example is the equipment on hand in the eight Army National Guard divisional air defense battalions. They have 100 percent of their air defense weapons on hand but all are obsolete M42 Dusters of Korean War vintage. Army National Guard air defense personnel have no opportunity to train with the more modern air defense weapons in the Army inventory. Further, during wartime, Army National Guard maintenance units will be expected to maintain such modern equipment as the M-1 tank, M-2 infantry fighting vehicle, and improved TOW vehicle, yet, they will have had little or no opportunity to train with that sophisticated equipment, nor do they have the tools and test equipment required to maintain it. Army modernization actions will result in improvements in this area during the period fiscal year 1984 to fiscal year 1988.

Senator HUMPHREY. Continuing in the area of equipment, it has been stated some of the shortfall or much of the shortfall existing in Reserve units would be made up when they fall on that prepositioned equipment. What about the case of the units assigned to the RDF, where are they going to get that equipment?

RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

General SHOEMAKER. Each month we review their status and then we make plans with Active Army assets, borrowing from wherever we can get it to top them off.

I should point out that is a relatively small problem. We are talking about a few units compared to the total force. We ought to be able to handle the RDF, and that is the way we would do it; that same methodology will not permit us to mobilize the whole force. The RDF presents a relatively small problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us focus on something fairly mundane but I think indicative, the matter of specialized clothing, chemical protective equipment. In what shape is the Guard in that respect, General Walker?

General WALKER. At the present time, we have a requirement of chemical defense equipment of around \$102 million.

Senator HUMPHREY. What kind of equipment?

General WALKER. We are talking about individual protective equipment. In that case, mainly chemical protective clothing and individual decontamination and detection equipment. That is our required inventory. At the present time, on hand I have about \$15 million, which leaves me with about a \$87 million shortage.

Senator HUMPHREY. Translate that into percentage of your soldiers who aren't properly equipped.

General WALKER. I have all my Rapid Deployment Force equipped. I have my early deployed units, out through day 15 equipped. I have enough training packages throughout the rest of the force just to train them.

Senator HUMPHREY. So, the troops deployed in the first 15 days are fully equipped?

General WALKER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the situation with regard to those you deploy later, day 16?

General WALKER. Those, generally speaking, have training sets.

Senator HUMPHREY. I beg your pardon?

General WALKER. Training sets, just enough to train.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just a few to pass around so that they get the idea?

General WALKER. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. What happens when they hit the battlefield?

General SHOEMAKER. Our policy on this across the board is that the Active Army or Reserve units that will deploy in the first 15 days, should have full equipment on hand. General Walker has done a good job doing that. The remainder of the equipment, chemical clothing equipment and cold-weather clothing, must be on hand at the mobilization station or on the shelf of the distribution system ready for issue.

Now, there is not enough on the shelf of Defense Logistics Agency to take care of the whole force. I don't have the figures but there is a large dollar amount in the 1982 budget for the USAR and for the Guard as well, but not enough. Again, they are stretched out over several years for this equipment. The whole bottom line figure can be provided, but at this moment there are not enough stocks on the shelf.

Senator HUMPHREY. Or even next year we are still going to be in a bind in that respect?

General SHOEMAKER. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the practical implications? Are you going to have people in the field without equipment to protect them from chemical agents?

General SHOEMAKER. That is correct. We are talking about the overgarments, the special overboots, the butyl gloves. There will not be enough to equip the force and to have the reserves that should be carried in the unit to replace equipment or clothing that becomes contaminated.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does that make it more tempting for an adversary to use chemical agents?

General SHOEMAKER. I would think so. Its use would be more effective for the enemy.

Senator HUMPHREY. How about the Reserves, where do they stand in this regard?

General BERKMAN. The situation is similar to the Army National Guard. There is defensive equipment, or it is being procured, for the RDF and for the early-deploying units of the Army Reserve. We are in the same status.

I can provide you with the details of the dollar amounts of shortages.

[The information follows:]

CHEMICAL CLOTHING

The shortages of chemical defensive equipment for the current USAR RDF-A and early deploying forces will be corrected with the fiscal year 1982 budget. We have also budgeted \$48.6M thru fiscal year 1987 to satisfy the training needs for the balance of the USAR force.

MEDICAL

Senator HUMPHREY. How about medical units; that is another area of considerable difficulty, is it not?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, it is, in medical professionals and nurses. There has been improvement in the past year. The Surgeon General of the Army has now undertaken responsibility for recruiting medical professionals for the U.S. Army Reserves. He has a well organized force in the field, and I expect next year we will see great improvement, but today there are still shortages of doctors and nurses.

There are also problems with the tents and the special field medical gear.

Senator HUMPHREY. What percentage of the medical units would the Guard and Reserve supply in a mobilization?

General BERKMAN. With respect to the Army Reserve, over one-third of the medical units required by the Army structure are in the Army Reserve.

General WALKER. Less than a third in the Guard.

Senator HUMPHREY. What percentage can you supply today?

General SHOEMAKER. The percentages provided were correct.

[Additional information follows:]

MEDICAL UNITS

The Army considers a unit as being mission capable if its readiness status is C-1, C-2, or C-3. A C-1 rating is the highest, with ratings of C-2 or C-3 indicating a lesser capability. A rating of C-4 means that a unit is not capable of performing its mission.

Current Unit Status Reports reflect that of those reserve component medical units reporting, [deleted] of the [deleted] are considered as being mission capable.

Senator HUMPHREY. How did we get into such a bind on medical personnel, doctors and nurses, particularly?

General SHOEMAKER. It has been a problem for the past decade in all the Services and all the components—Active, Guard, and Reserve—since the doctors' draft was stopped. The inducement programs were insufficient and the total country support wasn't there that would make these people join. It is being turned around today, but much more needs to be done.

That is a very important thing to be worked on in the next few years.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the practical implications of this situation in the event of mobilization and hostilities, even that which will exist in a year when we have made the improvements planned for 1982?

General SHOEMAKER. The practical implication is that there is a shortfall of trained and prepared units and the Nation would have to scramble. I presume there would be some patchwork, Band-Aid solutions, quickly drafting civilian doctors, and so forth; but it would be an unsatisfactory solution without training and organizing of the units.

General WALKER. May I interject something, please, sir?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General WALKER. I feel we are making real progress in this area. First of all, we have about half of our doctors. This is about a 5-percent increase over this time last year. We are over 100 percent in our nurses. We are over 100 percent in dentists, over 100 percent in veterinarians, and in medical service officers, 100 percent. I feel that next year we will make real progress in doctors because we are putting a recruiting force out there specifically for doctors. There are 32 of these recruiters programmed for this fiscal year.

Once you pass the budget for 1982, I will be putting those people out there. I think this is really going to have a big effect on the number of doctors we bring in.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Berkman, General Walker says he has over half of the equipment he is supposed to have in the event of war-time. What about the Reserves; what is the comparable figure there?

General BERKMAN. We have approximately 40 percent of our war-time requirements, 65 percent of our peacetime authorized requirement, by dollar value, to give you some idea of the magnitude in those terms.

EQUIPMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. General Shoemaker, where does the great equipment shortfall begin to impact?

General SHOEMAKER. It will impact on training; it will impact in the theater. I remind you, when I spoke only of units, there is not now as much pre-positioned war reserve materials, as General Russo mentioned, as we would like. The equipment will have an impact, from the point of view of the overseas commander, fairly early, and a serious impact on deploying units.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is there a report available on the MOBEX 80 analysis?

General RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; there is a report on MOBEX 80. We can provide that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[MOBEX 80 final report provided to the committee on December 18, 1981. Report retained in committee files.]

Senator HUMPHREY. I intend to have a number of hearings on the state of readiness of our forces—Active, Reserve, and Guard—to defend themselves against chemical warfare. I think that is a particularly vulnerable area today and I intend to focus on that in the months to come.

I notice that the Reserve is adding NBC units. Can you tell us something about those?

General SHOEMAKER. There are units being added to the force. In the Active Force we are adding two NBC companies in fiscal year 1983. That will give us an NBC company in 14 of the 16 active divisions. We are also adding NBC companies to our reserve force structure.

General WALKER. We have activated four companies—one of them in the State of Massachusetts, by the way—for the 50th Armored Division. That went into the structure last year.

We have four NBC companies with four divisions. We are scheduled to put four more out there this year.

It is our intention to have one NBC company for each of the eight divisions in the Guard.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the responsibility of those units? How do they function? Are they principally decontamination units?

General SHOEMAKER. They perform a reconnaissance function detecting chemical attack and a decontamination capability as well for equipment and individual people. They are involved in the supply and inspection of chemical items and provide a central role for teaching the people, sort of quality control for the rest of the division.

Senator HUMPHREY. Focusing on the Reserve again, General Berkman, you said that in spite of recent gains in personnel strength and some additional equipment, statistically there has been little improvement this last year in the readiness sustainability status of Army Reserve units. Why is that?

READINESS

General BERKMAN. In some cases it is because the unit reports on the absence of equipment required, and this gets reflected in that status report. Although the operating strength may go up in a unit, but if it is still short of equipment, because of that equipment shortages, the overall status report will not change.

Senator HUMPHREY. The readiness report is still valid, isn't it? There is no misleading element involved here, is there?

General SHOEMAKER. No, sir. This is my responsibility, to provide those. The readiness reports are accurate. The principal reason there has been an increase is the requirement for equipment overseas and other requirements that have a higher priority than the Reserve units for equipment.

The Army goes down the list of which things must be done first. You can't get 32 ounces out of a 24-ounce bottle; that is the problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is true.

FULL-TIME MANNING

General SHOEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, may I add one item that has not been focused on, that we need support for from the Congress, which will improve both the Guard and the Reserve? That is, additional full-time people in the units, which we expect will have a great effect on the training and the logistical and administrative readiness of the units.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that a new program?

General SHOEMAKER. New within the past 2 years. It has been in both the Guard and the Reserves. We have been increasing sharply. You may know that the Army units, particularly the Army Reserve, have far fewer full-time people than the other components.

We think that is a mistake. We need more full-time people. In the 5-year program we are asking for a substantial increase. I hope that the Congress will support this. We want to get in each company-sized unit in general about five people—administrator, supply person, maintenance person, trainer—to help do things so that the drilling reservists, Guards, and commanders can focus on training and readiness to do their wartime job.

The programs that will come over in the next few years will have requests for these personnel. I would hope that the Congress will be supportive. It is very important to the continued improvement of the Guard and the Reserve units.

General BERKMAN. I would like to join in that comment, Mr. Chairman. Historically, the Army Reserve has had approximately 4 percent full-time manning, and you compare that with the number of full-time positions in some of the other services that approach 20 percent, and there is a consequent impact on readiness. I think that this additional full-time manning will bear great benefit.

General WALKER. Mr. Chairman, given everything else including equipment, the key to readiness is these full-time people.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have statistics to bear out improvements in the readiness of these units where you have the full-time staff?

General SHOEMAKER. I can tell you from evaluations of hard data, from my own observations of our evaluation, they may or may not be the sort of thing to take the unit over the threshold, to move people from C-2 and C-3. We all agree that we need more full-time people in our units at the lower level. We need more at the higher level units for war planning, to make sure of their ability to understand those things and participate in joint exercises.

The Guard and Reserve now in the past 3 or 4 years have increased sharply each year in units that join in joint readiness exercises overseas and in the United States. Those programs are increasing and they are very helpful to improve readiness.

Senator HUMPHREY. Training is one of the elements in the readiness rating system, isn't it?

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. In those units where you have these full-time people, has there been a documented improvement in training readiness?

General SHOEMAKER. Documented in a subjective way. Again, we have not recently run analyses to show what that proves, but we will be getting that. I can just assure you that there is an effect on the readiness and training capability when you have a full-time training NCO in the unit.

General WALKER. Sir, you talk about training other than equipment my No. 1 problem is to put a training NCO in every unit across the entire structure of the Army National Guard. Why is this so important? That is our business; we have to train. We need a trainer in the units to help plan, to help get ready before the troops come to the Army.

Senator HUMPHREY. At this point I will ask those who haven't clearances or otherwise are not authorized to be in the room to leave, so that the subcommittee may proceed in executive session.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The subcommittee met in executive session pursuant to unanimous consent at 11:25 a.m., proceeding from open session, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, chairman, presiding.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Shoemaker, will you designate some responsible person to assure that only authorized people are present?

General SHOEMAKER. All the people accompanying the witnesses are cleared, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Did you want to make an opening statement in closed session?

General SHOEMAKER. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Anyone else?

Let us talk about the unit status reports.

Can you give us an overview on that at this point, General Shoemaker?

UNIT STATUS REPORT

General SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. That unit status report measures the status of the units, a snapshot at a given moment on the status of people, whether they are qualified on their jobs, whether the right number of senior grade people are there; in the case of equipment whether all of the required equipment is on hand and whether it is maintained in a ready condition; and then the training status of the unit, which is a subjective evaluation from the commander; and then an overall compilation of those factors.

In the case of Guard and Reserve units, the Army National Guard unit status report is submitted every 3 months; the Army Reserve unit status report is submitted every 6 months. The Active units, of course, report monthly.

Senator HUMPHREY. What has been the trend in those "snapshots" for the Guard and the Reserve?

General SHOEMAKER. There has been a steady improvement from 1973 when FORSCOM was created, each year an improvement in people, in equipment, until this last year, 1981, where we are essentially stable.

Would you like to see some overall numbers?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General RICHARDSON. I can address that.

Just to give you an example, let us take the National Guard divisions. There are eight Army National Guard divisions. From our last report, on 15 October for example, in personnel, the C ratings were between [deleted]. Equipment on hand was all category [deleted]; Redcon [deleted].

Equipment readiness was either [deleted].

Training was [deleted].

That gives an overall Redcon for the eight National Guard divisions, with three of them at [deleted], which is a subjective rating that the division commander would provide.

To give you some idea of the Redcon difference between the divisions and the round-out brigades which have a higher readiness condition and are associated with Active Forces, let me just give you the Georgia Brigade. It has an ALO of 1; its overall Redcon was [deleted]—equipment on hand was 2. There is an effort made to provide equipment, personnel, and resources to those brigades associated with the Active divisions. So you can see, there are substantial differences between a round-out brigade and the other divisions.

To give you some idea on the Reserve components' units, let me give you the rating for major brigade level units. There are about 18 of those. Again, we see the same sort of thing—equipment on hand is essentially for most of them, a [deleted].

In personnel it is [deleted].

Equipment readiness, which means condition of the equipment, is a mixture of [deleted].

In training, there is a mixture of [deleted].

The overall Redcon of those Reserve component brigades and regiments are mostly [deleted].

The trend continues up slightly but only marginally, primarily because the improvement is training is based on the ability to get the people into the training system. We have a lot of trainees waiting to get into the training system. This situation reduces their training capability.

Until that picks up, then we can't bring the training readiness condition up.

General WALKER. May I expand on that?

For example, all eight of our Guard divisions are [deleted] in personnel. For readiness reporting purposes, you only count those people who are trained and ready to go to war. The ARNG divisions have done such a good job of recruiting that now we have enough people actually assigned, counting those already trained and those in training, to eventually improve the personnel ratings of the eight divisions [deleted].

So, we think we are making progress.

General BERKMAN. The units to which General Richardson was referring in the Army Reserve are those units in the nondivisional combat increment. There are three separate brigades.

In the divisional increment there are roundout elements, a tank battalion and a bridge company. That really represents the Army Reserve Force structure in the division and nondivisional combat.

Most of the Army Reserve structure is in the tactical support and general support.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you want to flash something on the screen, General?


General SHOEMAKER. If I might, on equipment, which might help.

EQUIPMENT SERVICEABILITY

General SHOEMAKER. This is a busy chart. It gives snapshots of the Guard and USAR for various years. The key indicator is equipment on hand. You can see the percentage in 1973 and what has happened.

RESERVE COMPONENTS - LOGISTICAL STATUS

PERCENT ATTAINING ALO ARNG & USAR



On equipment serviceability—the rules were changed after 1979. This shows that in 1979 the Guard and Reserve maintained equipment on hand so that over [deleted] percent was available. That is still true.

What is now called equipment readiness counts equipment on hand shortages in the maintenance computations so the facts are not comparable.

There has been very little change in the amount of equipment on hand, and that is because there are higher priority claimants for the equipment available from the wholesale system of the Army.

Therefore, after the big increase from 1973, we have been essentially staying where we are at the present time. We are on a plateau.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are these other categories shown on there?

General Russo. Army National Guard, USAR, and then the blocks in the vertical are the equipment on hand, equipment serviceability for each of those components, National Guard and Army Reserve.

General SHOEMAKER. The numbers are in percentages of units achieving their authorized level, the level at which they are authorized.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your help.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY

MANPOWER

Senator HUMPHREY. Improvements registered in the past three years are fairly impressive. The Army has now projected 100 percent strength for the National Guard and selected reserves by 1987. Can this objective of 100 percent be achieved? At what cost?

Answer. The selected Reserve and National Guard are programed to 100 percent of wartime strength by mid-fiscal year 1986. The current fiscal year 1986 Wartime strength, as based on TAA-87, should be achieved at a cost as indicated in chart 1.

COST TO ACHIEVE 100 PERCENT WARTIME STRENGTH (SELECTED RESERVE)

	Fiscal year—			
	1983	1984	1985	1986
Army National Guard:				
End strength (thousands).....	417	436	449	455
Cost (millions).....	\$2,800.0	\$2,930.0	\$3,360.0	\$3,780.0
Army Reserve:				
End strength (thousands).....	260	275	290	305
Cost (millions).....	\$1,615.9	\$1,730.7	\$1,870.7	\$2,138.0
Total:				
End strength (thousands).....	677	711	739	760
Cost (millions).....	\$4,415.9	\$4,660.0	\$5,230.0	\$5,918.0

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the Army have more specific manpower objectives (e.g., more full-time manning, better coordination between requirements and skills, enhanced training for new equipment) that will have a higher priority than achieving 100 percent strength?

Answer. The requirement to increase full-time manning and improve the personnel quality content of the National Guard and the Army Reserve are concurrent and congruent goals with achieving full wartime strength. Attempts to prioritize these personnel entities is not an issue. If a rank-ordering requirement exists, quality and full-time manning would outweigh quantity. These objectives are necessary subsets of the larger goal as they are the basis for quality in the force achieved, therefore; all objectives should co-exist and be achieved simultaneously. The Army 1983-87 defense plan provides resources for all of the above.

Senator HUMPHREY. Why is 100 percent strength so important if equipment inventories continue to lag behind, as now seems likely?

Answer. With the lack of a national service requirement, and the lag time between mobilization and expansion of a trained deployable force through a draft mechanism, it is essential to have fully-trained manpower immediately available. While equipment inventories may continue to lag, and do in fact impact on ideal training, sufficient training can be accomplished through unit affiliation with active Army units and through efficient use of available equipment. At a minimum, units must be capable of deploying after marginal post-mobilization training and receipt of any new or replacement equipment that may be provided. Units deploying to POMCUS upon mobilization leave behind those items of equipment that are already prepositioned in Europe. These items are redistributed upon mobilization to units being mobilized. In a "come as you are" war we must have readily available trained manpower to provide the Nation with a combat capability that is deployable on short notice.

Senator HUMPHREY. What were the manpower objectives sought under previous 5 year defense plans? Has the goal of 100 percent strength ever been sought before?

Answer. Under previous 5-year defense plans the Army has based its Reserve component manpower objectives on the authorized (peacetime) strength. The goal of 100 percent wartime strength was sought for the first time during the preparation of the fiscal year 1983-87 Program Objective Memorandum.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the current percentage of women in the Army's Reserve components? What are the trends in this regard? Is the Army's percent-

age higher/lower than that for the reserve components of other services? Is it higher/lower than the percentage of women in the active Army?

Answer. The current percentage of women in the Reserve Components totals 8.8 percent with the USAR having the highest content at 15.5 percent. The National Guard has 5 percent female content. The higher content in the Army Reserve can be attributed to the fact that a larger portion of its organization have combat support roles which allows a greater female content under the combat exclusion policy. The trend in the past has been to increase the number of women in the reserves; however, the Army is currently reviewing its policy in assignment of women in the Army and how to best utilize our female manpower assets to insure the best possible readiness posture for the total Army. The Army's percentage of women is higher than that of the Naval, Marine Corps, Coast Guard Reserve, but lower than Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. The percentage of women in the selected reserve is less than that of the active component which is 98 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. What special considerations, if any, govern recruitment of women into the ARNG, since the ARNG is somewhat weighted towards combat units?

Answer. The ARNG currently follows the Army policy on skills exclusion as well as exclusions in the assignment of female personnel to certain categories of units.

TRAINING

Senator HUMPHREY. The Army is beginning to develop more sophisticated training programs for NG units. What are the factors driving you to more localized training, mainly travel costs?

Answer. Increases in localized training applies both to ARNG and USAR units. Reduction to travel costs is always a large consideration in the selection of training sites. Savings in travel costs realized by some units also produce some increase in travel funds for those units who must travel to distant sites because of limited availability of resources and/or terrain necessary for specified training missions. A planned NGB purchase of sophisticated training devices (e.g., Tank Gunnery Simulators) will permit further increases in the use of local training areas, thus saving training time thru reduced travel time. The ARNG is restricted to 15 days annual training, the USAR to 14 days, and savings in training time aids in mission accomplishment. Both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard plan to expand Annual Training to 21 days for selected units; however, this will involve only a small number of units in fiscal year 1982, with modest expansion projected for fiscal year 1983. Continued savings of dollars in travel costs through increased localization of training will help offset the increased level of funding associated with these policies.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the Army intend to give more responsibility to ARNG units for their own training? How will this be balanced with efforts to expand joint training between Active and Reserve Component units?

Answer. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has always had broad responsibility to train Guardsmen, but Title 10 of the U.S. Code does restrict responsibility for the conduct of Initial Entry Training for individual Guardsmen. There now exist some proposals to change the U.S. Code, and to allow the ARNG the flexibility to conduct limited Advanced Individual Training for its own members during Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Recruiting efforts would be enhanced by not requiring the soldier to be absent from work or school continuously for the entire Initial Entry Training cycle (presently a minimum of 12 weeks by law). Increased strength in ARNG units resulting from that recruiting should help offset the longer time it takes to train soldiers in the IDT mode. Joint training between Active and Reserve component units still applies only to a relatively small number of units and unit cells. The proposed changes in training policies for individual Guardsmen should have no significant impact on joint training.

Senator HUMPHREY. How are the costs for training National Guard units divided between the State and Federal Government? What are the trends in this area? What impact do State budgets have on the organization, administration, and readiness of National Guard units?

Answer. The specific cost associated with training Army National Guard units are funded by the Federal Government. This includes 100 percent Federal funding for weekend and annual training sites. This does not include operations and maintenance of unit armories. With few exceptions, such as the federally owned

and operated District of Columbia Armory, unit armories are built on State-furnished land with the Federal Government and the State providing 75 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of the construction funding. Upon completion, the armories are turned over to the State for 100 percent State operation and maintenance funding. While there has been no change in these procedures, several States have expressed difficulty in maintaining and operating their National Guard armories. This problem has been manifest in a general deterioration of the armory structure itself and in proposals to close armories. State budgets have a tremendous impact on the organization, administration, and readiness of National Guard units. Operation, maintenance, and repair of armories, the units' home station, and State headquarters, are entirely dependent upon State funds. When cutbacks are forced on the State military departments by the State legislature, the first areas affected by reduced funding are those of armory maintenance and repair. This impacts upon training, troop morale, structure condition, and additional costs for deferred maintenance.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Army has a large task on the horizon in conjunction with its modernization plan: i.e., the education of Reservists who, though perhaps not issued new equipment directly, will be responsible for supporting and repairing it. Does the Army have a plan to meet this challenge? What level of effort will be required?

Answer. New equipment training for both the Active and Reserve Component is covered in a new regulation AR 350-35, New Equipment Training. This training has been accomplished in the Reserve Components (RC) on only a limited number of pieces of new equipment due to lack of funding and an Active Component (AC) system to furnish the required assistance. At training support work group meetings in the spring, appropriate Army units will be identified and put into the new equipment training plans. The level of effort required will be expensive, since it will involve intensive weekend training. One Army Service School (the Army Ordnance School at Aberdeen Proving Grounds) now offers a weekend training packet for those RC units that can be funded. What have been piecemeal, localized efforts will be developed into a more comprehensive training program during this fiscal year.

Senator HUMPHREY. Greater affiliation with active units, more manpower growth, more participation in Joint Training Exercises—Growth in all these areas suggests the need for a rapidly expanding training budget for reserve components. What have been the budget trends in this area? Are the Reserve Components likely to have their training requirements met in the fiscal year 1983-87 defense budget?

Answer. The budget trend is upward. It appears now that training requirements in this area will be met in fiscal year 1983. Funding support should increase further in fiscal year 1984. During fiscal year 1985 thru fiscal year 1987, budget requirements will remain constant relative to training of RC units.

Senator HUMPHREY. The active Army is clearly breaking out of the "central front" mentality wherein much of its planning efforts were directed towards central Europe. How has this affected planning for employment of reserve components? What has been the level of reserve participation in RDF exercises? Why have there been delays in bringing selected reserve units with RDF missions up to higher strength levels? In terms of planning and budget priorities, is there anything "magic" about being designated as part of the RDF resource pool?

Answer. The planning effort for central Europe has not diminished but the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which became a separate Joint Task Force on 1 October 1981 reporting to the JCS, has been given contingency planning responsibility for Southwest Asia (SWA). This has resulted in an increase in planning efforts rather than a shift from central Europe.

The Army has no Reserve Component (RC) combat forces in the RDF but has designated a significant number of RC combat service support units as available for RDF planning. In some cases these RC units are dual missioned for NATO and SWA contingencies. To date Army RC units have not participated in RDF exercises, but are scheduled to participate in the next RDF exercise.

The Army recognizes that the reserve component has personnel shortfalls. Initiatives taken to improve high priority RC unit strength levels include the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) to improve accessions and retentions, priority for full time manning program, and recruiting emphasis. RDF units are high on the priority list for these initiatives.

As a general rule, designation of a unit to the RDF will result in the unit moving into higher priority packages both for procurement and distribution planning. No change in priority will occur for any unit already scheduled for early deployment on non-RDF contingencies.

"TRICKLE-DOWN" PROCUREMENT POLICIES

Senator HUMPHREY. The Army does not discriminate between active and reserve component requirements in organizing its procurement strategy, preferring instead to program only the "total Army" requirement.

In theory, procurement of new equipment should eventually result in a transfer of equipment from the active to reserve forces. In practice, this policy has not resulted in an adequate rate of modernization for reserve components. If it had, the equipment available to reserve components would be more compatible with that of the active force, and the status reports would be more favorable.

Does the Army consider its "trickle-down" policy a success?

Answer. It is the Army's goal to completely equip the total force with the best equipment available. However, adequate resources to accomplish this goal have not been available. Currently, the Army has approximately one half of the required materiel to equip the total force and provide a reasonable level of war reserve for sustainability in the event of war.

The Army has held to the procedure that those elements of the force structure, which are anticipated to be engaged in the early days of a conflict, should be fully equipped first with the most modern materiel available. It is because of this procedure and the constrained total obligation authority that the total force is not equipped equally and lower priority units (those deploying later) depend upon a "trickle-down" procedure. This "trickle-down" procedure has been considered successful in that it keeps those late deployed units equipped with sufficient items for training to achieve the high state of readiness.

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Senator HUMPHREY. In light of continued delay in the modernization program, and the reduction in Total Program Buy for some systems, why does the Army stick to its "trickle down" policy?

Answer. It has always been Army policy to place the most modern equipment in the hands of the most critical units. The equipment displaced from those units is redistributed to less critical units displacing even older items.

The procedure is sound. Peacetime funding constraints do not permit modernizing the whole force simultaneously so the Army places the greatest capability into the most critical units. The pace of modernization is slower than the Army would like it to be but that fact does not alter the fundamental soundness of the way in which it is achieved.

The present situation demands a ready, capable force forward deployed, backed up by a reinforcing force capable of rapidly deploying. Thus, the primary criterion by which units are sequenced for modernization is the sequence in which they deploy. Units are treated equally for equipment distribution priority irrespective of component, so an early deploying RC unit would have a higher priority than an AC unit of the same type which deployed later.

"TRICKLE-DOWN" PROCUREMENT POLICIES

Senator HUMPHREY. What effect is the mismatch between active and reserve equipment modernization having on logistics planning? What special measures must be taken to accommodate this problem? Is the situation getting better or worse? Will the Army increase its investment in logistics to overcome the problem, or should the Army be changing its management policies to avoid the problems?

Answer. While there is some mismatch between components of the force, there is also a mismatch within the components. This does in effect require duplicate stockage of some support items. The Army has increased its investment in logistics; however, total obligation authority will not permit total elimination of the problem in the near timeframe without causing an imbalance in the Army program overall. This problem is caused by modernization of the force piecemeal which is a deliberate policy dedicated to improving the force within constrained resources. During the fiscal year 1982-88 timeframe, many modernization items

will enter the force and this will further highlight the problem of different types of equipment throughout the Army. The fielding of these new systems will be carefully orchestrated to insure the systems are adequately supported. In turn, displaced equipment will be redistributed with the same intensive care as to their supportability.

RESERVE COMPONENT PROCUREMENT

Senator HUMPHREY. When was the last time the Army reviewed its procurement policy and its effect on the reserve components? Should the problem be revisited?

Answer. The Army continuously reviews its procurement policy based on those programs judged essential to meet the urgent demands facing the Total Army without regard to a specific component.

The framework for developing the Army's policy considers guidance from OSD, JCS and senior Army leadership in conjunction with an assessment of current force capabilities and resource constraints. Equipment is consequently programed and procured for the Total Army irrespective of component. While the Army's goal is to fill 100 percent of its requirements, the current posture is considerably less due to lack of sufficient fiscal resources to fully equip both the active Army, and Reserve components, as well as provide for POMCUS, war reserves, operational stocks and maintenance floats.

The Army recognizes the equipment shortages in the Guard and Reserve and is attempting to correct the most critical deficiencies as available resources permit, consistent with Total Army priorities.

Senator HUMPHREY. Please explain the Chain of Command structure for Reserve units in more detail. How does this change from peacetime to wartime?

Answer. The Reserve Components of the Army—the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve—operate under two peacetime command and control systems. The Army National Guard is commanded by the Governors of the States through their Adjutants General. The National Guard Bureau, at Headquarters Department of Army, is the legal channel of communication to the Governors and Adjutants General. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, is a principal member of the Army Staff and has no command authority. The U.S. Army Reserve is commanded by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) through three Continental U.S. Armies. The Chief, Army Reserve, at Headquarters Department of Army, is a principal member of the Army Staff and also has no command authority.

Upon mobilization (wartime), Army National Guard units and unit members are ordered to active duty and are relieved from duty in the Army National Guard of their respective States. They are commanded by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) through the three Continental U.S. Armies. There is no change in the chain of command structure for the U.S. Army Reserve.

Senator HUMPHREY. With greater affiliation between Active and Reserve Components, shouldn't we try to streamline management and bureaucracy?

What initiatives are being pursued to address this issue? What is the most desirable relationship between major reserve units and the active commands which gain units in the time of mobilization?

Answer. The Army Capstone Program (Short Title: Capstone) was implemented during fiscal year 1981. Capstone is a vehicle for welding the Total Army into cohesive planning and training associations of Active and Reserve Component units based upon their planned employment after mobilization. These associations permit all units to plan and train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime.

Planning associations provide for direct interaction of units to conduct mission planning based on a wartime assignment to a gaining wartime command. This planning process involves the development and exchange of War Plans and Field Standing Operating Procedures down to battalion level.

Training associations provide for direct interaction among geographically proximate Active and Reserve Component units for the purpose of improved training and overall readiness.

The Capstone Program has established a working relationship that is forging a Total Army that can go to war when ordered and win.

Senator HUMPHREY. What budget decisions tend to have the greatest impact on the readiness of the Army's Reserve Components?

Answer. The Army's request is a balanced, Total Force budget submission. Many Congressional decisions affect the readiness of the Reserve Components, particularly those involving the Reserve Component pay, operations and maintenance.

nance, and military construction appropriations; and the Army procurement accounts.

Unit readiness is an amalgam of personnel, training, and equipment levels. Briefly, our personnel status is improving and training is being conducted more effectively in the Reserve Components than before. Programs needed to achieve full manning in a few years and to improve the quality of training have been developed commensurate with resource availability and represent a prudent balance between readiness, sustainability, modernization, and other competing demands.

The most serious problem is the Army's equipment shortfall. Whether the shortages are placed in the Reserves, in the Active Force, POMCUS, or in war reserves does not change the fact that there is simply not sufficient equipment to fill force requirements. The Army's goal is to achieve the proper balance between near term equipment readiness needs and modernization. Funding has not been adequate to modernize, replace aging equipment, and fill shortages in units, POMCUS, and war reserve stocks. The management of this extraordinarily complex undertaking is a real challenge. Army planners must be free to manage Army equipment assets such as major items, ancillary components, and repair parts in a one-Army context.

The Congress can help most by continuing to support total Army equipment needs and maintaining the balance of the Army Budget contained in the DOD Budget Request as the various investment and operating appropriations are reviewed throughout the authorization/appropriation approval process.

Senator HUMPHREY. There appears to be considerable effort underway within OSD (MRA&L) and within the Army to improve the manpower situation. Yet, the most challenging problem is lagging equipment inventories. Is there no comparable effort underway in this area?

Answer. There is a comparable effort within OSD (MRA&L), as reflected in the fiscal year 1984-88 Defense Guidance, to enhance readiness related equipment inventories. The Army Guidance for fiscal year 1984-88 likewise emphasizes enhancement of equipment status by incorporating this initiative in the Army Plan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

Senator LEVIN. General Berkman, what are the projections for improvement in the equipment shortages listed on the chart on page 8 of your statement? How much improvement, for example, is anticipated in these shortages in the current 5-year defense plan?

Answer. Projections for improvement of the selected equipment shortages listed in Table III, page 8 for the USAR are not a function of this Agency. The Army Staff is preparing a detailed response on equipment programed for the Reserve Components in the 5-year defense plan. This information will be presented to the Congress by February 15, 1982.

Senator LEVIN. General Walker, could you provide some specific examples of equipment, shortages in the National Guard in such areas as aircraft, tanks artillery, and personnel carriers?

General WALKER. Shortages of major categories of equipment in the Army National Guard constitute a dollar value of approximately \$3.7 billion. This figure is based on on-hand equipment compared with that required for mobilization. Examples of these shortages are shown in this table:

TABLE I

Item:	Quantity short
Aircraft -----	933
Tanks -----	694
Carriers (all types) -----	3, 611
Field artillery -----	310
Air defense artillery :	
Stinger -----	9, 600
Vulcan/Chapparral -----	384
Trucks -----	3, 722

The fiscal year 1982 appropriation provides additional funding for procurement of AHIS attack helicopters, Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge, command post and mortar carriers, and 155-mm self-propelled howitzers specifically for the Army National Guard. This action will reduce the major equipment shortfall by approximately \$105 million.

Senator LEVIN. Describe the process within the Army staff by which equipment for the Guard and Reserves is programed and purchased. Out of every 10,000 ¼-ton trucks the Army purchases, how is the decision made on how many go to the active Army and how many go to the Reserve components?

Answer. Equipment is programed and purchased for the total Army, and not for just one aspect of it. The quantity of equipment procured is based on the requirements of the structures of Active Component, National Guard, and Army Reserve units and other demands such as POMCUS, war reserves, operational stocks, and maintenance floats. The recipients are prioritized by the Department of Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) that determines which units will receive equipment with respect to others. This priority system is based on the DOD Force/Activity Designator (FAD) Priority System whose criteria uses deployment dates and unit mission requirements. DOD guidance also prescribes that Active and Reserve Component units with similar missions have the same priority.

The Army does not plan to purchase ¼-ton trucks. This requirement will be met with the CUCV/HUMWV complementary program starting in fiscal year 1982. Using instead the example of 5-ton truck purchases, the issue priorities would generally follow DAMPL sequence based on the relative need of the recipients. Since the 5 ton is not a new system, it would be issued to units to fill known shortages or replace overage and/or over mileage vehicles on hand. Since the total Army demand for 5-ton trucks exceeds procurement dollars, the lowest priority Active and Reserve units would probably get few new trucks.

Senator LEVIN. Do you think Congress should set aside separate line items within existing Army procurement appropriation accounts, or even set up new procurement appropriation accounts for Army Guard and Reserve equipment to give greater visibility to the equipment shortages, and what is being done about these shortages?

Answer. The Army would prefer that the Congress neither set aside separate line items within existing Army procurement appropriation accounts, nor set up new procurement appropriation accounts for Army Guard and Reserve equipment. Neither of these options would ameliorate the basic problem which is not increased visibility of equipment shortages; it is the lack of sufficient fiscal resources to fully equip the Active Army, Guard, and Reserve forces concurrently, as well as provide for the POMCUS and War Reserve stocks. This is essentially a restatement of the Army's previous position as provided for the House record in August 1981. That position discussed the rationale of the requirement, acquisition, and priority of distribution process as related to the total Army force and suggested that providing greater visibility of major end item distribution was the better approach. The Army is and has been attempting to correct equipment shortages in the Guard and Reserve as available fiscal resources permit. The Army also recognizes that this is a long term problem, both for the Army and the Congress, due to the magnitude of fiscal resources required to correct it. However, the Army feels that this problem can best be overcome by addressing total force equipment requirements rather than by fragmenting same into additional line items and/or accounts.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Senator LEVIN. What specific initiatives do you have to attack the shortages in combat arms skills in the Army Reserve and National Guard? For example, do you pay larger enlistment bonuses for infantrymen than for cooks and bakers?

Answer. The Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) is designed to attack shortages in combat arms skills in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR). Combat arms skills for which enlistment and reenlistment incentives are offered include Career Management Fields (CMF) 11 (Infantry), 12 (Combat Engineer), 13 (Artillery), 16 (Air Defense), 19 (Armor). Other critical shortage skills in the SRIP are CMF 91 (Medical), 95B (Military Police); in addition, for the ARNG only CMF 31 (Signal) and for the USAR CMF 54 (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical), and 98 (Electronic Warfare). The SRIP is also available to designate priority units including, for example,

reserve component Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) units. A qualifying individual who enlists in a combat arm or other critical skill may opt for either a \$2,000 bonus or up to \$4,000 educational assistance (maximum of \$1,000 per year). For enlistment in a priority unit, a qualifying individual may opt for either a \$1,500 bonus or \$4,000 educational assistance. Since RDF and other priority units train, mobilize, and deploy as units, the use of incentives to enhance unit personnel readiness and cohesion is considered cost effective. The importance to the unit and total force requirements of the combat arms soldier and other critical skills is recognized by the higher cash incentive of \$2,000.

Senator LEVIN. General Walker, you predict a continued improvement in the personnel levels of the Army National Guard. On what specific evidence do you base this expectation of continued increases?

General WALKER. At the end of fiscal year 1981, the total Army National Guard paid strength was 389,009, the highest level since fiscal year 1976. Net gains for the first 2 months of the current fiscal year were 1,955 individuals. Preliminary results for December indicate that net gains for that month will approximate 2,000 individuals. Based on the accomplishments of the previous fiscal year and on the information available thus far this fiscal year, strength is projected to exceed that budgeted by approximately 4,000 individuals. These strength improvements have been made while also improving the quality of recruits. High school diploma holders have risen to 63 percent of accessions compared to an objective of 60 percent, while enlistees in the lowest mental category have declined to 13.2 percent of accessions, compared to a total Army goal of limiting personnel in this category to 30 percent of accessions. For fiscal year 1983 and beyond, the Army National Guard faces, along with the Total Force, an annual decline in the military age population. In response, the Army National Guard has programed additional full-time recruiters and recruiting and retention management support to ensure the continuation of both quantity and quality in the manpower needed to reach required strength levels. There are many challenges in the future, but in view of the current momentum and the continued support of the Army and Congress in providing essential resources, the prognosis for continued growth toward full wartime strength of 452,700 by fiscal year 1987 is good.

MANPOWER

Senator LEVIN. General Walker, your statement indicates that the Army Reserve Component Units still are short 76,000 of their current peacetime goal and about 125,000 short of the full wartime levels of all units. Please provide a detailed breakdown of both the peacetime and wartime strength goals by general types of personnel (armor, infantry, artillery, aviation) and the actual or projected strength in each of these categories from fiscal year 1978-fiscal year 1986.

Answer. Peacetime and wartime strength goals by general types of personnel and actual or projected strengths in each of these categories are not available without extensive manual data manipulation for the period requested. However, the breakdown of the overall peacetime and wartime strength goals for the Army Reserve and the National Guard are provided below:

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Army Reserve:									
Peacetime.....	(1)	(1)	258	260	264	266	268	272	275
Wartime requirements.....	(1)	(1)	272	295	286	287	290	295	298
Actual/program ES.....	186	190	204	223	243	260	275	290	305
National Guard:									
Peacetime.....	(1)	(1)	421	423	426	427	428	429	430
Wartime requirements.....	(1)	(1)	441	444	446	448	448	450	450
Actual/program ES.....	347	347	368	389	398	417	436	449	455

¹ Not available.

Senator LEVIN. Please provide a detailed breakdown of how these peacetime and wartime goals were established including casualty levels and any other dynamic analysis which justifies these goals.

Answer. Wartime unit requirements for support units are determined in the Total Army Analysis study. Requirements for combat units are established by the Joint Staff. The wartime manning level is 100 percent of required strength of those support and combat units. The peacetime manning level is set by the Army Plan which is derived from the defense guidance. Wartime and peacetime levels are not related to casualty levels.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Senator LEVIN. What is the current strength of the IRR, and the projected strength for the next 5 years? Compare the mobilization requirements for pre-trained individuals in the IRR with the actual or projected inventory for fiscal year 1978—fiscal year 1987.

Answer. The actual and projected strength of the IRR compared to the number needed to eliminate the M+90 trained manpower shortfall (assuming that IRR only is used to eliminate the shortfall and that the additional IRR strength would show at a rate of 70 percent) is shown below:

(In thousands)

Fiscal year	Actual/projected strength	Trained manpower shortfall	IRR needed
1978	168.6	305	604.3
1979	201.8	276	596.1
1980	205.4	249	561.1
1981	212.9	179	468.6
• • • •	•	•	•
1983	242.4	148	453.8
• • • •	•	•	•
1987	347.8	55	426.4

Senator LEVIN. Please provide a detailed justification of the Army's wartime requirement for the IRR. Indicate how this requirement was developed, including projections for casualty levels and the results of any dynamic analyses used to establish and justify this requirement.

Answer. Since the IRR has no structure or statutorily prescribed manning level, there is no actual authorization or structure requirement; thus, its requirement can only be discussed in terms of the residual shortfall after all pretrained personnel are applied against wartime manpower requirements. At the end of fiscal year 1981, the strength of the IRR was 212,925. The Army's end fiscal year 1981 calculation of the trained military manpower shortfall indicates that ninety days after full mobilization and fighting a NATO-only war, the Army would be short 179,000 trained individuals. If this shortfall were to be made up only by the IRR, and assuming an IRR showrate of seventy percent, another 256,000 individuals would be needed for a total of 469,000.

Shown below is a detailed display of the calculation which yields the end fiscal year 1981 total force shortfall of 179,000 at M+90:

Trained manpower requirements:	Thousands
Active, ARNG, USAR structure	1,488
Unmanned structure	28
Net increase for mobilization TDA	40
Casualty replacements	191
Transients, holdees, students	23
Total	1,770
Trained manpower supply:¹	
Active Component	752
Selected Reserve	551
Individual mobilization augmentees	7
Active Duty Guard/Reserve	15
Individual Ready Reserve	154
Inactive National Guard	8
Standby Reserve	3
Recalled retirees	78
Transients, holdees, students	23
Total	1,591
Aggregate shortfall	-179

¹ Appropriate showrates applied.

All the components of the shortfall calculations are the products of dynamic analyses. They are reviewed whenever updates are made necessary by policy changes, program decisions, and fiscal parameters.

Senator LEVIN. Describe in general the skill mix currently found in the IRR. What is the requirement of infantrymen, for example, in the IRR?

Answer. The current IRR skill mix is approximately 33 percent combat, 40 percent combat support, and 27 percent combat service support. Since the IRR has no structure or statutorily prescribed manning level, there is no actual authorization or structure requirement; thus, its requirement can only be discussed in terms of the residual shortfall after all pretrained personnel are applied against wartime manpower requirements.

Detailed data are not available on a by-skill analysis of the current IRR inventory objective (desired strength). The Army's IRR improvement programs are oriented toward developing, by fiscal year 1987, an IRR which does meet the by-skill needs of the total force shortfall. Shown below are some critical enlisted skills, including infantry, which experience chronic wartime shortages in the total Army, along with the desired IRR inventory objective for fiscal year 1987.

	Projected end Fiscal Year 1978 IRR enlisted strength	Fiscal Year 1978 wartime requirement shortfall	1978 IRR en- listed inven- tory objective
Infantry.....	38,075	-41,365	97,168
Armor.....	11,577	-17,888	37,131
Artillery.....	18,602	-6,444	27,808
Combat engineer.....	13,067	-3,447	17,991
Medical.....	16,635	-5,466	24,444

Projected end fiscal year 1987 strengths assume the funding and full success of programed IRR strength improvement initiatives, but do not include expected increases if Congress approves reinstatement of the IRR reenlistment bonus. The fiscal year 1987 wartime requirement shortfall is adjusted for anticipated no shows in arriving at the inventory objective.

Senator LEVIN. What portion of the Army's current mobilization requirement for doctors, nurses, and enlisted medical technicians resides in the Army Guard and Reserve? Show the requirements and the actual or projected strength for these medical specialties for fiscal year 1978-fiscal year 1987.

Answer. The Reserve Component (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) portion of the Army's mobilization requirement for pretrained military manpower for doctors, nurses, and enlisted medical technicians are as follows:

	Percent
Doctors	53
Nurses	80
Enlisted health technicians.....	57

The pretrained military requirements and actual or projected strength for the Reserve Components are displayed below:

	Fiscal years—				
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1987
Doctors requirement.....	6,273	6,273	6,273	6,273	6,273
Actual/projected.....	4,453	3,553	3,200	3,238	4,146
Nurses requirement.....	16,636	16,636	16,636	16,636	16,636
Actual/projected.....	4,289	4,569	5,222	6,090	8,461
Enlisted health.....	63,881	63,881	63,881	63,881	63,881
Technician requirement: Actual/projected.....	30,725	41,116	44,517	49,604	57,506

Senator LEVIN. Doesn't your proposal to increase the length of the military service obligation place a large burden on those who volunteer to serve in the armed forces? What effect do you expect such a move would have on recruiting?

Answer. No. Individuals will still have the option to serve the additional period

of obligated service in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) just as they do now. Consequently, only minimal participation will be required such as keeping the Army informed of their current physical condition, employment status and home address. While individuals in the IRR may volunteer for training, the Army does not currently require mandatory training. Those that want to devote more time may join National Guard or United States Army Reserve units and are encouraged to do so. In regard to your question on the impact that an additional service obligation will have recruiting, the answer is that we simply don't know and won't until it is tried. If after implementation of an increased obligation, it is determined that recruiting is suffering, the Secretary of Defense can either reduce the contractual obligation or apply more resources to recruiting and advertising programs. In any case, until we have experience on how extending the military service obligation affects recruiting, we assume that it is a no cost alternative and that it will eventually provide the Army with a pretrained individual manpower pool of sufficient size to meet our wartime requirements.

Senator LEVIN. Back in 1978, the Reserve Compensation System Study concluded that the Army Reserve Components are short first term enlisted personnel and are over in their 7-12 YOS category relative to their objective force profile. For both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve provide the current officer and enlisted objective force profile and indicate how the current personnel inventory in these two components matches the objective force.

Answer. Neither the Army National Guard nor the Army Reserve have developed an officer objective force based upon years of service. The most recent computation of an enlisted objective force by years of service for the Guard and Reserve was completed in 1980 based upon 1979 estimates. At that time the objective force was a projection of requirements in 1987 and the ramp to attain that force. The current enlisted personnel inventory and the fiscal year 1987 objectives based upon that data is as follows:

[In thousands]

YOS groups	End fiscal year 1981 actual	Fiscal year 1987 objective
Army Reserve:		
0 to 1.....	24.7	27.5
1 to 2.....	21.6	20.1
2 to 3.....	13.3	11.8
3 to 4.....	9.0	15.2
4 to 5.....	11.7	20.0
5 to 6.....	12.9	19.1
6 to 7.....	12.9	17.8
7 to 10.....	26.6	42.4
10 to 20.....	46.1	23.7
20 and over.....	9.1	8.7
National Guard:		
0 to 1.....	44.3	44.3
1 to 2.....	40.6	40.6
2 to 3.....	29.0	33.8
3 to 4.....	21.0	30.9
4 to 5.....	21.7	30.1
5 to 6.....	20.1	36.2
6 to 7.....	23.7	30.0
7 to 10.....	47.6	52.6
10 to 20.....	84.2	77.9
20 and over.....	18.3	13.6

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Senator LEVIN. General Shoemaker, the Army in 1979 provided Congress with a detailed breakdown of the Total Army manpower requirement for wartime—including active, RC, IRR, etc. This included dynamic analyses involving deployment times, casualty rates, medical care, recycling times, etc. Could you provide the committee with an updated revision of this set of charts and analyses?

Answer. The information previously provided to the Congress was the result of a massive, off-line effort by an ad hoc workshop that expended 1,090 manhours to produce the data. The Department of the Army does not presently have an automated data system designed to produce such data. An update would require an effort similar to that for the original submission.

MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING BASE

Senator LEVIN. General Shoemaker, during the debate on registration, it was pointed out that the Army mobilization base was incapable of supporting the more rapid influx of inductees that would be provided with peacetime registration. The Army indicated it would be programming resources to improve capability of the mobilization base to more quickly absorb draftees. What improvements have been made in this area, and what improvements are programed in the current five-year defense program? Provide a list of the programs and resources that will go toward improving the Army's mobilization training base in the next five years.

General SHOEMAKER. The fiscal year 1982 budget contained a number of initiatives to enhance training capacity. In that budget, the Army committed \$49 million toward resources for the mobilization training base. This has been followed by additional initiative in the five-year defense program. These initiatives total more than \$283 million. They include funds for 225,000 austere sets of individual clothing and equipment, as well as funds for critically needed items of equipment ranging from M-16 rifles to mortars and howitzers. Also included is funding for the purchase of mini-computers required by Army Reserve reception stations for processing new trainees upon mobilization. Additional funds are included for manpower to prepare mobilization programs of instruction, to maintain mobilization training equipment at storage sites and to plan the distribution of training devices and literature for mobilization. Also provided are funds for preliminary planning and design for emergency facility construction at training sites upon mobilization.

A number of actions designed to improve the capacity of the training base are now ongoing. The Army has refurbished 98,000 M-14 rifles for emergency use by trainees. One-third of the total required quantities of individual clothing and equipment sets are to be purchased and stockpiled this year. Surveying and planning for emergency post-mobilization construction at training sites are under way. The Army plans to employ 10 additional mobilization training specialists during 1982. Because of the priority the Army attaches to mobilization planning, the expansion requirements of the training base are continuously evaluated. Other corrective actions will be taken as further needs are identified.

Senator LEVIN. Have our peacetime and wartime mobilization manpower requirements changed since our commitment to defend the Persian Gulf? If not, why not?

Answer. The Army's mobilization manpower requirements have not changed substantially since the commitment to defend the Persian Gulf. Rather, defense of the Gulf is an operational mission that must be accomplished within the framework of the existing force. Efforts have been directed at improving the capabilities of the combat support and combat service support units required to project and sustain the Army in the Southwest Asia region; however, these improvements have been initiated without benefit of major force structure increases. Heretofore, the Army's mobilization manpower analyses have been focused primarily on a NATO-only scenario, based on assumptions that made it the most manpower intensive.

Senator LEVIN. Since 1979, DOD and the Army have accelerated significantly the Army's manpower delivery requirements upon mobilization. The M+30, 60 . . . requirements have been changed to M+15, . . . Can the mobilization base support these expanded requirements based on the funding for it in the fiscal years 1983-1987 POM? If not, detail the shortfalls and how additional funding could be used to more quickly address these deficiencies.

General SHOEMAKER. The current emergency capacity of the Army training base is constrained primarily by a shortage of key items of training equipment. Funds provided in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 of the Army Program will help alleviate this problem during the first month following mobilization. Currently, the Army could accept up to 83,000 new soldiers into its mobilized training base by M+30. By end fiscal year 1986, that number will grow to 133,000. Additional funding packages for ancillary and support equipment are being prepared for consideration in POM fiscal years 1984-1988. The dollar value of those proposals has not been determined as of this date.

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Senator LEVIN. Provide a list of the readiness ratings for the last 4 years of all Reserve and Guard units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force, along with

the ALO of each unit. Also, indicate what resources would be necessary to bring units up to their ALO.

Answer. Readiness ratings for the past 4 years and the ALO assigned to each Army Reserve and Army National Guard unit currently assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force are listed below. All of these units were assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force during fiscal year 1981.

To improve the equipment and strength posture of the Army National Guard units with Rapid Deployment Force missions, two key programs have been implemented and other initiatives emphasized. Implementation of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program and the Full Time Manning Program is designed to improve accession and training and attainment of retention goals. Also, there is increased emphasis on improving equipment readiness and filling critical equipment to accomplish unit missions. These units require \$6.5 million to fill reportable equipment shortages to their current ALO. (This pertains only to the 10 units not obtaining ALO.) There are sufficient funds earmarked in the fiscal year 1982 budget to satisfy the above shortfall.

To improve the strength posture of the Army Reserve units in the Rapid Deployment Force, several initiatives have been taken. Implementation of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program, in conjunction with increased recruiting emphasis for the Rapid Deployment Force units by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and increased emphasis to fill full time manning spaces in Rapid Deployment Force units with increases programed in POM years, is designed to improve accession and attainment of retention goals. Army Reserve Rapid Deployment Force units require \$58.1 million to fill reportable equipment shortages to their current ALO. There are sufficient funds earmarked in the fiscal year 1982 budget to satisfy the above shortfall.

Senator LEVIN. Provide a list of the readiness ratings for the last 4 years of all Reserve and Guard units currently scheduled to deploy by M+30, along with the ALO of each unit. Also indicate what resources would be necessary to bring units to their ALO.

Answer. Readiness ratings for the past 4 years and the ALO assigned to each Army Reserve and Army National Guard unit scheduled to deploy by M+30 are listed below.

To improve the equipment and MOS qualification posture of the ARNG units currently scheduled to deploy by M+30, increased emphasis has been focused in several areas—continuously emphasizing equipment readiness and filling critical equipment to accomplish assigned missions, individual skill qualification training and filling full time manning spaces in all M to M+30 units with increases programed in future years. Army National Guard units deploying by M+30 require \$15.0 million to fill reportable equipment shortages to their current ALO. (This pertains only to the 38 units not obtaining ALO.)

To improve the strength posture of the Army Reserve units currently scheduled to deploy by M+30, initiatives have been taken to authorize the Selected Reserve Incentive Program for all M to M+30 units and other high priority units, increase recruiting emphasis for M to M+30 units by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and increase emphasis to fill full time manning spaces in all M to M+30 units with increases programed in future years. Army Reserve units deploying by M+30 require \$363.3 million to fill reportable equipment shortages to their current ALO.

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES VERSUS U.S.S.R. RESERVES FORCES

Senator LEVIN. Please compare Army Guard and Reserve Components, including the IRR; with their Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact counterparts in the areas of:

- (a) Ability to mobilize quickly;
- (b) Unit equipment fill—numbers, amount of usable equipment, quality of equipment (lethal, RAM-D, etc.);
- (c) Quality of personnel-motivation and proficiency to operate and maintain their assigned equipment;
- (d) Ability to integrate effectively with Soviet active forces; and
- (e) Time required to reach combat effectiveness.

Answer. The Reserve forces of the United States and Soviet Union are organized differently due to dissimilar national traditions, strategic roles, military missions and geography. The Soviets maintain a large standing Active Army of

[deleted] divisions, maintained at varying levels of fill in personnel and support equipment. In the event of mobilization, a large reserve pool of personnel [deleted] most with prior military service would be used to bring Soviet divisions to wartime strength levels. In addition, their units would be augmented with equipment maintained in permanent storage from depots. The Soviets also maintain [deleted] sets of mobilization equipment which could either be constituted as divisions or the equipment used for war reserve stocks. Soviet divisions also are organized differently than U.S. divisions. The Soviets are more dependent upon support services provided by echelons above division. A function of their reserves is to provide trained support units, a function similar to that of the U.S. Reserve Components. However, the Soviet system would also mobilize support units from their civilian sector, for example transportation units. An estimated [deleted] maintained to military standards, would be used to support the transportation requirements of their Army.

In comparison to the U.S.S.R., the United States maintains a relatively small active Army (16 divisions) and is more reliant on the Reserve Components to provide trained combat units (8 divisions) and trained support units, in addition to individual replacements. In the event of mobilization, the United States Army would be deficient in both equipment and personnel below wartime unit authorizations. Shortages of pretrained manpower are estimated at approximately 180,000 for the total force. Equipment shortages are by far the limiting factor, with the National Guard short approximately 30 percent and the Army Reserve 60 percent of their wartime requirements. In terms of specific types of equipment, the Reserve Components are short over [deleted] armored personnel carriers. Estimates indicate that, with the exception of some support equipment, Soviet divisions have all of their equipment. Moreover, every 18 months the Soviet military releases from active duty to the reserves [deleted].

The United States versus U.S.S.R. maintain active forces in Europe, with the stated mission to deter aggression, and in the event of National emergency both would mobilize their Reserve forces. The U.S.S.R., aided by their geographic proximity and land lines of communication, could reinforce their [deleted] forward deployed divisions in the central region of Europe with an additional [deleted] divisions from adjacent areas of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary by [deleted] and an additional [deleted] divisions which would include [deleted]. The remaining [deleted] divisions [deleted] divisions) would have completed or be in the final stages of mobilization by [deleted] but probably would not be deployed to Europe. In contrast the U.S. has 4 forward deployed divisions in Europe, and could reinforce there by [deleted] additional active divisions (a total of [deleted] and early deploying Army Reserve support units, by [deleted]). A total of [deleted] U.S. divisions could be deployed by [deleted] which would include 3 Reserve Component divisions. Essentially, the total force could be deployed by [deleted], with the Reserve Components providing approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of the combat units and $\frac{2}{3}$ of the support units. However, upon deployment not all U.S. units would be at 100 percent fill of wartime authorizations of personnel and equipment.

The qualities of personnel and equipment are important factors of force effectiveness. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. distribute their newest equipment to units with high priority missions. Approximately half of the nearly [deleted] tanks assigned to Soviet active and mobilization divisions are the older T54/T55 models. The primary tanks of the U.S. Reserve Components are the older M60/M48A5 models. The M60/M48A5 are considered better tanks than the T54/T55. The personnel of the U.S. Reserve Components are considered to be highly motivated, but approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of their units are currently rated not combat ready for training. This rating is due to deficiencies in both individual training skills and short-falls in the quantity of personnel assigned. The Soviets undoubtedly have problems of their own and have publicly criticized their soldiers for drunkenness and lack of initiative. Soviet reservists are infrequently recalled for refresher training compared to 39 annual training days for U.S. reservists. However, the vast majority of Soviet reservists have served a minimum of 2 years active service, and the Soviets could meet their wartime personnel needs with soldiers discharged from active duty in the past [deleted] months.

Both nations have programs with the objective of insuring their reserves could be integrated smoothly and effectively into the total Army in event of mobilization. For example, the U.S. Army's mobilization stationing plan is designed to receive and process activated Reserve Component units in a time frame which

allows deployment consistent with a theater commander's war plans. Further, the Army Capstone program has the goal of optimally aligning active and Reserve Component structure in support of wartime assignments. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies whose armies have been organized in accordance with the Soviet model, probably have similar programs.

Senator HUMPHREY. I just want you to know that I have a commitment to try to eliminate some of these problems. That is why I display a certain level of interest that perhaps I don't in other committees.

Thank you. I appreciate your help.

General BERKMAN. Mr. Chairman, that interest indeed is appreciated.

[Whereupon, at 11 :35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

STATUS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVES

FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREPAREDNESS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Manchester, N.H.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m. at the State Armory, Manchester, N.H., Senator Gordon Humphrey, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey.

Staff present: Michael B. Donley, professional staff member.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY, CHAIRMAN

Senator HUMPHREY. Good morning.

The Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Senate meets this morning to continue hearings on the status of the National Guard. This is the third hearing of a series structured to provide the Armed Services Committee with a comprehensive hearing record from which to determine the ability of Reserve components to fulfill their wartime missions.

The subcommittee's interest in the readiness of the National Guard is based on their large and essential contribution to our total force capability.

Few people realize the extent to which the United States depends upon the National Guard. One-half of the Nation's combat power and two-thirds of its support capability are vested in the Reserve Forces.

Approximately 70 percent of all guardsmen and reservists are assigned to the Army. Seventy-one percent of the total Army divisions are either purely Guard or require Guard and Reserve elements to be combat ready. The Army National Guard alone contributes one-third of these combat divisions. Army National Guard contributions at the time of mobilization are astonishing: 60 percent of the armored cavalry regiments, 50 percent of the artillery battalions, 33 percent of the special forces units, 29 percent of the aviation strength, 70 percent of all separate brigades.

For the Air Force, the Guard and Reserve account for 64 percent of tactical airlift, 60 percent of air defense, 50 percent of strategic airlift, 32 percent of tactical fighters, and 21 percent of air refueling capability, plus a host of other assets.

But these objectives are meaningless because of crippling deficiencies in manpower and hardware. The Guard and Reserve Forces are unable to fulfill the role assigned them for most contingencies.

At the end of 1980, the Army National Guard and Reserve manpower levels were 97,000 short of their peacetime goal, and 146,000 below the wartime mobilization target. The Reserve was 73 percent short of the number of physicians and 43 percent short of the number of nurses required for mobilization, even though it is expected to be the major source of Army medical support. Although initial reports indicate gains in recruitment over the past year, the Army will still have to fill a large personnel gap.

The Army National Guard has only 69 percent, and the Reserve only 43 percent of the equipment for wartime, and much of it is outdated. Our National Guard is short 3,600 tracked vehicles, 3,000 trucks, 700 tanks, 570 artillery pieces, and 400 anti-aircraft weapons.

The subcommittee's interests are, therefore, focused on the major manpower and equipment issues which, to a large extent, determine both readiness and combat sustainability. In today's hearing we hope to examine the impact of these broad problems on the New Hampshire National Guard.

The subcommittee will receive testimony this morning from Maj. Gen. John Blatsos, the Adjutant General, and from Colonel Lilljedahl, Commander of the 157th Air Refueling Group, New Hampshire Air National Guard.

I wish to thank General Blatsos and also the State authorities for their cooperation in arranging this hearing this morning.

Gentlemen, we are prepared to hear your testimony.

General Blatsos, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN BLATSOS, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, NEW HAMPSHIRE; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. JAMES E. GALLAGHER, CHIEF OF STAFF, NHARNG; COL. HERBERT J. GEARY, JR., DIRECTOR, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION, NHARNG; MAJ. JOHN E. BLAIR, STATE AVIATION OFFICER, NHARNG AND MAJ. JOSEPH B. RILEY, JR., PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

General BLATSOS. Senator Humphrey, I am grateful for this opportunity to provide you with information about the condition and readiness levels of the New Hampshire National Guard.

First of all, thank you for consistently demonstrating an intense interest in, and dedication to our national defense concerns, especially as they relate to the readiness and capabilities of the Guard and Reserve. I would, however, be remiss if I did not express my gratitude to you, Senator, for your support in the Senate Armed Services Committee to retain the \$33 million in the Army National Guard Operation and Maintenance Fund for the purpose of reducing our critical deficiency in chemical defense equipment. I know this is just the beginning, but nevertheless, it is an important step forward in resolving major equipment problems.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Since early colonial days, the New Hampshire National Guard has been a proud and dedicated organization of citizen-soldiers, with a remarkable tradition of military service to this State and Nation.

Our units' colors, flags, and battle streamers speak for themselves. They represent victory, much more than simple triumph on a battlefield. They stand for endurance, perseverance, sacrifice—answering our Nation's call from the siege of Boston in 1775, to the war in Vietnam.

Over the years, the posture and responsibilities of the National Guard has changed to meet the ever-changing defense needs of our Nation. Expansion of our Federal mission has been accomplished without the loss of identity with the community and State. Today's primary emphasis on the Federal mission gives us a more important role in total force mobilization. The National Guard must be ready to go to war today and tomorrow.

While we are full partners in the total force, with an expanded Federal mission, it is essential that we sustain and maintain our unique constitutional responsibility to the State of New Hampshire.

The New Hampshire National Guard has demonstrated on many occasions that it is manned and equipped to respond promptly to all local emergencies. We are always prepared to provide support and assistance to civil authorities in restoring law and order during civil disturbance, in safeguarding the general public during natural or manmade disaster, and by responding to search and rescue missions. Once again, our record of emergency support to this State speaks for itself.

By State statute, New Hampshire is required to provide adequate accommodations for units of the Army and Air National Guard and to maintain these facilities in order that the Guard's mission can be accomplished.

In this fiscal year, our State operating budget is \$1,189,000, of which \$260,000 is reimbursed to the State by the Federal Government for Army and Air National Guard service contracts. These funds support 19 armories, an aviation support facility, a combined support maintenance shop, a U.S. property and fiscal office and warehouse, 5 organizational maintenance shops, and 11 Air National Guard buildings at Pease Air Force Base.

I want to reassure you and your colleagues that our dual role is neither in conflict with, nor detrimental to our primary Federal mission.

Our peacetime chain of command starts with communications from the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force and flows through the National Guard Bureau to the many States.

The Governor is the Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard and is represented in the military chain of command by the Adjutant General.

In order that you have a complete understanding of our Army and Air Guard organizational structure, we will provide you with descriptive material following this presentation.

In the event of mobilization, units of the Army and Air National Guard immediately become part of the Active Army and Air Force.

To better understand our mobilization schedule, we can look at two hypothetical New Hampshire Army National Guard units: Category 1, a high-priority combat support unit; and category 2, a combat service support unit.

We assume for discussion's sake that both receive a mobilization warning order at least 1 week prior to mobilization. This is followed by a mobilization alert 2 to 3 days before mobilization day.

The category 1 unit remains at home station for 2 days prior to the move to their mobilization station. During this period, administrative processing is completed, such as issue of identification cards for members and dependents, issue of additional clothing and equipment, as well as legal, financial, and medical briefings. The high-priority unit moves to its mobilization station to prepare for air deployment to Europe.

The category 2 unit would have about 10 days at home station prior to the move to their mobilization station. They, too, complete the administrative processing, move to the mobilization station, and await air or sea deployment, depending on the priority and availability of transport at that time.

While our Army units have a preplanned mobilization schedule, the critical nature of the world situation at that time would determine the actual mobilization schedule.

As for the Air National Guard, the 157th Air Refueling Group, and its subordinate units, become part of the Strategic Air Command upon mobilization. The chain of command includes the 45th Air Division at Pease Air Force Base, 8th Air Force at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, and SAC Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. The 509th Bombardment Wing at Pease Air Force Base, upon mobilization, assumes command and control of the eight K-135's now operated by our Air National Guard, and upon early warning orders, the aircrews. The 157th Communications Flight and the 157th Civil Engineering Flight would have assignments dependent on the situation.

At this time, I would like to address some specific readiness issues of great concern to this subcommittee, the Congress and the Guard. I will address the manpower, training, and equipment status of the Army National Guard and Col. Robert Lilljedahl, Commander of the 157th Air Refueling Group, will discuss the Air National Guard.

As a small State, representing less than 1 percent of the authorized National Guard strength, the shortfalls or deficiencies you will hear about are, most likely, only a small part of the total Guard picture which can be more precisely defined by the National Guard Bureau or the National Guard Association of the United States.

MANPOWER

As for manpower, the New Hampshire Army National Guard, a force of just over 2,000 active guard members, is at 81 percent of authorized strength. We have been experiencing consistent manpower growth over the past 18 months and do not foresee a major change in the upward trend. Manpower is properly a high priority here and nationally. Our manpower program and marketing objective is aimed toward achieving 100 percent required manpower levels. It is also important, however, for you to know that at the same time, we are prepared to accept additional new and challenging units to the State. For example, last year we organized a 102-member nuclear, biological, and chemical defense company at Lebanon and received other manning modifications. We have experienced recruiting gains in the face of our increasing strength requirements.

Currently, female guard members comprise about 4 percent of our National Guard manpower. Women are successfully performing a wide variety of duties in our units. However, due to the combat nature of our field artillery units, we have some built-in exclusions to female recruitment, but a large number of our command and combat support positions are open to women.

As the Adjutant General, I am primarily concerned with the quality of the soldiers we enlist, and not necessarily with the quantity. We make a serious effort in our recruitment programs to be somewhat selective. While we are not increasing our strength rapidly, we have sharply reduced the disqualification rate during initial military training and cut down on attrition problems for the commander.

Essentially, the key to successful recruiting depends upon our ability to provide satisfactory financial incentive, academic or technical training, and a challenging Guard job. The congressionally approved enlistment and educational assistance bonuses have been most attractive during these difficult economic times. However, as Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Reserve Affairs, recently testified before your subcommittee, "It is impossible to pay an intelligent person enough money to bore him indefinitely."

ATTRITION PROBLEM

This brings me to the attrition problem. The New Hampshire Army National Guard has an excellent retention record. We have not and cannot become complacent and need to continually solve within our capability the in-State problems that result in the loss of good, qualified Guard members. Washington, at the same time, must analyze all possible ideas, recommendations and incentives that could improve retention of qualified personnel in the National Guard. This goes beyond money. Materials, equipment, meaningful training and advancement opportunities are some of the major issues related to soldier productivity and longevity.

Also important to your study and understanding of the National Guard and Reserve, a part-time military force in the true citizen-soldier tradition, is the area of family and employer support. We depend on both. Guard service and longevity require backing and understanding of the spouse and the family. In fact, many re-enlistment decisions are attributed to the extent and nature of family support, as well as one's ability to minimize inherent conflicts on a regular basis. We have been making attempts to build and improve the family support structure. However, we could probably devote a lot more energy and time to it.

We have been extremely fortunate in our employer-employee-Guard relationships. However, we have lost some valuable members over the years as a direct result of the stress and conflict inherent to Guard service and the job. I have no doubt that we must do better in recognizing the contributions, sacrifices and understanding of employers.

The Guard is a reflection of the community it serves, no stronger or weaker than the support it receives.

TRAINING

The Army National Guard, with its expanded total force mission, must be prepared for mobilization, not, as in the past, to provide a follow-up force, but quite early, even at the commencement of hostilities.

Illustrative of the interdependence in the total Army is its 24-division force. Little known, but true, is the fact that eight of the divisions are pure National Guard, seven pure Active Army, and nine are hybrids, that is, they require Active, Guard or Reserve units working together to reach full potential. Said another way, more than 70 percent of the Army's combat divisions are pure National Guard or require Guard and Reserve units to reach their full combat potential.

Therefore, the New Hampshire Army National Guard has a demanding challenge to provide the Army with a ready, proficient, and well-trained force of combat support and combat service support units. Commanders are responsible for developing the technical and tactical skills of individual soldiers and his unit in order that as a team they will be effective on the modern battlefield.

We have some autonomy in developing and executing our State training programs. However, we rely quite heavily on the guidance and evaluations of the regular Army. Our responsibility is to attain and maintain the training objectives and readiness levels set forth in Army and National Guard regulations. Actually, our ability to perform proficiently as a total force partner depends on the peacetime training experiences that our units have within the structure. The only acceptable level is that which is expected for the post-mobilization mission.

With this in mind, the Army has instituted the Capstone program which is designed to establish planning and training associations during peacetime between Active and Reserve units, to support wartime requirements for both combat and combat service support units. All of New Hampshire's units are linked up with their wartime command, either overseas or within the continental United States.

Last year, in our first overseas exercise, Battery A of the 2d Battalion of the 197th Field Artillery, which are located in Berlin and Lancaster, deployed to Baumholder, Germany, to train for 2 weeks with their Capstone Command.

The unit commander told me that this training experience was extremely valuable. It increased unit morale, improved recruiting and retention, and increased the unit's technical and tactical military expertise.

While we have no other unit scheduled for overseas deployment in this training year, I strongly encourage this type of training for our units and hope to see an increase in overseas deployment training schedules.

It is important to point out at this time that the type and extent of military training exercises, whether overseas or Stateside, have a direct bearing not only on soldier and unit proficiency in battle, but more importantly, on our ability to challenge and retain our members.

Normally, the issues of manpower, training, and equipment are discussed as separate and distinct entities. But it is of utmost importance that Congress recognize their innate interrelationship. We cannot have any one without the other. For today's Army to fight and win, each issue must be viewed with equal importance and given equal priority. This is costly, but not as costly as an underprepared and ill-equipped force.

At present, the peacetime training cost to the Federal Government for the New Hampshire Army National Guard is nearly \$5 million. This includes monthly weekend unit training, the 2-week annual training period, and our ongoing military education requirements. We have been generally successful, with certain budgetary limitations, in managing our State's individual and unit training programs.

While there are many nice-to-have training schools and curricula, we generally prioritize our training requirements to insure that absolute needs are fulfilled. If sufficient training funds are available, our preference is to train our officers and noncommissioned officers in resident military training programs.

New Hampshire relies heavily on the staff expertise and training quality provided through the New Hampshire Military Academy at Concord for the academic growth of our Guard members. The academy conducts a prebasic training program to introduce nonprior service enlistees to basic military training before entering the U.S. Army Training Center. They offer basic, advanced, and senior training programs for our noncommissioned officers to improve their military leadership skills and lay the groundwork for our senior leaders of tomorrow. The quality of our leadership, command and military training programs have had a significantly positive result in the civilian careers of many New Hampshire Guardsmen.

Since 1957, the New Hampshire Military Academy's Officer Candidate School has been a primary source of our Army National Guard officers. The intensive 14-month program is designed to provide basic military leadership and command skills to National Guard members who have the desire and meet the prerequisites for commissioned service. Over the past 25 years, 270 officers have been commissioned, many of whom hold key command and staff positions in the New Hampshire Army National Guard today, as well as in the Active Army.

The State of New Hampshire provides \$4,200 each year for the operational costs of the officer candidate school.

As for equipment, the New Hampshire Army National Guard is equipped totally by the Department of the Army. There is much debate at the national level, as you are well aware, as to whether the Guard is adequately equipped or not. We will provide you with a detailed listing of our equipment status: what we have, and what we do not have. But in order to keep the Guard's equipment requirements in proper perspective, we believe that the subject must be viewed in two categories: training and deployment.

Presently, our units are in a training status, and the level at which they are equipped is based on their position on the Department of the Army master priority list.

At deployment, our operational units should have 100 percent of their required equipment. We should either have this equipment with our units or have some guarantee from the Army that it is available upon deployment.

It is our assessment that currently our New Hampshire units are adequately equipped for training purposes. However, there are a few soft areas which must be strengthened. We are 100 percent short of night vision goggles for our aviators, and nearly as deficient in deployable speech secure and direction finding equipment. We also lack a weather station for our target acquisition battery and chemical decontaminating equipment for our nuclear, biological, and chemical defense company.

Unless our units and the individual soldier have the capability to train with the equipment needed for wartime, the impact is that additional training will be required after mobilization, and proficiency levels will not be at peak.

Senator, the New Hampshire Army National Guard is not equipped for deployment. While this may appear to be contradictory, the fact is that armies have always trained with less than their wartime assets. It was done by borrowing equipment and simulating.

This was, perhaps, an acceptable situation before the total force policy came into effect a decade ago. However today, with the early deployment time, the Army should have only one acceptable standard—full equipment for combat.

For example, the primary weapon of the field artillery brigade is the model 198, 155-mm. towed howitzer. This item, of which we require 54, is not in our current inventory. As a substitute, however, we have a model 114, which cannot shoot the extended range ammunition required upon deployment. To correct this shortcoming, retubing of the model 114 is scheduled for later this year.

I really feel you should take a hard look at our serious deficiencies in chemical defense. Our soldiers are not equipped and our nuclear, biological, and chemical defense company is not equipped. This means only one thing: They cannot function. They are unable to conduct effective and meaningful training in anticipation of chemical warfare, but more importantly, we could face some harsh realities at postmobilization. Unless the situation is corrected immediately, New Hampshire units could face serious vulnerability and a terrible casualty rate on the battlefield.

Once your subcommittee has an opportunity to completely review the information we will have provided on our equipment status, I am certain that when incorporated with the total National Guard shortfall, you will have a much better view of the Guard's equipment level.

We would like to leave this subcommittee, however, with one point. Our units should have some assurances that the equipment they need to fight and win with is on hand. It may not necessarily be at our State armories, but should be in the Army inventory. We hope it is.

At this time, Senator, I ask Col. Robert Lilliedahl, Commander of the 157th Air Refueling Group at Pease Air Force Base, to address the status of the New Hampshire Air National Guard to this subcommittee.

Senator HUMPHREY. Colonel?

STATEMENT OF COL. ROBERT C. LILLJEDAHL, COMMANDER, 157TH AIR REFUELING GROUP, NEW HAMPSHIRE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, PEASE AIR FORCE BASE; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. KENNETH R. CLARK, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR MAINTENANCE; MAJ. KENNETH D. ALLEN, COMMANDER, COMBAT SUPPORT SQUADRON; MAJ. ALLAN G. WHITE, CHIEF OF MILITARY PERSONNEL; CAPT. DONALD J. RECHER, FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR (STAN/VTAL BR); AND MAJ. ROBERT F. FRANCOEUR, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR RESOURCES

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. Senator Humphrey, I am grateful also for this opportunity to provide you with information on the present status of the New Hampshire Air National Guard. I would like to begin with a brief history of the 157th Air Refueling Group since its conversion to the Strategic Air Command's refueling mission, and follow that by discussing the three primary aspects of our unit: manpower, training and equipment.

First, let me say that the record of the 157th Air Refueling Group will speak for itself concerning its readiness condition to support the national command authority's single integrated operational plan. Since 1976, the 157th Air Refueling Group has participated actively in every phase of SAC's air refueling mission in addition to a crew on alert for 24 hours of each day, our remaining aircrews fly daily air refueling missions in support of the Strategic Air Command's bombers, the Tactical Air Command's fighters, and the Military Airlift Command's air lifters, including the C-5A. All of this considerable daily activity has been completed with a positive attitude toward safety, attested to by the fact that the unit has not had a major accident during the last 23 years.

The daily training missions tell only part of the story. Our organization, in concert with the Total Force Policy, has always been a full partner with the Strategic Air Command. We have participated in many worldwide activities of the Command. Our KC-135's fly to Mildenhall Air Force Base in the United Kingdom four times a year for a 2-week period to serve with the European Tanker Task Force. We participate with the Alaskan Tanker Task Force at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, and on February 23, 4 tankers and 160 guardpersons from this unit will deploy to Anderson Air Force in Guam for a 15-day tour of duty with the Pacific Tanker Task Force. This 17,000-mile-round trip will achieve an even higher state of readiness for our personnel as they perform their military skills in the Pacific area.

As for manpower, there never has been a problem with the overall manning level of the unit since this area of the northeast, in close proximity to areas of high population density, gives us a large general population base from which to recruit. The unit is authorized 870 people and currently we are at 98.4 percent with 856 persons aboard. Our primary goal is to man our critical careers at 100 percent. Recently we have had some members requesting conditional release from our unit to go on active duty, and these are always approved, because we feel that a person who goes on active duty will benefit the Air Force more if they are serving on a full-time basis.

There are presently 67 women in our unit, about 7.17 percent of our total authorized strength, and that figure continues to rise. Women, for the most part, gravitate toward the traditional women's positions in the unit, primarily in the administrative, secretarial, and medical fields. However, we are seeing increased numbers entering nontraditional job specialties. There are a few who are serving in the maintenance field. We have one female aircrew member who joined us as a KC-135 boom operator, who recently completed the educational requirements and is now at Mather Air Force Base undergoing navigator training. Regardless of the specialty that these women choose to enter, they are doing exceedingly well throughout the unit.

We have one shortage among critical skills that has been difficult to rectify, and that is in the security police field. This has also been a problem in active duty units, since, I am sure, Senator, you realize that standing on a flightline on a cold winter evening is not truly a desirable military specialty. Because this unit is collocated with an active duty bomb wing and merely augments their security police flight, this has not caused us serious difficulty. Also, recent bonus initiatives for recruiting and retention of critical military specialties should see the security police manner at 100 percent soon.

The recruitment of aircrew members causes the unit concern only because so many highly qualified people have to be turned down, especially in the pilot specialty. Our Personnel Section has the names of many highly qualified personnel, for the most part ex-Air Force pilots, on file, hoping to get a position with the unit. Navigators and boom operators, though not quite so plentiful, have never been a problem.

In summary, manpower in this Air National Guard unit presents no problem. We have the people and they are well trained.

As for training, the training process of all units of the 157th Air Refueling Group seems to be well adapted to the perceived needs. Those units whose role and mission destine them to remain in the continental United States do most of their training here. Those units whose mission most probably would be conducted out of the continental United States do at least some training there. Obviously, the aircrews engaged in a mission that is intercontinental in scope are frequently training both away from home station in the continental United States and also outside the continental United States.

I am very happy to say that no training time is lost as a result of State-related training. Federal training programs maintain the skills that our personnel need to fulfill any requirement for State activation. Those units most frequently called to State Active Duty are our Civil Engineering Flight, the Clinic and the Security Police Flight.

As for equipment, I feel the supply support to this Air National Guard unit is outstanding. Each working day over 600 supply items are processed by the Supply Division of this unit. Delivery time for mission essential aircraft spare parts and other items is not excessive. We are scheduling a local four-day flying exercise this spring that will cause us to quick-turn aircraft for 72 consecutive hours to better assess the unit's capability to respond to that type of tasking both from an aircrew and a spare parts standpoint. Self-initiated operations of this type give us an opportunity to operate under a scenario that follows more closely one we might expect to encounter during wartime.

Perhaps we are very fortunate that Boeing built such a fine aircraft 25 years ago, for today, the KC-135's maintainability still presents no serious problems.

The two items that concern me, however, are the re-engining of the KC-135 and a shortage of chemical warfare defense equipment.

The new engines for the KC-135 is not a simple issue; however, since the day you flew the Boeing 707 aircraft equipped with the CFM-56 engine into Pease Air Force Base, the re-engining issue has received much publicity, and I believe finally the problem is about to be resolved.

As you are aware, the decade of the seventies saw the emergence of the KC-135 as a vital link in both strategic and tactical air power. The political climate for hosting of U.S. Air Force bases and the sharply rising costs of supporting those bases causes a significant cutback in overseas operating locations. To counter this decline, we have grown more and more dependent on in-flight refueling to provide the range needed for a rapidly deployable defense.

Since 1970, in-flight refueling capability has been added to the C-5A, the C-141, and the C-130 transports. Every new aircraft added to the Tactical Inventory, F-14's, F-15's, F-16's, the A-10 has also required in-flight refueling. This has resulted in a large increase in total demand for refueling training sorties. In addition, the B-52 is now being fitted with air launched cruise missiles which will degrade the B-52's range and proportionately increase the need for alert tankers to support the single integrated operational plan for our emergency war orders.

This increase in demand has been offset partially by the purchase of KC-10 tankers. Although this aircraft has exceptional capability to support strategic airlift and tactical unit moves, it is not intended to support the single integrated operational plan and can account for only a small percentage of the increased demand for training sorties. To date, there are no plans for the purchase of additional KC-10's or a new generation medium-sized tanker.

This leaves the burden for in-flight refueling to the K-135. It stands today as one of our most reliable aircraft, and it is capable of performing its role into the 21st century. Life extension modifications to the lower wing skin will extend the life of the structure from its current 10,000 hours to 25,000 hours, or approximately to the year 2020. Updated avionics are already being installed, and constant efforts are being made to insure that the remaining systems will be supportable for the life of the aircraft structure.

The sole capability which this workhorse lacks is adequate engine thrust. Its current four Pratt & Whitney J-57 engines each produce 12,925 pounds of thrust below 20° F., and above 20° they require demineralized water to be injected into the compressors to reach that thrust setting. This dependence on demineralized water severely hampers the dispersal capability of the aircraft.

In addition to its lack of thrust, the J-57 is, by today's standards, a fuel inefficient engine. Since the fuel tanks for feeding the aircraft engines and the offload tanks are not separate, the tanker can either burn or offload all of its fuel. This means that every pound of fuel that is not consumed by the tanker can be made available for offload to a receiver. A 10-percent reduction in fuel consumed by the

tanker during an 8-hour mission can result in a 20-percent increase in the available offload an engine which could produce more thrust with less fuel consumed would, in many cases, double the tanker's effective offload capability.

The Air Force began to study reengining in 1976, and in January 1980, the CFM-56 engine was selected through competition as the replacement engine. The CFM-56 is a high-bypass turbofan engine which produced 22,000 pounds of thrust at temperatures up to 90 degrees without water injection. It is a high technology engine built through a joint venture by General Electric and Snelma. The CFM-56 provides a 70-percent increase in thrust and a 25-percent reduction in fuel consumption. This amazing combination allows for an increased takeoff weight and decrease in consumption, which, on an 8-hour mission, can increase the current KC-135 offload capability by 250 percent.

There seems to be little question that the CFM-56 is the engine for the job. The only factor inhibiting a fleet-wide retrofit is the high cost of this modification. There are 615 tankers to be considered and that makes the total cost and time required to complete the program a significant factor in the decision.

A rate of six aircraft per month beginning in 1985 seems to be the fastest that this modification can be completed due to the demand on tankers for alert and training. This equates to 300 tankers by 1990. The cost for these 300 aircraft in 1982 dollars is estimated at \$7.5 billion, including the required spare and support equipment. Continuation of the modification beyond this point becomes less certain as the defense needs and state of aviation technology alter the program demands.

That would bring us to 1990 with 315 tankers trying to continue to perform their mission with engines which will be nearly 35 years old. The J-57 engines that become spare engines when they are removed for reengining will provide a large supply of spare parts, but there are parts on all of these engines which will need to be replaced by newly manufactured parts if the engines are to continue to provide their original rate of thrust.

The final option regarding reengining was a proposal made by American Airlines in October 1980. Federal regulations are requiring them to retire or reengine their 707 fleet which is equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT-3D turbofan engines. American Airlines suggested removing these engines for installation on the KC-135. Although this engine does not have the capability of a CFM-56, it does offer a 30-percent increase in thrust, 12-percent decrease in fuel consumption, and reverse thrust which would allow the KC-135 to use three times as many runways in the United States and Europe. These improvements can equate to an 80-percent increase in offload capability on the 8-hour mission previously described.

The JT-3D has numerous other benefits in that it is 85 percent compatible with its military counterpart, the TF-33, and the TF-33 is currently installed in the C-141, the E-3A, the C and VC-135B, and B-52H. Logistical support for this engine is in existence and technical data and performance characteristics for the KC-135 can be easily obtained from the existing C-135B data.

The decision to install these engines on 18 special purpose C-135 aircraft was made in September 1981, and the first completed modi-

fication is scheduled for delivery by the Boeing Military Airplane Co., on January 30, 1982. The entire group of 18 aircraft will be completed by June 18, 1982. The 1982 military appropriation bill added \$56 million in procurement funds and \$29 million for installation of the JT-3D engines on the standard tanker model. This amount is adequate to complete 16 tanker aircraft including spare engines by the end of fiscal year 1982.

How does this impact the Air National Guard? There is no doubt that the CFM-56 is an outstanding addition to the KC-135, and its added offload capacity goes a long way toward justifying its cost. The current program for 300 aircraft will do slightly less than one-half of the entire KC-135 fleet, and plans call for only 16 of the Air Guard's 104 tankers to be CFM-56 equipped. That leaves the Air Guard in 1990 trying to continue with the J-57 on 88 tankers which are operating from some civilian fields where runway length limitations cause very significant fuel load restrictions and subsequent reduced offload capability.

The Air National Guard feels that the CFM-56 and the JT-3D proposals must be pursued simultaneously and without prejudice to one another. This is not an either/or option but a blending of two proposals to reach a goal. The Air Staff must now decide which units will be equipped with the JT-3D reengined aircraft as they begin to come off the line in July of this year. The National Guard Bureau would like to see those 16 aircraft assigned to the Air National Guard with some very good reasons.

The first reason would be the Air Guard units currently have the most severe offload degrades due to the civilian airfield restrictions.

Second, with the first aircraft going to the Guard, the logistical support details can be worked within the Guard which has a proven record of problem solving.

Third, the skill level of the air technician jet engine mechanics is such that they could send a minimum number of people to a formal school and then train the remainder through on-the-job training.

Fourth, keeping the JT-3D engines within the Air Guard would eliminate a major training problem for the Strategic Air Command since by 1985 they could conceivably have to be training and managing three engines, the J-57, the JT-3D, the CFM-56, all on the KC-135 concurrently.

Fifth, since Air Guard units often work together to support receiver taskings and often rely on each other for logistics support, it is important that all Air Guard KC-135's have the same engines and performance characteristics.

Sixth, the supply problems associated with stocking parts for multiple engines are also significant. With only JT-3D's in the Guard, there will be a minimum of disruption for the active forces, and there will be continuity within the Guard.

Seventh, 7 of the 13 Air Guard units are located at civilian airports where noise ordinances impact on their operating hours and training priorities. Those units are currently required to use noise suppressors for ground maintenance, which adds to their support costs.

And eighth, the performance differences brought about by new engines will require additional aircrew training. Since the Air Guard

pilots already have the highest experience level in SAC and they also have airline experience with the JT-3D and reverse thrust, the training program should be minimal. To continue this fast moving program and complete the remaining 88 Guard tankers would require the expenditure of an additional \$275 million.

I cannot stress enough the value of the tanker as a key to the Nation's air power. We can spend money for new weapons delivery systems and for transports to get the supplies to the troops, but they all must have fuel and inflight refueling has proven to be the most reliable and flexible way of providing it. Thus, as long as this requirement exists, our tanker fleet must have greater offload capability to meet the growing demands.

We would like to thank you, Senator, for your strong support of the re-engining issue, and regardless of the way this program develops, a more modern engine should be our goal.

The other equipment item causing us concern is the shortage of chemical warfare defense equipment which is limiting the 157th's capability to fully support higher headquarters' contingency tasking. This equipment must be available for these units to perform their wartime missions in a chemical, biological, or radioactive environment. What bothers us is that we presently have procured 57 percent of our total requirement, yet at present cannot form a single bag that has the complete chemical warfare defense equipment kit included. The requisitioning of those items is NGB directed, based upon availability of funds, the assets, and the priority of the mission.

The equipment at best is marginally acceptable for use by an aircrew member due to its sheer bulk. Again, we are hearing that a new generation of equipment will soon be available. It would seem the status of this entire program should be reviewed for, if asked to perform in hostile environments, we can certainly foresee disastrous results, with an attendant large scale loss of life.

Senator Humphrey, the New Hampshire Air National Guard trains in its wartime mission on a daily basis. The problems that I have addressed are, for the most, national in scope. The National Guard Bureau is aware of our problems, and with continued congressional appropriations and support, I am certain they can be solved.

And we do sincerely thank you for your interest, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Colonel.

CONCLUSION

General BLATSOS. Senator, we have attempted to present a thoroughly accurate, unbiased and comprehensive overview of the New Hampshire National Guard.

With the resources available, we have concentrated on stabilizing our strength and correcting the decline we faced between fiscal years 1974 and 1979. We are encouraged. Congressionally approved monetary incentives in critical skill areas have been beneficial. Our increased emphasis on retention should improve our personnel management system and provide us greater insight into the attrition problems.

It is our conclusion that training readiness levels have improved and that our units have achieved objectives in spite of time and financial constraints. In this area, however, our priority units, as well as support units require the dedicated assistance of the Army and Air Force in

improving our mobilization and deployment capability. Training outside the United States is a key factor for our units to be successful in transitioning to a wartime environment.

Finally, equipping our units with modern, deployable equipment is essential to insure readiness for mobilization and early deployment. This must remain our highest priority since most of our current equipment inventory, while combat deployable, is not fully compatible with the equipment found in similar active component units. Upon deployment in a come-as-you-are war, equipment compatibility for spare parts and comparability for survival are a critical concern.

What we need, Senator, is more than promises of adequate wartime equipment level. We need guarantees that the equipment required to fight and win with is on hand, either in the possession of our units or available for distribution at deployment.

The New Hampshire units have proven that they are an integral part of the total force. We are capable of supporting the national security objectives of the United States, as well as uniquely qualified to respond rapidly and professionally to emergencies within the State.

We have accepted the challenges. Our future, however, relies upon the continuing strong support of the Congress in both funding and enabling legislation. That support will permit us to continue modernizing our force and make significant progress toward combat and mobilization readiness.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee. At this time, with your approval, my staff will join me in responding to any further questions you may have.

I would like to introduce my staff, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine.

General BLATSOS. Colonel Gallagher is the chief of staff. Colonel Geary is the personnel officer and director of personnel, and Major Blair is our Army aviation officer on my staff.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

General BLATSOS. Bob, I think you might want to.

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. Yes. Major Clark is the deputy commander for maintenance of the 157th. Next to him is Major Allen who is the combat support squadron commander at Pease. Don Recher is representing the deputy commander for operations. Captain Recher's job here is with our standardization and evaluation branch. Major Francoeur is the chief of resources of the 157th.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much.

I note that your statement, Colonel Lilljedahl, this morning differs somewhat from the statement that was submitted in that for reasons of brevity or perhaps modesty you have omitted the section that dwelt on the many awards which your unit has won in recent years, and like every citizen of the State of New Hampshire, we are very proud of that, and so I am going to include that part in the record nevertheless.

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. Thank you, sir.

[The information follows:]

LIST OF AWARDS

The record of the 157th Air Refueling Group speaks for itself when it comes to capabilities. If I might list some of the awards this unit has won during its brief history with the Strategic Air Command, you might get some idea of the

scope of those capabilities. These awards are by no means all inclusive, but they are those that best illustrate readiness—the ingredient that the unit works so hard to maintain.

On 30 June 1978, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, SAC, selected the 157th Air Refueling Group as the recipient of the SSgt Richard D. Rousher Trophy for outstanding operational capability and performance, and the 133rd Air Refueling Squadron of the 157th Group, the recipient of Eighth Air Force's "Golden Boom" Trophy for outstanding aircrew professionalism. These awards were won in a competition with all active and Air Force Reserve units within Eighth Air Force.

On 30 June 1978, the National Guard Bureau awarded our unit the National Guard Association of the United States Distinguished Flying Unit Plaque in recognition of achieving and maintaining the highest standards of operation readiness.

On 25 October 1978, SAC's Command Management Team awarded the 157th Supply Division an Outstanding rating. The Supply Division's equipment accounting error rate of less than one percent was the lowest ever recorded by any SAC Inspection Team.

In November of 1979 the 157th Air Refueling Group won the Navigation Trophy during SAC's Annual Bombing and Navigation Competition. Our unit was the first reserve force unit to ever win a trophy in that competition.

In December of 1979 the Department of the Air Force advised the 157th that they had been selected to receive the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for the period of 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1979.

In January 1980 the unit again won the Staff Sergeant Richard D. Rousher Memorial Trophy as Eighth Air Force's outstanding non-located tanker unit.

In February 1980 the unit won the Golden Tanker Trophy for outstanding aircrew professionalism. It was the first time that an air reserve force unit had received this award.

In August 1980, the 157th Air Refueling Group was designated as the top Air National Guard Flying Unit in the United States and was presented the General Carl A. Spaatz Memorial Trophy. This award recognizes the distinguished performance of all areas of the group and is the highest Air National Guard award given.

In January 1981 the Golden Tanker Trophy was presented to the 133rd Air Refueling Squadron of our group in recognition of aircrew and staff professionalism in the conduct of the air refueling mission. This was the second consecutive year that the unit won this award.

In February 1981 the unit again received the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award—this time for the period from 1 July 1979 to 30 June 1980.

Senator Humphrey, I would like to state unequivocally that this Air National Guard unit could never have been recognized in so many instances for its accomplishments if the unit were not ready, and I mean ready NOW to fulfill its wartime mission.

The accomplishments of this unit are unparalleled by any reserve force unit now flying the tanker. I am indeed a humble commander, intensely proud to be associated with a group of 870 highly professional members of the military. I feel also that the legislature of this State and the citizens of this State should be very proud of the accomplishments of their citizen soldiers. I know that our Commander-in-Chief, Governor Gallen, and our Adjutant General, Major General Blatsos, share my feelings, and we earnestly solicit your continued support of your air national guard unit.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have a number of questions that I want to ask you, General and Colonel, to expand on and clarify your testimony, but first I want to go to a series of questions that we have put together over the last week or two.

Before I turn to that list of questions, General Blatsos, in that you have been in the New Hampshire National Guard now for many, many years, and have been on hand to witness the transformation of the National Guard from an organization of, shall I say, weekend warriors that was not taken seriously and which did not have in today's terms, at least, a serious role except that of reinforcement

during a period of mobilization, into one in which it is part of the total force and expected to mobilize in very short order and indeed play a part, come immediately into the Active Army. I would like you to talk about the changes you have seen in the National Guard over the years and to explain what this total force concept is and the dramatically changed roles and responsibilities of the National Guard.

Can you do that for us to begin with? I think that would put things in context.

General BLATSOS. I think the National Guard and State militia have probably come full circle, Senator, and this is unprepared, incidentally. At one time we were the only force available to the territories here. Gradually, of course, there was a buildup of regular forces, and ultimately there was a large regular force, and the State's militia became just that, a State's militia. We participated in every war, and in fact, we were the primary source of manpower and equipment in most wars up until the Civil War.

Senator HUMPHREY. You were not involved at that point in time.

General BLATSOS. Not quite, not quite.

Within my experience—and I joined the Guard in 1939—we have become far more professional. The Guard has always had very capable people. It always had a little above the cut of the average citizen within its ranks.

However, the training requirements and the equipment became more and more sophisticated, and the people were recruited and retrained to accept that particular challenge.

Today's National Guard is no comparison to what I ever joined. We have a far more capable officer, far more dedicated people, far better educated, far healthier, and in greater numbers. And I might say the same about equipment. It is far better than we ever had in the past. It does leave a lot to be desired, as I think our testimony brought out.

I hope that answers that part of your question, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

I would like to pursue that a little bit further. The point I'm trying to bring out is that the National Guard of today, its role and its responsibilities are not those which it had and which I think Americans still think of it as having.

If you can contrast what is expected today of the National Guard in the event of a mobilization with what was expected of it in Korea and World War II, I think that would bring it into sharper focus.

General BLATSOS. I think there are several factors that have influenced that particular situation. The All-Volunteer Army has no doubt had a big influence on that. Essentially what we have today in the Armed Forces, both in the Reserves and in the Active, are the people that are going to fight the war. Before we can generate enough people to come in and fill out our ranks and fill out our losses, it will be more than several weeks, and I think I have heard all kinds of figures, from 10 to 20 weeks, and even more, before we have enough people to fill out our ranks, in other words, before you can get a draft operational.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General BLATSOS. Which means we would have to fight with what we have. And this is where the total Army concept came into being,

where they integrate the entire Army and Air Force assets into one viable resource.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General BLATSOS. And this was the genesis of that particular thinking.

What we have is what we are going to fight a war with—and I think this is probably what you are referring to, both in equipment and manpower. I would doubt if we could generate enough industrial capability overnight like we did in World War II. I am not too sure the industrial base is there, I am not too sure that we would have the time. We had 3 or 4 years to do it in World War II. We would not have that time today.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

It is also true, is it not, that responsibilities that once rested in the Active Army today have been transferred to the Reserve and the National Guard, and for that reason, units of the Guard and the Reserve would be called up virtually immediately and become part of the Active Army. It isn't like World War II and Korea where your people would be coming in weeks and months later to replace those who had been lost on the frontlines. You are going to be in the frontlines and expected to be in the frontlines within a very short period of time. And that is the genesis for the title of or the characterization of the total force concept, that the Guard and the Reserve today are part of the total force, and they are expected to play every bit as important a role as the Active Army, indeed, to become the Active Army and to become a part of it within just a few days' time.

That, of course, is the reason why we are more than ever concerned with the readiness status and preparedness of the National Guard and the Reserves, because we do expect them and depend upon them to come into the Active Force immediately and not some weeks or months later as formerly was the case.

And I worry. I dwell on this point because I think most Americans, in fact, I am afraid most Members of Congress, are not aware of that change in responsibility and how very important the Guard is today and how heavily dependent we are on the people of the National Guard to come right into combat in the event that occurs.

Well, let me work away at this list of questions, General, and then we will go back to your testimony because there are some questions that come to my mind on the basis of your statement as well.

I mentioned a moment ago that a dramatic transformation has occurred in the National Guard that roles which formerly belonged to the Active Army today are assigned to the National Guard.

How do you feel about that? Are the responsibilities that—does the Guard feel adequate to fulfill the responsibilities, to meet the responsibilities which have been transferred to it? Are there others that you could assume, or for that matter, vice versa? Are there roles that you would like to see turned back to the Active Army?

General BLATSOS. I think the missions and roles that have been assigned to the National Guard are usually cleared well ahead of time by the particular service, Army or Air Force, with the State involved, so that the missions we have we can handle and they are given with our approval, even before we receive them.

There is a discussion period before anything is assigned to any State. Does that answer your question, Senator?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. So you have no qualms about the role with the Guard in the total force concept.

General BLATSOS. None whatsoever. I feel very comfortable with it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I mentioned earlier that the Guard, in the event of mobilization, would be deploying some units and individuals very early.

Can you give us some examples of how units under your command would be expected to mobilize in very short order?

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Gallagher, my chief of staff, might better answer that question, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine.

Colonel GALLAGHER. Senator, during the past 10 years since the total force policy has come into being, we have noticed that deployment times of our units have shortened tremendously. Take one example of our helicopter unit, our medical evacuation unit. We anticipate that that would be within a matter of days of mobilization as some of our other units, some of the larger units might deploy somewhat later.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you qualify them a little better?

How many days are you talking about?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Without getting into classified data, Senator, I would say that it is weeks; not days.

Senator HUMPHREY. The fact is that we have done this, Congress has turned over a higher responsibility to the National Guard, which entails an early mobilization as a way of saving money. We have simply turned many of these responsibilities over to the National Guard because the National Guard is a more economical way of maintaining a force in a ready state than maintaining it in the Active Army. I am dwelling on this because I want to make a strong point—we should not have the terms Reserve and National Guard today because they call up the wrong perceptions. In fact this is the Active Army in a somewhat different form, and it would be a part of the Army in the field within a matter of days.

Colonel GALLAGHER. I might add one thing, Senator. Last summer during annual training of the 397th Medical Detachment, they in fact practiced the mobilization procedure. They proved that they could load their helicopters on aircraft, process their people, and in fact be ready to go in 48 hours.

Senator HUMPHREY. One of the disturbing elements of our military posture is our relative inability to deal with what is today called NBC. It used to be CBR's, but today it is nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. There is little reason to believe that our principal adversary would have any qualms about using those agents against us. Indeed, every reason to believe that they would, and every evidence to show that they are prepared to do it. It is part of their doctrine. Of course, we have seen that they have supplied chemical agents to their agents or their allies in Southeast Asia and perhaps other parts of the world.

And yet I am aware, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, that both our Active and Reserve and Guard Forces are ill-equipped, in fact, unequipped, to wage that kind of warfare, and ill-equipped to deter it, to protect themselves from it.

Can you talk about that, General? I know that you have a new unit up in Lebanon specifically designed to deal with this, and yet I note from your equipment list that about the only thing they have in full authorized quantity is hunting knives.

General BLATSOS. I think I addressed this in the opening statement, Senator, that we are not equipped, or properly equipped, actually, for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, and I am talking about a passive portion of it. We do not have the equipment.

Offensively, of course, I think you are well aware that our artillery units are trained in nuclear delivery systems, and we, too, have the system and we can handle it, and do an excellent job of it.

But I think that answers your question.

I think on the air side also we have a serious shortage in NBC equipment.

You might address that.

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. As I mentioned in my statement, the thing that concerns me is that we have spent considerable money on the equipment. Fifty-seven percent of that equipment is on hand.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. But it comes in without all of the various items of equipment, so it is impossible to put together even one complete kit of the chemical warfare defense equipment.

In addition to that, we did acquire a training ensemble, put it on an aircrew one day, and sent them out to fly a mission. We found it was a very, very bulky piece of equipment, very uncomfortable for a pilot to wear on a very long range mission, over several hours. It could seriously impair his ability to fly the airplane effectively.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am sure it would. I saw one such costume when I was in Germany recently, and it was supposed to be worn by a fighter pilot in an F-4. I do not know how he could get in the cockpit, much less fly the airplane. It looks as though it is something hastily assembled from items off the shelf that were intended for something else and it is another sign of how ill-prepared we are in this area.

But you mentioned the protection for aircrew, for pilots. What about for personnel on the ground, both Army and Air? What do you have in the National Guard?

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. The aircrew members that are deployable to high threat areas are authorized to be issued equipment, but their status is the same as other deployable members of the unit. In other words, we are getting the equipment in, but we do not have enough yet to put a single ensemble together.

Senator HUMPHREY. So there is not one member of the Air National Guard who has a complete ensemble.

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. Not yet.

Senator HUMPHREY. And so the fact of the matter is that were your people to be mobilized, and were they to encounter NBC or CBS—I'm not sure which is worse actually—

[General laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY [continuing]. Were they to encounter chemical agents, they would probably be dead; would they not?

Colonel LILLJEDAHN. Absolutely.

Senator HUMPHREY. Out of service or dead probably. And likewise that is true of the National Guard, the Army National Guard, General; is that not the case?

General BLATSOS. Yes, sir. I think Colonel Gallagher might have something to add to that particular situation.

Colonel GALLAGHER. We have requirements in two areas in CBR. One, as you mentioned, Senator, is the 195th Chemical Company, which we have newly formed in Lebanon, and they have two requirements, both the individual protective equipment, which they have very little of—about 10 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Colonel GALLAGHER. On the other side of the coin, to perform their mission, they need chemical decontamination units, which they do not have any of. However, it is promising because they are programed in July of 1982 to receive eight of these kits, fairly large kits, costing about \$10,000 each. However, the remainder of the personnel in the Army Guard have only about 5 percent of the equipment. That is for training purposes only.

You also have to understand you need a double issue of this equipment. You need one set for training and then one set that remains hermetically sealed. Our requirement in the Army alone for that individual equipment is about \$330,000, which we do not have.

Senator HUMPHREY. So there are two aspects of this. There is the protective equipment for all of the troops, both Air and Army, and there is a unit, specially created, to decontaminate equipment and personnel. And even that special unit does not have its equipment to protect against nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

I think it is important to understand where the funds come from in buying equipment. The National Guard is a hybrid of both State and Federal responsibilities, receiving funds both from the State and from the Federal Government. The vast bulk of it comes from the Federal Government. Nevertheless, I think it would be worth getting on the record for the clarification of those in the room where the money comes from, or why.

Which party is responsible for the underfunding and the ill-equipping of this force which is expected to mobilize, many parts of it, within a matter of days? That money comes from Congress, and it must be Congress and of course not the State that has to bear the responsibility for the problems that exist today, the very critical and grave problems. I think nothing brings it out faster than our ill-preparedness to deal with a chemical environment. Unfortunately, it is a very likely environment today, based on what we see the Soviets doing, and what their capabilities are and what their doctrine is with respect to use of that kind of warfare. We simply are ill-prepared.

If we had to mobilize these New Hampshire people or people from any other Guard units around the country, they would be naked to chemical agents, and most of them would die. In my opinion these are the terms that we have to use because there is far too much rhetoric in this country about how we are spending too much money on defense. We are going to do it, and we have to do it right. If we

do not want to do it right or cannot afford it, then we should do as Great Britain has done and reduce our role in the world and accept status as a fifth-rate nation. But if we are going to do it and ask these young men and women to put on a uniform, then we ought to at least give them the protection and the weapons with which to have a fighting chance.

Continuing to focus on equipment, General Blatsos, if you were mobilized today, what would your situation be with respect to equipment?

You have several times said this morning that you feel there should be some guarantee that the equipment would be there. You do not have it today. That is not unusual. Guard units have never had it, but they ought to have it today because the responsibility of the Guard units has changed markedly in recent years. But you do not have it. You apparently were assured somewhere on paper that you would have it, but I detect you are feeling uneasy about just where it is. You would like to know it is out there somewhere.

What is your status on equipment in the event that you were mobilized today?

General BLATSOS. I think that our equipment problems, Senator, are in three general areas. First, I think as we just discussed, the first area would be in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare equipment, both passive and active.

I think a second area that we experience a problem in is the noncompatibility of our artillery pieces with those in Europe. And incidentally, I might bring out that our firing battery that went to Europe last year, the battery out of Berlin and Lancaster, initially when they were identified to go, on a little closer examination we discovered the weapon we are armed with is not available in Europe, and we promptly—we had several months to work with—had this unit go over on weekend training assemblies to Camp Johnson, in Vermont, since the Vermont National Guard did have this particular weapon, and our people trained on that weapon so they could be familiar with it when they went overseas.

Incidentally, when they went over to Baumholder in Germany, they did an outstanding job. They walked 10 feet tall when they came back.

I think a third item I would like to bring out is—other than the comparability of our artillery pieces—is the lack of speech security equipment. This would be vital in any conversation that you wanted to carry on between aircraft and ground, or even people on the ground. Unless we have this secure equipment, we are going to have a serious problem because of the nature of the conversations that you have to carry on.

These are the three areas, Senator, that we have a serious problem in.

I think, Senator, if you want any further amplification on the com sec equipment, I think both Colonel Gallagher or Major Blair may add a little.

Senator HUMPHREY. Sure. Any time you want to call on your staff, go right ahead.

Colonel GALLAGHER. I would like to just elaborate a little bit on what the General mentioned on communications security equipment. This is broken down into two general areas, at least in the Army. One

is the security equipment for radio teletypewriters. That we are in good shape on. We have that complete. But on the other side of the coin, the radios, frequency modulated radios for speech, we have some equipment in this area, but it is not deployable. It is not compatible with what is presently in Europe.

We checked with the Army logistics people at Fort Huachuca, and there is no proposed get-well date. It does not appear that this is available. Hopefully it is somewhere.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are the implications of noncompatibility of equipment? What are the real implications, the practical implications? If you find yourself in Europe next week, what does that mean?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Let's take, for instance, one of our artillery battalions that would be assigned to a gaining command in Europe, say an artillery group headquarters. They are equipped with speech secure equipment. We would not be able to talk to them. It is that simple.

Senator HUMPHREY. You would be unable to communicate.

Colonel GALLAGHER. Yes, sir; securely.

Senator HUMPHREY. Securely. And if you are forced to communicate through nonsecure channels, what does that mean?

Colonel GALLAGHER. It leaves you quite vulnerable to being intercepted.

Senator HUMPHREY. And giving away your positions and plans. So you have a choice of not communicating or communicating while the enemy is listening in.

Colonel GALLAGHER. There are other means such as codes and ciphers. It is quite time consuming and not acceptable in today's battlefield environment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

While we are on the equipment, what about the age of the equipment that you have? How much useful life remains in, for instance, your howitzers, the communications equipment, your trucks and radar units?

I saw some of that equipment out at Camp Drum. It was out of service by virtue of being hauled over interstate highways from New Hampshire to upstate New York. What happens if you put that equipment over some rough roads, vacuum tube radar sets. Is that equipment going to be any good when it gets there?

Colonel GALLAGHER. You are mentioning our Q-4 radar and our target acquisition batteries. It is absolutely unacceptable equipment, as you know. It is just not maintainable. It takes two to keep one going. The equipment that is—we are programed for about 1984 or 1985 to receive the new T-36 equipment, and that is a few years away.

Senator HUMPHREY. In the meantime, on the basis of what you say, what is the designation of that radar?

Colonel GALLAGHER. I believe it is the TPQ-36. However, this is not only true for the National Guard. This is true for the active service. The active divisions are still equipped with the MPQ-4.

Senator HUMPHREY. If it takes two units to keep one in service, you have a reliability rate of about 50 percent.

Colonel GALLAGHER. At best.

Senator HUMPHREY. At best.

What about trucks? How much life is remaining? Are you in good shape?

Colonel GALLAGHER. The 744th Transportation Company, is authorized fifty-two 5-ton tractor trucks with 120 low-boy trailers. We only have three or four of the trailers. We have most of the 5-ton tractors, but they are 1952 vintage.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is an interesting statistic, but it does not necessarily give us an idea of how much useful life is remaining. I have seen 1952 type airplanes—of course, some of the B-52's were built in that era—that are still in perfectly good shape.

How much useful life is remaining in those trucks? Are they reliable?

Colonel GALLAGHER. I am not prepared to really say that now. I do not really know.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, General, or a member of the general's staff, how would you generalize the condition of your principal equipment? Is it pretty worn out, is it in pretty good shape? Is it reliable?

General BLATSOS. To answer your question, Senator, I think our equipment in general might be in pretty good shape. It is all running. We have an exceptionally good maintenance capability in the National Guard, as I think we brought out, because of the stability of our work force. I think the equipment is in a good, drivable state, and will probably last a long time.

I would question whether the equipment is deployable, and whether it is of the same generation of equipment that might be in Europe or whatever battlefield we might go to, and whether we could get parts and so forth for it.

What might run good here in an old vintage truck and so forth might be all right, but can you get parts for that if you go overseas?

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, you have a lot of equipment which the Army no longer has in its active inventory and therefore has no spare parts for.

General BLATSOS. I think to a certain extent—I do not have any figures, unless somebody here does—but to a certain extent, yes we have older generation equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. So you would have a tough time keeping it repaired in the field.

General BLATSOS. If we deployed with it, yes, because again, as you probably know, you need a steady stream of supplies to keep any equipment operational. It does not matter whether it is weapons or motor vehicles or tanks or airplanes.

Senator HUMPHREY. We will come back to this subject.

Earlier you expressed some doubts, General Blatsos, about the ability of the industrial base, or our ability to count on the industrial base to provide us with needed equipment in the event of a mobilization.

In earlier mobilizations we had the luxury, shall we say, of some months and even years to build up the industrial base to produce what we needed. Today the environment has changed considerably. We are in the era, as you pointed out, of the come-as-you-are war.

Why did you raise that issue? Do you feel that the Guard is dependent to some degree on the industrial base for equipment which it does not now have?

General BLATSOS. I think I mentioned that when I said we should have some kind of a guarantee that when we do deploy to whatever area, that the equipment is there for us to use. I think this is when it came up. If it is not there, and the equipment we have is not deployable, then I would raise the question: Can we get it? And I am not an authority, of course, on our industrial base or anything. It was just a comment that came out inadvertently. That would be of concern, could we get the equipment fast enough. I would doubt whether we would have the luxury of a 3- or 4-year buildup period in any future war.

Senator HUMPHREYS. Yes, yes.

Well, your concern about where the equipment lies that your men would be expected to use keeps coming out. As you have admitted, it is not unusual that the Guard simply does not have its wartime equipment. It barely has its training equipment. In fact, it does not have its full complement of training equipment.

So it is only natural that you would wonder where the equipment is that you are training to use or would be expected to use. Apparently it has not been made clear to you by the Army where that equipment is. Maybe they do not know.

One would think that the State adjutant would know where the equipment is, where he and his people are going to find the equipment they are supposed to use. Apparently it is not made clear to State adjutants by the Army where the equipment is; is that correct?

General BLATSOS. I think probably in certain areas it has been made clear. I am sure there are POMCUS sites where we store our equipment in Europe and in Germany, and I think you may have visited some of those sites. They have a considerable number of division sets prepared for units coming over.

I am not aware as to whether we have equipment allocated or earmarked for us if we go over. I would assume that the units with a priority mobilization mission have already been informed that there are unit sets ready for them the minute they are airlifted into Europe.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General BLATSOS. I am not aware of that because I do not think we have any units earmarked that clearly.

Do we?

Colonel GALLAGHER. We do not have any earmarked in POMCUS sites.

Colonel BLATSOS. So I cannot give you an answer.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, this is certainly no criticism of you, but rather, of the Army. It is worrisome that someone with your responsibilities is unsure of where he is going to get the equipment, particularly in light of the fact that none of your units are entitled to these pre-positioned stocks in Europe. That is, for the benefit of those who do not have their dictionary of acronyms, what POMCUS is all about. They are pre-positioned stocks in Europe on which our people would fall and pick up their equipment; the idea being that they can save time by not having to bring it with them.

But none of the New Hampshire Guard units are entitled to the use of any of that equipment. So that is one more source that is eliminated to make up this shortage in equipment needed at the time of mobilization.

So the mystery remains: Where is the equipment? And I would say on the basis of my hearings that a large part of it is simply not there, period.

Are your units programed for any new equipment, General Blatsos?

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Gallagher probably can give you the answer to that.

Colonel GALLAGHER. Sir, I mentioned that we were programed for the chemical decontamination units.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

How soon are you going to have that Lebanon unit fully equipped? How soon is the Army going to give you that equipment?

Colonel GALLAGHER. We do not know that answer. We do not have the answer. Funds are one of the big problems, the money to equip the individuals with the individual equipment, we just do not have sufficient money at this time. We are slowly getting into it as money becomes available. That is dollars made available to the State.

General BLATSOS. I think I may have a little more definitive answer for you, Senator. We are programed to receive certain things. I think we have an automated data processing system committed to our 3643d maintenance company on January 1, 1983. That is a year from now. We have 54 new tubes that will be installed on our 155mm howitzers that will give us a longer range capability, and also the capability to handle the more sophisticated ammunition that has been developed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fifty-four out of how many?

General BLATSOS. That is how many we are authorized.

Senator HUMPHREY. So you are being completely reequipped or modernized in howitzers.

General BLATSOS. That is right, and that is a fairly expensive procedure.

We do have eight chemical decontamination units that will be available on July 1, 1982, and this is what is programed now. They cost, incidentally, about \$10,000 apiece, and they will be going to the nuclear company that we have in Lebanon.

We are slowly beginning to be equipped with defensive chemical equipment other than gas masks. We are currently equipped at 10 percent, and to bring the New Hampshire Army National Guard up to the full equipment level would cost something like \$329,000. That is in NBC equipment. And I think they established priorities at the National Guard Bureau as to what units would get this, and it is always a matter of dollars. I am not sure it is just on equipment.

Does that answer part of your question?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; it does. Thank you.

What about organizational changes? Any units coming in or programed to leave?

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Gallagher can probably best answer that.

Colonel GALLAGHER. The National Guard Bureau is constantly in a state of reviewing the structure, also the authorization documents that we presently have. So we are constantly receiving minor changes to the present structure. But they do not have any real impact on readiness.

To our knowledge, there are no major organizational changes programmed for the New Hampshire National Guard.

Senator HUMPHREY. I doubt that most citizens are aware of just how large an impact the National Guard has on the State. One way of measuring is the economic impact in dollars and cents.

Can you characterize the economic effect on the State of the National Guard's operations?

General BLATSOS. Senator, I think in this past fiscal year the Federal Government has spent well over \$20 million in the State of New Hampshire, that is, with payrolls and all the other things that we expend for the National Guard in New Hampshire. That was the Federal Government's share of spending.

If you want to compare that and, of course, if the good citizens of New Hampshire want to compare it, it is something less than \$1 million that the State of New Hampshire has contributed toward the National Guard. That was primarily for buildings, heat, utility, and labor force, \$20 million is the figure the Federal Government spent here in New Hampshire for the National Guard.

Senator HUMPHREY. And that is with your strength at what percent?

General BLATSOS. Eighty-one percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. Eighty-one percent.

What would it be if you were at 100 percent? Would it change significantly?

General BLATSOS. There would be a significant change. There would be something like \$2.7 million additional in the State of New Hampshire, and that would be strictly for payrolls.

It is big business.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let's turn to the area of manpower. You are at 81 percent of peacetime authorized strength, is that correct?

General BLATSOS. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is there a difference between your peacetime strength and your wartime strength?

General BLATSOS. The wartime strength is the actual strength that we are programmed for. We just have not arrived there. I think country-wide the National Guard is at 92 percent, and we are just below the average there.

We are striving to hit 100 percent, and we probably will. When, I am not sure. But I think that we recognize that we are also increasing our strength requirements every year in the National Guard, and we have also done it here in the State of New Hampshire, with modifications in our table of organization, and also in that we have picked up new units, like the NBC company which added another 102 people to our strength.

So, to answer your question, we are not at 100 percent. We would like to be at it. That is a desirable goal to reach, and we probably will.

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope you are right.

Colonel GEARY. Senator, I am Colonel Geary, Director of Personnel.

I would like to add that last year we increased our overall strength by 185 officers and enlisted people, which was a significant increase from the previous year.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, that is good, and I am sure it is a result of conscientious effort. But nevertheless, the historical trend has been

a considerable shortfall not just for New Hampshire units, but for National Guard in general.

What is the problem in New Hampshire? Is there an insufficient manpower base for your needs? What are the obstacles, General Blatsos?

General BLATSOS. I think I probably answered that a little earlier. We could have been at 100 percent, if we did not keep reorganizing and upgrading our units. If you have an artillery battalion that originally starts with a 500-man unit, or a 500-man strength, and then you add 100 people to it, through a change in the table of organization, or you add another unit to it, then you automatically fall down to 80 percent of strength. We have done this. We have shot ourselves in the foot strengthwise by doing just that, picking up the NBC company, as an example.

The other thing, of course, is there is no doubt that both demographics and the number of people in the eligible age group is gradually diminishing throughout the whole United States, and I think they expect within the next several years that we are going to have 25 percent fewer people that would be eligible for military duty.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, is the manpower pool a problem today in New Hampshire?

General BLATSOS. I do not think so. I think more than that we have a much better economy in New Hampshire than most other States, due to lower unemployment. Second, I think that incentives are absolutely necessary to recruit people into skilled and unskilled military jobs. If you do want to get a good or better caliber person, you have to give them the incentive to join. And we have noticed that every time we have been given added incentives, either by the State or by the Federal Government, that we have had a much better opportunity to sell the National Guard.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

You are still finding there is insufficient financial incentive to attract enough recruits to bring your manpower up to 100 percent?

General BLATSOS. I think we can always use more incentives, Senator, because we are constantly going into a different pool of people, a different market.

I think we do. We constantly have problems with both families and—it is not a matter of finding a man, but you have to find a man whose family agrees with the move. You also have to find a man, or a woman—I use man——

Senator HUMPHREY. Spouse is the word today.

General BLATSOS. But you also have to recruit an individual who will not have a problem with his employer. Keep in mind that the National Guard is a part-time organization and these people have to work for a living. The Guard is a part-time job, so to speak, and unless we find an employer or a person that has the blessing of an employer, then we have an additional problem.

So to answer your question, I think we can recruit—and recruit well—if we have a variety or a broad spectrum of incentives to include the employer, if possible.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any ideas along those lines?

General BLATSOS. Millions of dollars are expended annually by the Government to convince America and American men and women that

the All-Volunteer Force can effectively provide for national strength and maintenance of world peace. But, how much longer can we lull ourselves into believing that the Nation's real military manpower base—the National Guard and Reserve—will continue to risk job security or career development?

Despite the dedicated American employer who has pledged "patriotic cooperation" in support of the Guard and Reserve, recent surveys pointedly reaffirm that job conflict is the No. 1 impediment to voluntary Reserve service. The Universal Military Training Act has, in actually, little clout and is circumvented, in many instances, with little ease.

Our message that Guard or Reserve employees are more reliable, more responsible and better equipped to perform under pressure is little consolation to the blue collar "citizen-soldier" who labors endlessly to make ends meet each month. They are the ones who confront the company hassles each year at annual training time and ask, "Is my E-4 salary worth all this?"

It is time for America to make a solid investment in the Reserve soldier, if the All-Volunteer Force is intended to survive. Bonuses, incentives, and advertising only scratch the surface. It is time to move the American employer on the defense side of the track. Certificates of Appreciation are great for the short term, but, they have little lasting value. The time has come to give our guardsmen and reservists an E. F. Hutton feeling of security.

The defense establishment should be talking the language of the American businessman—money. If the All-Volunteer Force is to be preserved and employer support is to be a saleable commodity, then American businessmen should have access to a financial incentive for employing guardsmen and reservists.

The Congress should enact legislation that allows a business to take an across the board tax credit of at least 4 percent of the gross annual salary for each Guard or Reserve employee. After all, tax credit make business sense.

Just think about the result—employers encourage employees to serve in the Guard or Reserve—a no hassle annual training—job security and nondiscriminatory career advancement. Furthermore, an incentive of this nature will take those of us responsible for strength management off our knees and put us face to face in the employer support arena.

This should not reduce our employer support activity or reflect negatively on those patriotic employers who have pledged support. Rather, it should reaffirm our defense posture and reassure the Guard and Reserve that naivete has been replaced by reality and they can, in fact, "lead two lives."

America can put its money where the need is.

When this was proposed to me, it sounded like pie in the sky, in a way, but it sounded like an excellent means of finally approaching the employer. And there is no doubt, although there are many laws that protect the National Guardsmen, the State and Federal laws that protect us from any abuse on the part of any employer, we rarely exercise these laws because we realize that it would be again shooting ourselves in the foot because there are many employers that just do not look upon membership in the Guard for any of their employees as being com-

patible with their employment. There is no doubt, it is a hardship. A proposal like this would no doubt sweeten the deal for an employer.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you finding, on the basis of your experience over the years that employers are more willing or less willing to put up with Guard members' training absences?

General BLATSOS. More willing. I think we have gone a long way toward winning the understanding of the employers. And when I say employers, I am talking about the employers in general. The Federal Government, of course, has set up the employer support committee which has a large job of influencing business, and particularly the big corporations. Those do not pose a problem. The problem that we usually have is with the first-line supervisor of our guardsmen, the foreman, the person who is only one or two steps above our guardsman.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about the other side of the coin, the area of manpower levels, retention? How are you doing there? What are the problems?

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Geary can best answer that.

Colonel GEARY. Sir, in the area of retention, New Hampshire is presently ranked the second highest State in the country for retention at expiration term of service. So we are right up there on retention.

As far as retaining those people who will leave the Guard prior to the expiration of their term of service, we rank seventh in the country, the highest in New England.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is that in absolute figures? If they are all doing poorly, it is not too hard to be seventh highest.

What is the retention rate?

Colonel GEARY. We have an 82-percent-retention rate and manage to keep our unprogramed losses to about 1 percent of our assigned enlisted strength.

Senator HUMPHREY. Over what period of time has that trend held, a couple years?

Colonel GEARY. Yes; it has been about 2 years.

Senator HUMPHREY. So your principal problem is recruitment, is that it?

General BLATSOS. That is it.

Colonel GEARY. Senator, we are presently short 492, both officers and enlisted men and women in the Guard, but we do feel with the present population in New Hampshire, and if we have the Congress support for incentives toward recruitment and the added support of full time recruiting personnel, we can attain 100 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a pretty remarkable rate of retention. I commend you for that. I know it does not happen by accident.

If you were at 100 percent, General, is there enough money, or would you be spreading your training resources even thinner and diluting your training even further? Or would you get additional money from the Army if you had that 100-percent complement.

General BLATSOS. The Federal funds are there for us to go up to 100 percent, because the National Guard, in budgeting, assumes that all are going to be—I guess they make an educated guess, but they assume that the entire structure will be up to strength. So they budget very close, but they assume, of course, that they will not quite reach it because they know what the trends are. But the money would be there.

Senator HUMPHREY. To what extent have the pay raises in recent years for the active forces affected the Guard? Did your people share in that at all?

General BLATSOS. We are on the same pay scale, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. And what has been the result of those pay increases? Have they helped in the way of recruitment?

General BLATSOS. Elation. Everybody is very happy with them, and yes, they have helped. There is no doubt about their helping.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you seen recruitment go up since those pay raises?

General BLATSOS. We have an additional selling point there. I do not know if you can tie it directly. Retention would be the critical thing because these are the people that are in the service, and they see the additional \$10 or \$20 a day, whatever the rate might be.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would certainly be interested in having your staff prepare some proposals to improve recruitment, some incentives. I do not want to dwell on that further today, but that appears to be the heart of the problem.

If you want to have your staff submit some ideas to me in writing, I would be glad to have them.

General BLATSOS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The following proposals are submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Military Preparedness for the purpose of improving recruiting and retention in the National Guard and Reserve.

1. Congress is urged to authorize and fund incentives to all units and all personnel of the National Guard and Reserve, regardless of career skill or priority of units.

2. Congress is urged to pass legislation to authorize: medical and dental care, pay and allowances, travel and transportation allowances (hospital), physical disability retirement or separation for the member; burial expenses and medical and dental care for surviving dependents if death results from injuries incurred by a Guardsman under different forms of training duty.

3. Congress is urged to pass, in the first session of the 97th Congress, H.R. 1400 and H.R. 3977, the Veterans Education Assistance Act, which extends a form of the G.I. Bill to active and reserve components.

4. Congress is urged to amend the Survivor Plan (SBP) to provide that a member of the National Guard or Reserve who dies after completing 20 years of qualifying service under Chapter 67 of Title 10, USC, and who has not elected any other option, shall be deemed to have elected an immediate annuity, in the maximum amount, payable to the member's spouse, or, if there is no surviving spouse, then to the children in equal shares.

5. Congress and the Department of Defense are urged to provide an open period for a Survivor Benefit Plan option selection by Guard and Reserve members who elected not to participate in the plan before enactment of Public Law 96-402.

6. Congress and the Secretary of Defense are urged to change applicable rules and regulations to allow qualified surviving dependents the use of exchange and commissary privileges when they become eligible for an annuity under Survivor Benefit Plan.

7. Congress is urged to adopt H.R. 1498 to provide full retirement credit for all inactive duty training recorded by members of the National Guard and other Reserve components. This should be retroactive.

8. Guardsmen and Reservists and dependents should have unlimited Exchange and Commissary privileges at military installations.

Senator HUMPHREY. How is the full-time manning program going? Give us an insight into that. What are its advantages and so on?

General BLATSOS. Well, the full-time manning program plays a very critical part, there is no doubt, in the National Guard today. I think

Colonel Geary can probably—it is his area of expertise. I think he can give you a far more definitive answer on it.

Colonel GEARY. Senator, the full-time manning, as the general mentioned, certainly plays an important part toward the readiness of the unit for mobilization.

Senator HUMPHREY. Will you give us a quick explanation of what that is for the benefit of the people in the audience?

Colonel GEARY. For example, sir, our guardsmen, because of additional support at the unit level, are enjoying better training, better administration, and better supervision by our NCO's during training because of the full-time support personnel who have been there to assist between training assemblies, to prepare for the next training program. They also have been—which is important—there to have the armories open for guardsmen to come in between assemblies. This is important toward maintenance of strength, morale, and welfare of the unit members.

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Lilljedahl might have the Air Force side of that, Senator.

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. I might add that at Pease Air Force Base, the latest strength figures we have of our full-time force, includes 13 who are full-time, military people. Those 13 people that we have in the organization have not added to the strength of our full time support. It seems as through they have merely gone from civil service employees to full-time military. So I want to point out to you that it has not created any additional manpower for us.

The only thing that bothers me about it—and it is not a serious concern—is that the civil service program, or the technician program, has developed an outstanding Guard unit, particularly the Air Guard; it has been a great thing, the civilian-military connection, and involves a lot of great morale in the unit. Though I would not want to say that a full time military program would alter the outstanding performance of the Guard unit, I would still say we have been very successful, and I wonder if we want to, alter that too much.

General BLATSOS. May I interject here, Senator, just for a second?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General BLATSOS. I think this full-time manning might just have thrown us off a little bit. As you probably know, the original program that we had for full-time employees in the National Guard were civil service employees, technicians.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

General BLATSOS. And subsequent to that we started also adding active duty military people to our forces, and this we call full-time manning. I think we may have a slight—I am not too sure whether we were discussing the same thing. Were we?

Full-time manning—and I put this in cap letters now—Full-Time Manning is the program now, there are a series of programs where we actually take a person and put him on active duty, not in civil service status but in active duty, and we have several right here in our presence in that particular category, and they are paid active duty pay, and all the allowances and everything else an active duty man has, but they are not in civil service status.

Were you referring to this?

Senator HUMPHREY. That is what I was referring to, what you just described.

Is that something new? How is it going?

General BLATSOS. Full-time manning is going good. It is going good. It gives us a little more flexibility in our program. As Colonel Liljedahl mentioned, it has not materially added to our strength in full-time employees, but it has given us a little different type of person, a little different category of person in many ways. In this particular case, you put a person on active duty, you keep him—I think the 2-year tour is the customary one, and you can keep renewing it. If the person or the particular job runs out, you can discharge the person. It is a little harder to handle it than the other persons. But both programs are excellent.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you have some continuity in your administration.

General BLATSOS. That is right, but the Congress allowed this particular program to start concurrent with the technician program several years ago, and to date, to answer your question, it has worked, and worked quite well.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, what areas do you have full-time personnel?

General BLATSOS. We have them in recruitment and retention, we have them in certain jobs that have been changed over. I think we have some in mechanics.

Pete, I think you can answer that.

Colonel GEARY. Sir, some of our higher priority units getting additional men added to them, and they are working out very well.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the full-time person in the area of recruitment and retention resulted in higher and greater successes in those areas?

General BLATSOS. No doubt. It has been a highly successful program, and I think the thing that Colonel Geary just mentioned about our success both in recruitment and retention compared to the other States would indicate it. It has been an excellent program.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have need for more of those people?

General BLATSOS. I think we will in the future. I am not too sure what the need will be.

Are you referring to recruitment and retention, or in general?

Senator HUMPHREY. In general.

General BLATSOS. In general, yes. I think it is indicated that if we want to maintain a high state of readiness, that we are going to need more people, and particularly—and I think Colonel Gallagher can probably best answer—what we feel are the real shortages.

Colonel GALLAGHER. Before I answer that, Senator, I would like to just go back a little bit and redefine what we really mean by full time manning. I think the Air National Guard and the Army is a little bit different.

There are a number of programs in the total technician program. Presently we have civil servants on the general schedule and wage scale. We have title 32 of the United States Code, people which some of us are referring to as full time manning. That is merely converting a general schedule or wage scale person to a title 32 active duty status. We also have recruiters who are on title 10, active duty.

There is an additional program I think that we, the Army, have what the Air National Guard does not have. That is the additive manning program, and what these are, are a combination of people that we can hire into our units as supply people, training NCO's and administrators. There are two types of these people. We can hire them from our own assets or we can go to the Active Army and have them assign an Active Army man to us, and I think this area is what the general was alluding to when he said we need more of these people. And it is in this general area that General Walker at the National Guard Bureau, the Director of the Army Guard, has, expressed many times, the desirability of having a training NCO in each of our Army units to enhance our training.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many people do you have assigned to you from the Active Army?

General BLATSOS. What is that number?

Colonel Geary may have the answer.

Colonel GEARY. Presently we have two people that are assigned from the Active Army.

Senator HUMPHREY. In what capacity?

Colonel GEARY. They are in the 744th Transportation Company. They are assigned as training NCO's.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, what problems did you find surfacing when your units deployed overseas with their sister units or parent units or whatever you call them?

I imagine you learned a lot of things by sending your people overseas, having them deploy under more realistic conditions.

I think that is a very good program. I would like to see that continued and extended, but I would like to know on your level what your people found out, what kind of problems came up and so on?

General BLATSOS. Well, we had the ordinary problems of communications, of where we were going, what we were going to do, and who we were going to meet and some of these minor ones. We have a problem, of course, in transportation.

And Jim, could you address that?

Colonel GALLAGHER. It was merely a hassle trying to get it all accomplished. It always does get accomplished in the the end. It is just not an easy thing.

Senator HUMPHREY. You had problems with logistics to begin with?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Not particularly, no, sir. The general mentioned earlier that our people were deploying on a different model weapon. They are 155-millimeter towed howitzer, which we were assigned and authorized here. What they were training on over there was a self-propelled, what they call an M-109. It is a self-propelled 155-mm howitzer, not a particular problem because, as the general mentioned, we trained on it before we went, but just moving the people. All they went with was their personal field gear. They used the equipment from the host unit at Baumholder.

Senator HUMPHREY. What kind of problems?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Just problems of transportation.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are they?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Moving on buses, aircraft at different locations.

Senator HUMPHREY. Coordination?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Coordination and a redeployment right up to the last minute, the evening, before we got final answers on how they were going to move, and if this is a problem in peacetime, what is it going to be—

Senator HUMPHREY. Absolutely. That is why it is so important to do it, because you do not know what the problems are until you try it.

General BLATSOS. Senator, if you would like, we have an afteraction report that was prepared after the unit returned here that pretty well defines the pluses and minuses of everything that occurred. We will include that with a package of material for you, for your perusal.

Senator HUMPHREY. Very well, thank you.

This matter of deploying and falling on equipment that differs significantly from what you have in training is one that worries me.

Is that problem only the area of the howitzers, or is it in other areas as well?

General BLATSOS. Well, of course, we have this in communications, which was mentioned earlier, and the howitzers, and what else?

John, I think you had some problems in aviation.

Major BLAIR. Our aircraft, Senator, are the same. They are fully deployable and the same that the Active Army has. We have similar problems to our ground forces and the Active Forces, in that we have little nuclear, biological and chemical defensive equipment. As the general mentioned, we have no night vision goggles for training.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the significance of that?

Major BLAIR. It limits our ability to fly at terrain flight levels, at low level, at night in a total blackout. You are unable to do that, so you are easier to detect and easier to eliminate.

Senator HUMPHREY. You do not even have training access.

Major BLAIR. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. So your pilots, did they get that training during active duty?

Major BLAIR. The pilots are receiving it in flight school now, but we are unable to take our more senior pilots that have been in the unit and train them.

Senator HUMPHREY. So some of your more senior pilots have never been exposed to these night vision devices; is that correct?

Major BLAIR. Of our pilots, only one or two have received it.

Senator HUMPHREY. During mobilization they would be expected to be proficient in the use of those devices, flying low to presumably avoid hostile fire.

Major BLAIR. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. So they are just not trained in something that they are expected to be able to do when you get there because of lack of equipment.

Major BLAIR. Correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about the communications problem, the incompatibility of what you have over here and what you find in the field? Is the equipment significantly different? Do you have a case of an operator getting in front of a panel he does not know how to use?

General BLATSOS. Does it affect your operation, John?

Major BLAIR. In aircraft, our radios are compatible except for FM speech secure equipment. We do not have that. We have the communication radios.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about ground communications equipment, field communications equipment?

Colonel GALLAGHER. That basically is the same answer as the aviation. The equipment is compatible except for the speech secure equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see.

Major Blair, you said that your helicopters are pretty much the same used by the Active Army. Is that correct? Did I understand that correctly? Do you have all of the equipment aboard them? You have already mentioned the night vision equipment that you do not have.

Are there other items, or is that the only exception?

Major BLAIR. No; there are other items, sir. The medical evacuation helicopters do not have a second VOR navigation radio, localizer receiver, marker beacon and guidescope receiver, or radar altimeters.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you at liberty to say whether you would take those aircraft with you on your deployment, or would you pick up something over there?

Major BLAIR. I believe this would be the equipment that we would leave.

Senator HUMPHREY. You would leave with that equipment?

Major BLAIR. We have the same equipment as does the active duty.

Senator HUMPHREY. It does not have the full complement of navigation equipment that the Regular Army helicopters have.

Major BLAIR. That is correct. The medical evacuation helicopters do not have the same equipment as the Active Army, which is called the UH-1V. It is not exactly the same.

Senator HUMPHREY. Any other deficiencies? Any other differences between your helicopters and that the Army has?

Major BLAIR. Not as much as the UH-1 or the OH-58 helicopter goes except that there is I think a common problem between the active component and the Reserve as far as having adequate defensive equipment to defend against heat-seeking or radar-guided antiaircraft weapons.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is that equipment called?

Major BLAIR. Either heat-seeking or—defensive equipment to defend against heat-seeking or radar-guided antiaircraft.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, the Regular Army helicopters have some kind of warning system to advise the pilot that radar is locked on, or is being tracked, and can take evasive action. You do not have that?

Major BLAIR. We do not have that, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mentioned earlier—let me go back. I want to be sure of something in my mind. I mentioned earlier I saw your radar units in the field, and they were vacuum tube technology. Is that an exceptional case or is much of your equipment quite old and outdated in terms of technology?

I am not talking about serviceability or whether it still works, but I am talking about how old it is.

General BLATSOS. I think in the case of our radar equipment, it is the same equipment that the Regular Army uses. Whether they are outfitted—I think some of the Rapid Deployment Forces still use them; do they not?

Colonel GALLAGHER. I don't know.

General BLATSOS. But to answer your question, in other equipment—and again, Colonel Gallagher might have a better answer—is there a big generation gap between our equipment and the Regular Army, other than the howitzers?

Colonel GALLAGHER. It is difficult to say yes or no because in procurement we get some equipment right from the factory. For instance, the latest series of trucks we have been getting the last few years, the M-880 trucks, they are all brandnew equipment.

Senator HUMPHREY. How large a truck is that?

Colonel GALLAGHER. A ton and a half. We recently received all new radio teletypewriters. These are units that fit in the back of the 880 trucks, and they are all brand new. So we get some things directly from the factory. Some we get in the trickle-down process. Of our howitzers, it is kind of interesting to note, one in Keene, N.H., is a 155-millimeter model with a serial No. 5 on it. So it has been around a few years.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Blatsos, you talked about the special problems the Guard has because of family considerations. Those problems no doubt would be magnified in the event of a mobilization.

What problems would those be, and what responsibility do you have, if any, to deal with that kind of problem?

General BLATSOS. I think upon mobilization, Senator, of course the entire family, the soldier concerned, and spouse and the family, are all immediately brought under the umbrella of the Federal Government like any other active duty soldier, and we promptly take people in, and we prepare and issue identification cards for the entire family, give them the entire gamut of medical, administrative, logistical, and even religious assistance. Essentially and legally, our responsibility would stop upon mobilization of the individual soldier. Then they would come under the Regular Army responsibility. However, in practice we have continued to assist them, and we experienced this in the Vietnam callup when we sent a battalion to Vietnam, and we continued to assist all of the families. We acted as a go-between ourselves and all the services.

And I think probably one of my staff can amplify on this.

Colonel Geary?

Colonel GEARY. Sir, we have in the past, as the General mentioned, maintained a close relationship with the families, have always offered the services of the Adjutant General's Office any time there were problems or questions. We also have offered our own legal personnel to help solve any problems which may have come about, and we intend to do this in the future.

We are constantly preparing ourselves for mobilization through Mobex exercises. Most recently, we had a mobilization exercise of the 397th Medical Evacuation Unit, whereby several families of the guardsmen participated. We gave the mobilization briefings that they would normally receive upon mobilization. We took ID photos, prepared dependents ID cards, explained procedures for preparation of wills, and all in all it was an excellent exercise.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, going back to this matter of the changed role of the Guard and its being an important part of the total

force. Would it be possible that some of your unit would mobilize, that is, be shipped to a theater in advance of certain units of the Active Army?

General BLATSOS. Very possible. In fact, Colonel Gallagher may have some situations when this would happen.

Colonel GALLAGHER. It is hard to get into that area without getting into classified data, Senator. There is no doubt that what the General said is definitely true. Some high priority Guard units would definitely go before active.

Senator HUMPHREY. Including some units in New Hampshire?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. That once again underscores the marked difference between the National Guard today and what it was formerly. I am not criticizing what it was formerly, but it is a new role and a new responsibility. When you think that some National Guard units might beat some Active Army units to the battlefield, then you begin to understand why it is so very important that the Guard not be regarded by the citizenry, and particularly by Congress, as a group of weekend warriors on whom we can dump a bunch of junk. That has too often been the case, and it is too much the case today.

In general General, what are your feelings about your capability to mobilize today? What are your worries? I mean, you are going to be the man on the carpet in the event that you are federalized and your units go on their way.

What are the things that worry you?

General BLATSOS. Senator, we have an excellent capability to mobilize, and to mobilize immediately. I think General Walker mentioned at a previous hearing that actually we have a minimobilization every year in preparation to go to camp, and we do it with speed and efficiency. There is no reason why we cannot mobilize as quickly as anybody else, to answer that portion of your question. We have never experienced major problems in mobilization. A few minor problems, but nothing that would deter us from getting on the battlefield and getting there rapidly.

Does anybody have any question on that?

Senator HUMPHREY. What about the manpower shortfalls? What would be the practical, real life effect in the event you were mobilized? If you have a missing skill or a missing man or woman, what does that mean? I know you will make do, but obviously if you are not up to full complement, full speed, full ability, does that not endanger the other people in the unit?

It is a chink in your armor, is it not, to some extent? I know you can make compensations, but what are the practical effects?

Colonel GEARY. As you know Senator, the Individual Ready Reserve manpower pool is extremely low, lower than it ever has been. We do have some personnel shortages, and critical MOS shortages. We place a lot of our primary plans for spending of school money for training those critical skill MOS's. No doubt about it, we would need to fill our vacancies as soon as we are mobilized, and we are hoping that the Active Forces will provide the manpower.

Senator HUMPHREY. As you know they are not exactly flowing over with excess personnel.

Colonel GEARY. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. So it is analogous to the case where you are hoping that the Active Army has those weapons and equipment that you do not have. If I may say so, it is not a hope that is well-grounded in reality.

You mentioned a moment ago training schools. Tell us about the training schools you have, the problems. Are you able to send as many people to schools as you think necessary?

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Gallagher can answer that.

Colonel GALLAGHER. The training beyond basic training and the advanced individual training, which is the training that our soldiers receive when they are first recruited. This is all funded by the Active Army, which we have no problem with. Where we get involved with the funds for training is in the ongoing training of officers and key NCO's. The facts are for this training year we have received about \$200,000 to train 180 known requirements, or 180 people, but our complete requirements are almost double that.

But as the General mentioned earlier, we prioritize our training, and what funds we have for this year is pretty close to sufficient for our higher priorities. Some of the other lower priorities, it would be nice to have training for some of the other lower priorities, but not absolutely necessary.

Senator HUMPHREY. So generally speaking, you feel your funds for schools are adequate. You could always use more.

Colonel GALLAGHER. We could always use more. If we had \$180,000 more right now, we could fulfill every known requirement.

General BLATSOS. I think Colonel Lilljedahl may have a comment on that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine.

Colonel?

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. I think on the Air Force side that one of the problems is getting basic military training vacancies and military school vacancies.

I am going to let Major White discuss that. The way that impacts on us most seriously is that if you get a new person recruited to the Air Guard and then you start giving that person the story that, we would like you to come in but we will not have a basic military training opening for 6 or 8 months, it is very difficult to put people off for that length of time, and we find in many, many cases that we lose that recruit before we can send him to school.

Now, perhaps, Major White, would you help us on this?

Major WHITE. Yes, Senator, I am Major White, Chief of Personnel for the Air Guard.

We generally have little problem with obtaining schools for basic training, but beyond that point we run into problems for the people who will be cross training in our organization. We have had to wait as much as 2 years for someone who is going to cross train. The only schools available to us are fallout from people who failed basic training and therefore creating an opening.

With basic training, also, we currently have to program a year and a half in advance which schools we want which is fine if the person we recruit wants that school, but if we have a recruit who wants another school, we have a problem and we just cannot bring that person in.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

I notice from your equipment list that another common piece of equipment that presumably would be fairly easy to procure is in very short supply, camouflage nets.

Are these what they suggest? Why are you so short on something that seemingly would be easy to procure?

General BLATSOS. We might get a better answer, but they have been traditionally in short supply. I am not too sure whether it is an item they feel they can supply at the last minute relatively easily, and they will take those dollars and allocate them to something of a little higher priority. Camouflage equipment and camouflage nets, per se, have always been in very short supply.

Senator HUMPHREY. These are things you use to disguise artillery and trucks?

General BLATSOS. There is no doubt you need them. If you are in a position where you have to camouflage your equipment, hide your equipment, it would be critical.

I think you may have a better answer out of my staff here, but I'm not too sure.

Colonel GALLAGHER. I think you hit it right on the head, General. It is a question of two things. Primarily it is money. Whether they are available in the inventory out there, I am not sure. The money that we have, if we have a choice of buying camouflage nets or something else, something else generally takes priority.

Senator HUMPHREY. The inventory of the transponder equipment I see is in bad shape.

What is that all about?

General BLATSOS. The transponder?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes; the aircraft transponders.

General BLATSOS. Is that in ours?

Senator HUMPHREY. The Army.

Major BLAIR. We have had a problem, sir, in the repair of transponders and transponder testing equipment. We have had test set equipment on order for many years. There are times when the equipment has to be shipped out and we do not receive it back, sometimes up to a year.

Senator HUMPHREY. This is a device carried aboard the helicopter that enables friends to be separated from foes on the radar screen, is it not?

Major BLAIR. That is correct. We have the equipment that is capable for the air traffic control system, and the military air traffic control system; yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. If you do not have these aboard your helicopters, how do you keep from being shot down by your own people?

Major BLAIR. I do not know, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I guess you have to rely on luck.

What has been the problem there, long overhaul times? You send them off and they do not come back, or what?

Major BLAIR. I would be speaking about something I do not know. We just receive them after a long delay, and when we send something out and expect to get it back, it is a long ways out. I do not know what the cause of delay is.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, you included in your statement a graph that explains mobilization. It is this one.

Can you run through that for me? It is not easy to interpret.

General BLATSOS. Colonel Gallagher, can you explain the graph?

Colonel GALLAGHER. You have me on this one. I have not seen this graph.

(See table 3, p. 163.)

Senator HUMPHREY. You can explain it for the record, if you wish.

Colonel GALLAGHER. Yes; could we do that?

The record will be held open.

General BLATSOS. Could we provide that for the record later,

Senator HUMPHREY. That is a good idea.

Senator?

[The information follows:]

Table 3 depicts 2 typical units of the New Hampshire Army National Guard and the sequence of events leading to the Mobilization of these 2 units. For demonstration purposes we have selected a high priority unit which we will call a Category I unit. The Category II unit is a Combat Service Support Unit.

PREMOBILIZATION

We are assuming that both units would receive a Mobilization Warning Order approximately 1 week to 10 days prior to their actual call to active duty. During this period unit members would be notified of the possible call to active duty, and if known at this time, the effective date the unit will enter on active duty. Additional unit assemblies would be scheduled for selected members to accomplish administrative processing required by Army Regulation 135-300.

MOBILIZATION

Approximately 2-3 days prior to Mobilization the units can expect to receive a Mobilization Alert Order. The Alert Order will include specific instructions to the Commanders to call their units to active duty and conduct home station processing procedures. Administrative processing would include, Legal, Financial, Medical Briefings; Requests for Additional Clothing and Equipment; Scheduling Physical Examinations and Immunizations for Unit Members; Briefing of Dependents; Issuing of Member and Depend Identification Cards; Unit plan for feeding and billeting unit members, etc.

MOBILIZATION DAY

Unit members report to their home station mobilization point, normally the Armory. Home station processing will continue for as long as the unit remains at home station. In the case of our typical units the Category I unit would have 2 days for processing prior to their departure to the Mobilization Station. Much of the processing would have to be completed at the Mobilization Station and provisions made to continue to process dependents at home station. The State Area Command would assume this responsibility. The Category II unit would have 10 days for unit processing prior to their move to the Mobilization Station.

MOBILIZATION STATION ARRIVAL

Upon arrival at their Mobilization Station both units would complete processing, conduct training, as time permits, and deploy to Europe. The Category I unit, high priority unit, would fly and arrive in their deployment area 29 days after Mobilization. The Category II will either fly or go by sea, depending on the situation and the availability of transportation and arrive in their deployment area 65 days after the Mobilization date.

Note: The Mobilization Scenario depicted is for planning purposes only. The situation and the need for any unit in Europe would dictate possible changes to the time frames and reporting dates indicated.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to go to your testimony and ask you some questions about that.

I will just refer to the page number in case you want to look.

Page 7, third paragraph about recruitment, you are being more selective. You have reduced the disqualification rate during initial military training. You mean you were having people—did you find the place? Third paragraph on page 7.

You are being more selective, you have reduced the disqualification rate during initial military training. What does that mean, that you were recruiting some people that were not making it through basic training?

General BLATSOS. We have done two things really to try to reduce this disqualification rate, which we have had dramatic success with, incidentally. It is a very costly procedure to recruit somebody and then send him off to basic training and find that they are rejected by the training base.

Senator HUMPHREY. You mean they failed in training or they never entered?

General BLATSOS. They are not trainable or they have unacceptable mental or physical profiles upon arrival.

Senator HUMPHREY. Excuse me for interrupting, but I want to understand this. You mean, they got there and in the initial screening they were disqualified, or they went into training and they flunked out, or both?

General BLATSOS. They would either be disqualified before they started, or in the course of their training they were disqualified. And the reasons are many. Some just could not adapt to military life. There are others who have other problems and should never have been recruited in that category, a mental category or any number of several physical reasons. So we must be a lot more selective in the type of person we recruit. We must be very careful about physical, mental, and moral qualifications of the individuals.

Second, we pretrain them at our military academy in Concord. The idea is to prepare for the big cultural gap that exists between living at home and going into a military environment. This has produced dramatic results.

I think the end results were exactly what was mentioned here, that we have had outstanding success in people going to basic training and coming back out from the other end of the pipeline rather than being discharged ahead of time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that not like getting a copy of an exam beforehand and studying for the exam? I mean, people volunteering for the regular Army do not have the benefit of that. Hence, it may be that you are recruiting some people who were so bad they had to be prepped in order to get through basic training?

General BLATSOS. It is possible. There is no doubt about it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that how hard it is to get people?

General BLATSOS. It is hard to get people, but I think Major Riley could probably answer that a little better. He is our recruiting manager.

Major RILEY. Senator, I think one of the things we are saying is that they have recently changed the armed services vocational aptitude

battery testing system. We, prior to fiscal year 1981, had an option to test applicants either through the ASVAB testing system or through the ACB system. We determined that the ASVAB test provided us with a higher quality individual.

Sad to say, sir, that one of the things we have found out is that there are a number of high school juniors and seniors in New Hampshire today who are unable to pass the ASVAB test, particularly in the recently added reading comprehension area. However, those who do pass the ASVAB—and that is a requirement the adjutant general has established for entry into the Army National Guard of New Hampshire for those who have no prior service. Utilizing the ASVAB gives us, we feel, a fairly confident, high quality individual.

At the same time, it allows us to eliminate the individual who is most likely, academically or aptitudinally, to run into problems with basic military training.

I visited the Army's basic training site at Fort Dix and found that they are enhancing their program. They are increasing the demands, they are making the expectations a lot harder and a lot more difficult, and particularly they have the full 8-week training cycle.

I felt, at least on my observation, that at Fort Dix, the end of the course test was very rugged, and there was a real no-nonsense attitude. As a result, we cannot afford to send individuals from our communities to basic training when they are not prepared for the cultural shock that the general was referring to. That is the purpose of the pre-basic-training program that we operate at the Academy. We feel we owe it to our guardsmen. We feel that it is just another one of the responsibilities that we have.

We are talking about part-time soldiers once they get back from their active duty training.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not faulting you for that. I commend you for it. It sounds as though the pool from which you can draw recruits is so small that you are having to take some who are marginal, and you are going to have to prep them just so they can get through basic training.

Major RILEY. Sir, I will stake the recruits that we have up against anybody that is recruited by the Active Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines today. We have seen some superquality people.

I think as far as the manpower base in the State of New Hampshire is concerned, we are no different than anywhere else in the country. We are seeing a declining population. We are also experiencing those economic instabilities that are occurring everywhere. It may or may not be as great as it is in other areas of the country. I do think, that as we talked about earlier, one of the things about the National Guard is recognition that the market for the non-prior-service applicant is a very tight and very much sought after market. There are not the great numbers that there were over the past few years.

I think what you are going to find, sir, in any studies that you conduct, whether you take New Hampshire or you take the country, is that there is an awful lot of competition for that non-prior-service market, or else I am missing the boat. The Active Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine recruiters and the Air National Guard are competing for the same market that we are competing for. So there are a lot of recruiters out there.

We are also noticing that we have tremendous advantages in the prior-service market. There are a lot of individuals coming back from Europe who are getting out of the Army today or in other branches of service, who want to continue service on a part-time basis, and we offer several advantages. That is why I think it is so important for your subcommittee, for you, Senator, and for the rest of Congress to support the incentive programs that are developed to bring active soldiers into the Guard and the Reserve. And that is where I think we are going to make our money in terms of manpower.

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope we can get some concrete suggestions on how we can improve the situation. And again, I am not being critical or trying to downgrade your people. I am proud of our military people, and that is why I spend so much time in trying to help you with your problems. But I never heard of sending somebody to a program so he could get through basic training.

Tell me this, General, if we had compulsory military service today for all youth without deferment, would the pool, in your opinion, from which you could draw National Guard recruits improve to the point where you would not have to prep people so that they could get through basic training?

General BLATSOS. Well, this prepping that we do, and I am not too sure that we got that message across, Senator. The prepping that we do is not so much to prepare them academically or anything like that. The prepping is really to prepare for the cultural shock that some people experience when they go from home to the Army.

Senator HUMPHREY. You did not have the prepping when you first went in the service, and you made it, and I did as well. I will bet almost everybody in this room made it as well. So I just sense that there is a problem here if you are having to prep your people for whatever reason, from whatever standpoint, emotionally, educationally, physically, then you are not getting as many quality recruits perhaps as you ought to be.

General BLATSOS. That is true. The quality person can no doubt adapt much quicker to any environment.

Senator HUMPHREY. So you are having a problem getting as many good people as you would like to have.

General BLATSOS. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Would that improve if we had a draft?

General BLATSOS. We would get a better cross-section of people, there is no doubt.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have in any case reduced your disqualification rate significantly.

General BLATSOS. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. From what to what?

Major RILEY. Fifty-seven percent last year. In other words, the number of disqualifications in 1980 were reduced 57 percent in 1981. We are not talking about large numbers. We are talking about 14 to 20 people in the course of a year, and we have reduced that, I believe our high was 18 and we have reduced that 57 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. What is the latest year for you?

Major RILEY. Fiscal year 1981.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have figures for fiscal year 1981?

Major RILEY. We will be able to provide that for you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, off the top of your head, what were they for 1980? How many did you send to basic training, and how many didn't make it?

Major RILEY. The TRADOC rate would refer to those who did not make it. In fiscal year 1980 I believe we had 16 who failed during initial training.

Senator HUMPHREY. Sixteen out of how many?

Major RILEY. Sixteen who failed basic training out of over 150.

Last year, fiscal 1981, we sent nearly 200 to basic training and had only 7 disqualifications.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Blatsos, you quoted Secretary Philbin, again on page 7, "It is impossible to pay an intelligent person enough money to bore him indefinitely."

That, no doubt, is true.

Why is the National Guard boring people?

General BLATSOS. I think it becomes boring when you cannot really give them that kind of challenging training that you can do with something other than weekend assembly, where you can go to some military base, not necessarily overseas, but to various places and have something a little more adventurous, because, as you probably realize, everything is by rote, whether you are training a pilot or anything else. It is by rote.

Senator HUMPHREY. Particularly for pilots.

General BLATSOS. That is right. That is why they have simulators. But you run into this problem, particularly with the brighter type of person, they have to be constantly challenged. I think this is what Mr. Philbin had probably brought up, and money itself will not give that answer.

It does mean that you have to take people and ship them to Europe for a number of reasons, not because they are going to look at the terrain, because the terrain of Europe is not going to be that much different than it is from maybe New England, but you will meet your counterparts. You will find out whether they have two heads or one head, whether they think like you do. You experience a foreign environment, that total picture.

So I think this is what he was referring to, really, that you have to keep challenging this individual, or else you are going to lose him.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, you seem to be saying—and I am just trying to understand more thoroughly your problems, and not give you a hard time—but you seem to be saying that unless we send our people to other bases, domestic or foreign, that we are going to be boring them, that in other words, these weekend sessions are inherently boring.

General BLATSOS. I do not think so, because we do inject a lot of different programs into our weekend sessions. If we do not, as an example, have all the sophisticated equipment for everybody to train on, there is no reason why we cannot pool our equipment and train as if you have a particular type of radio set that is in the inventory which we should be using, and we only have one in the State, we will take that and move it around so that everybody gets a chance to work on it. We have done this with computers, we have done it with any number of things.

But to answer your question: No, they are not bored on every occasion at every drill. There is no doubt that you cannot challenge a person for 16 hours on a weekend every minute of the time. There are going to be boring moments, there is no doubt about it. And a lot of people accept it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, you say in order to alleviate the boredom, to have more lively training sessions, you ship equipment around the State. So you are saying that one of the reasons for boredom is lack of training equipment, realistic training which stems from a lack of equipment.

General BLATSOS. There is no doubt, there is no doubt.

I think an example might be the computer, the FADAC computer which has been in the inventory for what, 30 years, and we have never had one assigned to us. The only thing we can do is use it on occasion when we can borrow it either from within our region or from another State.

Am I correct on that?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. So one of the principal problems in retention is providing an interesting training environment, and that stems from a shortage of equipment.

General BLATSOS. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, it would be a good investment, not only from the standpoint of readiness, having the equipment ready to go, but it would be a good investment for Congress to make in terms of better retention, as well, of personnel.

General BLATSOS. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. You do not even have your training equipment or your wartime equipment, and because you do not have it, you have good people sitting around in effect training with broomsticks?

General BLATSOS. You are talking to one, Senator. I did.

Senator HUMPHREY. We have the modern-day equivalent of that today.

You probably recall, as I do, the statement of some Japanese official whose name I have forgotten, but who, in discussing the events leading up to World War II, stated that officials in Japan noted our troops were training with broomsticks and that such a Nation could not be taken seriously. The mobilization capabilities and the will to defend itself could not be taken very seriously.

I am going to recess temporarily, and we will come back at 11:35.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator HUMPHREY. The committee will come to order, please.

Major RILEY. Senator, excuse me. We do not want to leave the record unclear on one thing that we discussed, and that is the prebasic-training program that our New Hampshire Military Academy offers our nonprior-service enlistees.

I would like to clarify this even better for you: First of all, the prepping, you referred to, or the preparation that we provide through the New Hampshire Military Academy, is only unique in that it is a consolidated effort now in New Hampshire. The Guard has always had a responsibility through the unit commander, to prepare the individual enlistee who is nonprior service for the basic training experience in the Active Army.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see.

Major RILEY. Essentially, sir, when you and I went through basic training there were two choices: Serve or go to the stockade. Under the all-volunteer concept, we have an obligation to provide the Army with the best, most qualified individual. Otherwise we are wasting our time and taxpayer money. It does us absolutely no good to send an individual from the State of New Hampshire to a basic military training site who is unprepared, unqualified, and is essentially, after 3 days, going to be fed up with that system and have one option, and one option only, and that is an expeditious discharge. We cannot afford to do this in America, and we definitely cannot afford to do this in the State of New Hampshire.

I think that is what the general was referring to in his statement when he talked about providing the Army with quality, not just the Active Army, but the Army National Guard. We want to provide quality soldiers. Otherwise we end up with serious problems.

And then, more importantly, for every individual that we enlist, we go through the process, we physical, we test, we ship, we are talking about \$1,200 to \$1,500 just to get the individual from home to the basic training site. That is a terrible waste of taxpayer money, sir, if they don't qualify and that is the reason why we decided to take our responsibility seriously to prepare individuals for their obligations in military service. We have consolidated that through the military academy.

[Additional information follows:]

The non-prior-service training program is designed for personnel who have not departed for Initial Active Duty Training. It is intended to introduce these personnel to the military environment and ease their adjustment to active duty and basic training. The 36-hour program should provide a proper mixture of classroom and "hands on" performance subjects. Once personnel have completed the training program they will be utilized in their requested MOS during unit training assemblies until departure for basic training.

So, just to take the negative out of the record, I wanted to try to clarify it and hopefully I did.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine. I hope you have. But I think my point remains, that if the pool from which you draw were upgraded in caliber—I am not saying you do not have good people. You do. What I am detecting is that you do not have enough in that pool, and if the caliber of that pool were somehow upgraded, then you would not have to worry about preparing people for basic training which is supposed to be basic training. It is supposed to be initial training.

Colonel GALLAGHER. I might add, Senator, that in my first years in the National Guard, the Department of the Army required the individual unit commander, when he enlists a person, to give him a certain number of hours in prebasic training. So what Major Riley is saying, all we are doing in New Hampshire is consolidating. We are taking the load off the unit commander, because he may only have two men going to basic training, and it is a burden for him to give them 36 hours of prebasic training. He has to direct NCO's to do this training, but since we are such a small State we can afford to consolidate this training, take the load off the unit commander, therefore we do it centrally at our military academy.

So it is a requirement of the Department of the Army, not a requirement of the adjutant general. We are just consolidating.

Senator HUMPHREY. I would simply point out again that those going into the Regular Army have no such advance training, and that would seem to indicate that the National Guard—the Army, we well know, is having a hard time getting enough good people. The fact that you have to prepare these people in order to bring down your rate of attrition suggests to me that you are having a difficult time.

Am I mistaken in that?

Major RILEY. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am.

Major RILEY. Again, it is somewhat subjective in a way. It depends on what you are looking for. The adjutant general has a responsibility to provide a force based upon the authorization of the State of New Hampshire to do the job that is called for, and we are doing it, and we are heading toward 100 percent. Well, 100 percent of what? I think the fact is that we do not operate on a quota and the Active Army does. They operate under a quota system. The budgetary process is based upon a quota. We have a responsibility to make sure that the person we bring into our force is going to do the job, and at the same time, meet an established manpower goal for a fiscal year. We have the luxury of being in a better position to do everything possible to keep that individual a lot longer than the individual would stay in active military service. So we have to keep this in mind as far as the quality of individuals is concerned.

Again, I guess it depends on what you are looking for. If we just want to fill our ranks with bodies, whether they walk, run cannot get out of a chair, I suppose we could do that, but we do not want to get into that business.

Senator HUMPHREY. It sounds like in former years that has been the case with the high attrition that you experienced.

Major RILEY. Perhaps, sir, but I think if you look back at the record of the draft, if you look at the record of the New Hampshire National Guard between fiscal years 1974 and 1979, once that draft ended, bingo, attrition was a big problem. They did not stay because there was no longer an obligation.

I think right now we are back to a point where we have a force of dedicated, qualified individuals who are going to stay with us for a time. We hope that we can provide the challenge, we hope that we can take care of any family or employer problems that might prevent the individual from staying with us, but I think we have a much more stable force than we had.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do not get me wrong: I am very proud of the National Guard and the Army and all of our services, but we have some problems. We do not get congressional support to overcome those problems unless we define them very clearly.

I must say that at times the can-do spirit of our military people is upsetting because the purpose of these hearings is to compile evidence with which to bring about change. If our people come in and say we can get by with—we will do miracles, give us a broomstick and a slingshot and we will go defeat the Russians, you know, that kind of attitude is admirable, but it sure does not help us to change things.

Major RILEY. We certainly have not told you that, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am exaggerating, but often that is a problem.

On page 9, General, again the matter of overseas training deployments, the last sentence of the second paragraph on page 9, all New

Hampshire's units are linked up with their wartime command either overseas or within the continental United States.

Are you saying there that—this just is for my own education—that you already know in advance which units you will be linking up with in every case?

General BLATSOS. Yes, sir. They came out with the Capstone program. Capstone is one of those functional programs which, if you are acquainted with the Air Force, resembles the gain-in-command concept. So they have tried to identify all the military units, all the Army units and who they are going to work for in the event of mobilization.

Example: The 8th Division might have only two brigades instead of three brigades. There is a third brigade, a separate brigade that is training under National Guard auspices somewhere, that under this concept, this brigade knows that it is going to affiliate immediately, or join immediately the 8th Division, as part of that division, immediately upon mobilization. That is the Capstone program, and they have tried to identify everybody so they will know who mother and father is going to be on mobilization. These units actually communicate together, train together on occasion if they are not as far apart as we have here, some in Port Lewis, Wash., and some are in Massachusetts, so that they gain this relationship of talking to each other periodically, knowing who the boss is, and exchanging information, operating procedures and this type of information. The Air National Guard has done this for years.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I know. I am aware of the Air Guard's case, but what I am getting at is, beyond the Capstone program, the training program, do you already know which units your people are going to be assigned to on a mobilization?

Colonel GALLAGHER. Yes, sir, on the Army side we know 100 percent, with one exception, our 39th Army Band. They are not tied to anybody. Every other unit in the Army Guard has a trace right up through, for instance, the V Corps.

Senator HUMPHREY. Good.

Page 10, General, in the first paragraph of your last sentence, you imply that it is costly to have an underprepared and ill-equipped force.

Were you with the Guard in Korea? What was your experience then?

General BLATSOS. No, sir. My war experience was World War II. We have Korea veterans and we have Vietnam veterans here if you want.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, the reason I ask is I wonder what the experience was. What I am trying to do is reduce to human terms that sentence about the cost of an underprepared and ill-equipped force. What has happened in the past? I assume speaking of the Korean war, for instance, that when the Guard was in its old status as being a reinforcement coming in months after mobilization, that some guardsmen were underprepared and ill-equipped. What happened in those cases? Can you speak to that?

General BLATSOS. I am not too sure I can, Senator. I do not have a ready answer for that.

Does anybody?

Senator HUMPHREY. Just from personal experience. Has anybody been through that?

I think it is pretty logical to assume that it costs you a lot in dead and wounded.

General BLATSOS. There is no doubt, if you are ill-equipped, you will, just in the nuclear, biological and chemical warfare environment, if you do not have protective gear, you are dead.

I think on the other hand, the same with any other passive or active system we might have.

Senator HUMPHREY. On page 11, the fourth paragraph, is there any goal to provide the National Guard with 100 percent of its required equipment?

General BLATSOS. I believe the goal is there. How far we have gone along the road I am not too sure, Senator.

Does anyone have a better idea?

Colonel GALLAGHER. We can identify some fill. Other areas we know there is no program even identified.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, in the absence of the equipment, what guarantee is there from the Army that you are going to get this equipment?

General BLATSOS. There is no answer. We do not have a guarantee.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does that not affect your ability to fulfill your responsibilities?

General BLATSOS. It definitely does, Senator. Again, if you want to use the European scenario and if you assume that the Russians outnumber us tube for tube by 3 to 1 or 4 to 1, as I understand they do, then we are definitely going to need better equipment, more accurate fires, in order to suppress them. It is very simple. You know, if you are outnumbered, then you have got to have something to compensate for it. And if we do not have operational radar sets for our target acquisition units, we cannot actively evaluate where the enemy ammunition is coming from, which is exactly what they are designed for, and promptly fire back at them with the appropriate weapons. Then in a matter of time, this becomes academic. With a 4 to 1 ratio it will not be long before we are out of business before they are.

These are the things that would concern me very, very much.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, assuming that, or in the context of the uncertainty of where this equipment would come from, how prepared do you feel as a commander to fulfill your responsibilities?

General BLATSOS. I think we are prepared to give a good account for ourselves within the limit of our equipment and our personnel. I have no doubt we would give a good account for ourselves.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have no doubt of that either, within the limits of your equipment.

It sounds to me as though a lot of the capability is on paper, unfortunately, and not in being.

General BLATSOS. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you have so stated, in effect, on page 14, paragraph 3. Senator, the New Hampshire Army National Guard is not equipped for deployment. It might have been okay under prior circumstances, but under the new circumstances; namely, that the National Guard is part of the total force, implying that it is expected to be up to speed within a very short order, this is unsatisfactory and dangerous in my opinion.

Do you disagree with that?

General BLATSOS. I agree with you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, I am sure the Air Force has been feeling left out, and I am not picking on the Army or ignoring the Air Force. It is just that for organic reasons with which you are well acquainted, the Air Force's Air National Guard is in better shape because in this State, here again, it does play a very active role in the Nation's defense. I mean by that that it is deployed side by side today with the Active Air Force. That is not the case with the National Guard. I am not criticizing the Army. There are organic differences here.

And just to make sure that the record is complete, in the area of NBC again, there is not one of your people who have the complete set of equipment, a complete—

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. Ensemble.

Senator HUMPHREY. Ensemble. It sounds pretty fashionable—a complete ensemble. Therefore, every one of them is vulnerable to chemical attack which, I suppose, is the most likely of the three.

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. And absolutely unprepared in that respect.

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. This is perhaps not a fair question, but my curiosity is piqued.

What can you tell me about this new generation of equipment that will be available? Does anyone know anything about that?

Colonel LILLJEDAHL. I have not seen the new generation of equipment. I have heard there is one being planned, and I would assume if the planning is correct, it will be of less bulk and I would ask Major Francoeur, who works in resources, if he has seen what it is like.

Major FRANCOEUR. No, sir, I have not seen nor heard the technical specifications of the new equipment, but we do understand that it is going to be more lightweight and allow the individual more freedom of action to perform his tasks compared to the present bulky one.

Senator HUMPHREY. How recent is this increased attention to NBC in the Guard units? Is that something that has come about in the last year or two, or what is the situation?

General BLATSOS. I think the threat has really been perceived in the last year or two. The Army has always been conscious of this. However, we have downgraded our chemical warfare—and I will use that to cover NBC—over a period of years. I do not know why. Evidently Washington is afraid to discuss chemical weapons, to have them, to store them, to do anything at all. We have had them in the past. We have been trained on them in the past. I have noticed a downgrading of both, probably in the last year or two.

What has probably brought chemical warfare to a head has been the perception that it was used in Southeast Asia after our departure from there, and there is also a very, very strong possibility that it has been used in Afghanistan, and I am not too sure, but those two situations may have alerted people to the fact that it is a foreseeable threat.

Senator HUMPHREY. So it is a recent initiative, and therefore you can understand to some extent why we have not gotten very far. But that is no excuse, and I am not blaming it on you. It is a question of funding, and that rests with the Congress, and of course, the Pentagon in terms of setting priorities.

I have exhausted all of the questions I wanted to ask. The hearing has run just about the advertised span of time.

Are there any further comments that you want to make, General?
General BLATSOS. No, sir, I do not. I think I have just about exhausted my comments.

Does the staff have anything that we should probably add to this?

I just want to express my gratitude to you, Senator, for giving us this opportunity in this forum to have our problems heard. I would like to also suggest that you again visit us during our field training period when you can see us operate in three dimensions rather than two, and where it gives you an opportunity to talk with an awful lot of people, and oddly enough, you will get many gems from a soldier that escapes me completely and escapes all of the supervisory people. And I think you perceived that in your trip to Camp Drum last year and talked to some of those people, some of those things that startled me, for instance, that were mentioned, and they came from some of our soldiers.

We will be going almost en masse this year to Camp Drum, N.Y., and I would like very much to have you visit us there, and within all of my capabilities, I will try to even arrange for the trip up. Maybe even West Point will airlift us again.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine. I will accept that invitation, but in the meantime, I want to see some of these weekend drill periods as realistically as I can.

Thank you for your help and that of your staff, and also Colonel Lilljedahl and your staff.

Incidentally, your testimony on the reengineering program, the JT-3D, was not avoided. Although I did not dwell on it, it certainly is a new insight into that problem, and I cannot fault your logic.

Thank you all very much.

The record will remain open for 15 days for the submission of requested material.

[Additional information follows:]

HEADQUARTERS, NEW HAMPSHIRE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD,
Concord, N.H., November 20, 1981.

NHARNG CIRCULAR No. 350-15: TRAINING—PRE-REP 63 TRAINING PROGRAM,
EXPIRES 30 SEP 1982

1. PURPOSE

To provide non-prior service personnel with basic military knowledge prior to attending Basic/Advanced Individual Training. Completion of this course will better prepare soldiers to successfully complete their Individual Active Duty Training.

2. OBJECTIVES

- a. Introduce soldiers to a military environment.
- b. Provide students an introduction to basic military subjects.
- c. Assist participants in developing self-confidence.
- d. Provide students with knowledge concerning National Guard and U.S. Army.

3. STAFF AND FACULTY

This program will be administered by the New Hampshire Military Academy.

4. PROGRAM

- a. The program consists of 36 hours of instructions (Appendix A). The Program will be conducted on 30-31 Jan and 20-21 Feb 82. Trainees are required

to arrive at the Academy by 0830 hours each Saturday. Personnel will remain overnight on Saturday and be dismissed by 1545 hours on Sunday.

b. Students will be organized into a platoon and afforded the opportunity to serve in various leadership positions.

c. All soldiers recommended by their Unit Commander, will be accepted.

d. Additional periods of training will be announced by change to this Circular.

5. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

It is recommended that prior to reporting for training, each individual be issued one complete fatigue uniform to include boots and field jacket with liner. All other organizational equipment required will be furnished by the Academy.

6. ADMINISTRATION

a. Units will provide the Academy with a roster of personnel attending recruit training NLT 15 Jan 1982.

b. Transportation

(1) Government transportation is authorized and will be utilized whenever possible.

(2) Individuals who do not possess a military driver's license and cannot secure transportation with other students utilizing government vehicles are authorized POV with reimbursement. This authority is in accordance with NHARNG REG 37-106 dated 1Oct81, para 4. TAGNH Form 162 submitted for POV authorization must indicate that individual does not possess a military license.

c. Quarters:

(1) Students will be billeted at the Academy. Necessary bedding and equipment will be issued. Trainees should be instructed to bring personal toilet articles as well as change of underwear, athletic shoes, gym shorts, shirt and sweat shirt.

(2) Quarters are available at the Academy for Friday night if requested. Prior coordination with the Academy is required.

d. Meals: Meals will be served by the Academy.

e. Training Records: Individual training records will be maintained by the TAC NCO Staff. A certificate of training will be presented to each trainee who completes the entire 36 hours of training.

J. F. SULLIVAN,
LTC FA NHARNG, Plans, Opns and Tng Officer,
(For the Adjutant General).

APPENDIX A TO NHARNG CIRCULAR No. 350-15

	Hours
A. Troop information and indoctrination.....	11
1. Role and purpose of the National Guard as a State militia, achievements and traditions of the National Guard.....	2
2. Military courtesy.....	2
3. Military justice (Federal and State).....	2
4. Troop information to include: promotion, NCO training, OCS training, finance orders, transportation.....	3
5. Recruiting and retention.....	1
6. Arrival at BCT.....	1
B. General military subjects.....	25
1. Drill and ceremonies—facing movements, squad and platoon drill, manual of arms, interior guard, barracks procedures....	12
2. First aid.....	2
3. Field hygiene and sanitation.....	1
4. Physical security of weapons and sensitive items.....	1
5. Mechanical training on M-16.....	3
6. Maintenance and supply economy.....	2
7. Physical training to include PT test.....	3
8. REP seminar.....	1
9. Graduation	1

UNIT	NEW HAMPSHIRE MILITARY ACADEMY - NCOES - REP 63 TRAINING	ARTF	DATE
STATION	C STATE ARMOY CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE	FROM JAN 82 TO FEB 82	INCLUSIVE DATES
DAY, DATE & HOURS	PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING	SUBJECT	LOCALITY
SATURDAY 30 Jan 82 Drill 13 & 14 0830-0920	REP 63s	ROLL CALL & ORIENTATION	F
0920-1015	REP 63s	DRILL & COMMAND	J
1015-1045	REP 63s	ROLE & PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD	F
1045-1150	REP 63s	PHYSICAL TRAINING TEST	J
1150-1230	REP 63s	NOON MEAL	J
1230-1630	REP 63s	GENERAL SUBJECTS ROUND ROBIN	J, F
1630-1655	REP 63s	DRILL & COMMAND TO INCLUDE RETREAT	J, PP
1700-1740	REP 63s	EVENING MEAL	J
1740-1800	REP 63s	TAC TIME	J
1800-1950	REP 63s	BARRACKS SOP	BB
2000-2050	REP 63s	PHYSICAL TRAINING	J
2050-2145	REP 63s	PERSONAL HYGIENE	F, BB
2200	REP 63s	LIGHTS OUT	BB
APPROVED:	J. F. SULLIVAN LTC PA NHARNG Plans, Opns & Tng Officer	Gerald P. Janelle LTC IN NHARNG Commandant	Handwritten Signature
PURPOSE OF THIS ORGANIZATION ARE: of law and regulation, to attend the of law for the period			


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
UNIT	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	1-24	17-28	27-28	24-25	22-23	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	16-17	20-21	20-21	17-18	15-16	26-27	17-18	28-29	25-26				21 Aug 82
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	13-14	3-4	1-2	12-13	10-11	14-15	18-19				YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	6,13 20,27	3,10 17,24	3,10 17,24	7,14 21,28	5,12 19,30	2,9 16,23	7,14 21,28	4,11 18,25	8,15 22,29				YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	1-2	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				25-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	1-2	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				27-31 Oct 81
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	13-14	3-4	1-2	12-13	10-11	14-15	18-19				YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	13-14	3-4	1-2	12-13	10-11	14-15	18-19				30-24 Jul 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	22-23	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				26 Jun-10 Jul 82
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	13-14	3-4	1-2	12-13	10-11	14-15	18-19				20 Jun-4 Jul 82
100TH STAFF	9-10	20-21 6-7	6-7	3-4	1-2	5-6	NONE	7-8	18-19				8-22 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	22-23	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				7-21 Aug 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	22-23	12-13	24-25	14-15	18-19				YEAR AROUND
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	24-25	8,12	2,11	24-25	21-22	12-13				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	23-25	15-16	9,30	24-25	21-22	18-19				17-26 Jun 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 2-4	1-2 11	12-13	NONE	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 2-4	1-2 11	12-13	NONE	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 2-4	1-2 11	12-13	NONE	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 2-4	1-2 11	12-13	NONE	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 2-4	1-2 11	12-13	NONE	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	17-18	1-2	MUTA 3 26-27	24-25	21-22	18-19				15 May-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	6-7	3-4 24-25	NONE	MUTA 3 12-13	MUTA 5 23-25	MUTA 3 21-22	18-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	17-18	1-2	MUTA 3 25-26	24-25	MUTA 5 20-22	MUTA 3 17-18				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	17-18	1-2	MUTA 3 26-27	MUTA 3 24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 24-26				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	17-18	1-2	MUTA 3 26-27	24-25	21-22	18-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 23-25	UTA 1 12	2, 26-27	24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 23-25	UTA 1 12	2, 26-27	24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 23-25	UTA 1 12	2, 26-27	24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 23-25	UTA 1 12	2, 26-27	24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	23-24	27-28	27-28	MUTA 5 23-25	UTA 1 12	2, 26-27	24-25	21-22	MUTA 5 17-19				15-29 May 82
100TH STAFF	9-10	6-7	6-7	3-4	1-2	5-6	10-11	28-29	11-12				YEAR AROUND

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES BY THE N.H. NATIONAL GUARD:

DATE	MISSION	LOCATION
16Jun77	Air Evacuation of Injured Person	Tuckerman's Ravine, NH
17-19Jun77	National Motorcycle Races	Loudon, NH
24Jun77	Air Search for Bank Robbers	Nashua, NH
3Jul77	Air Evacuation of Injured Hiker	MT Washington, NH
1Sep77	Air Search for Missing Person	Glenclyff, NH
5Sep77	Search for Downed Aircraft	MT Cabot, NH
31Oct77	Air Search for Missing Persons	MT Chocorua, NH
11Jan78	Air Search for Missing Persons	Lincoln, NH
7-9Feb78	Evacuation - Search - Rescue During Blizzard & Floodings (Blizzard of '78)	Hampton Beach, NH
		Rye, NH
		North Haverhill, NH
28May78	Air Evacuation of Injured Skier	MT Washington, NH
	Air Evacuation of Injured Hiker	MT Chocorua, NH
23-26Jun78	Operation "Seabrook III"	Seabrook, NH
9Aug78	Air Search for Missing Cruiser	Ossipee, NH
17Aug78	Air Search for Drowned Scuba Diver	Rye, NH
6-16Sep78	Operation "Fire-Fighter"	Manchester, NH
9-13-21Mar79	Aviation Support in Connecticut River Flooding	North Stratford, NH
11May79	Aviation Support in Shooting of Priest and Double Suicides	Littleton, NH
2Jul79	Air Evacuation of Epileptic Hiker	Crawford Notch, NH
24-26Jul79	Assistance in Water Shortage	Groveton, NH
4-9Oct79	Operation "Seabrook IV"	Seabrook, NH
26Mar80	Search for Missing Person	Concord, NH
23-26May80	Operation "Seabrook V"	Seabrook, NH
18Jun80	Air Evacuation of Heart Attack Victim	MT Liberty - Littleton, NH
22Sep80	Broken Water Main at Frisbee Hospital	Rochester, NH
30Jan81	FB-111 Jet Crash	Portsmouth, NH
12Feb81	Flooding	Plymouth, NH
3Mar81	Seabrook Nuclear Reactor Movement to Plant	Seabrook, NH
29-30Apr81	Fuel Storage Area Explosion	Newington, NH
23-25Jun81	NH State Employees' "Sickout"	Concord - Manchester - Laconia, NH
6-7Jul81	Aeromedical Evacuation of 12 Year Old Autistic Boy	North Haverhill, NH
8Jul81	Aeromedical Evacuation of Injured Person	Franconia, NH
23Jul81	Air Search for Missing Person	Lee, NH
11Aug81	Air Rescue of Injured Hikers	MT Liberty - Franconia Notch, NH
8Dec81	Air Rescue of Missing & Injured Hikers	Garfield, NH


PRE-MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION






NEW HAMPSHIRE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART





ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Army National Guard in New Hampshire consists of 28 units. These units are divided into "Command and Control Units" and "The Field Artillery Command."

1. The Command and Control Units consist of :
 - a. A Command and Control Headquarters located in Manchester.
 - b. A Forward Direct Support Maintenance Company and a Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) located in Concord.
 - c. A Transportation Company located in Hillsboro and Claremont.
 - d. A 45-piece Army Band located in Manchester.
 - e. An Engineer Detachment (Utilities) located in Peterboro.
 - f. A Public Affairs Detachment located in Manchester.
 - g. An Aviation Flight Detachment located in Concord.
 - h. A Medical Dispensary Detachment located in Concord.
 - i. A Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Company located in Lebanon.
2. The Artillery Command consists of :
 - a. A Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters located in Manchester.
 - b. A Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battery located in Manchester.
 - c. Three 155mm Towed Field Artillery Battalions with Headquarters located in Berlin, Manchester and Portsmouth.

State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment located in Concord has overall command of the units of the New Hampshire Army National Guard. Included in the State Headquarters Detachment organization is the New Hampshire Military Academy also located in Concord. The State Headquarters also contains the nucleus of the State Area Command, a headquarters which comes into full operational status upon Federal mobilization in time of national emergency.

THE NEW HAMPSHIRE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The New Hampshire Air National Guard is an all-volunteer force of Air Force-trained officers and airmen who serve in the 157th Air Refueling Group (SAC), with Headquarters and facilities at Pease Air Force Base near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Operations and training are supervised by the USAF's Strategic Air Command, to which the unit would report in event of a call to Federal duty.

Organization

The New Hampshire Air National Guard is made up of these units. A brief mission statement follows each unit listed.

Hq NHANG.—Acts on behalf of the Adjutant General in commanding, controlling and supervising ANG units within the State, including employments for State Missions and preparations for their mobilization assignment.

Hq, 157th Air Refueling Group.—Provides command and control over assigned units within the Group.

133rd Air Refueling Squadron.—Mission squadron—provides crews to fly unit aircraft. The majority of the NHANG officers are assigned to this unit; they are the pilots and navigators who fly the KC-135 Stratotanker.

157th USAF Clinic.—Medical/Dental support for units of the NHANG.

157th Security Police Flight.—Provides Base Combat Defense teams for protection of resources. Operates a pass and ID facility as well as routine traffic and law enforcement functions.

157th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron.—Provides maintenance, personnel and equipment to keep the KC-135 aircraft operationally ready.

157th Combat Support Squadron.—Provides all support functions required to operate a Base; i.e., Administration, Chaplain, Personnel, Food Service, Motor Vehicle.

157th Civil Engineering Flight.—Provides road and ground crews, electrical, plumbing, heating and air conditioning personnel, Rapid Runway Repair teams, plus other specialties related to construction.

157th Communications Flight.—Communications support for all units of the NHANG; i.e., telephone, ground to ground radio and ground to air radio; teletype and cryptographic facility. This flight operates and repairs their own equipment.

157th Resource Management Squadron.—Provides base-level support in the following areas: Comptroller, supply, transportation, procurement, data automation and resource plans functions. The commander serves as the principal financial and logistics (other than maintenance) coordinator for the group commander and staff.

NHARNG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
Detachment No. 1, Company A, 26th Aviation Battalion (UIC: WPFQA1):				
Mask CBR protective	4	4	3	
Night vision goggles	10	10	0	6
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	6	6	0	2
Radiacmeter, IM-174/P	6	6	0	
Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD (N-std asset)			4	
Radio set, AN/PRC-77	2	2	0	
Radio set, AN/PRC-9 (sub)			1	
Radio set, AN/PRC-25 (sub)			1	
Speech security equipment	6	6	0	6
Transponder, computer	6	6	0	6
744th Transportation Company (UIC: WPZPAA):				
Power supply, PP-2953	1	1	0	1
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27	1	1	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	10	10	2	
Radiacmeter, IM-174/P	5	5	0	
Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD (N-std asset)			2	
Semitrailer, stake	120	120	4	50
Semitrailer, M-17A1 (sub)			7	
Semitrailer, tank bulk	1	1	0	
Semitrailer, fuel, M-131A5 (sub)			1	
Truck, tractor, 5 ton	61	61	27	50
Truck, tractor, 5 ton (sub)			22	
197th Field Artillery Brigade (UIC: WP20AA):				
Air-conditioner fir	2	2	0	
Alarm chemical agent	1	1	0	
Bayonet-knife with scabbard	140	128	128	
Binocular modular co	9	7	7	
Cable telephone, DR-8	18	15	15	
Cable telephone, RL-159	30	20	19	
Camouflage screen system	106	102	2	20
Camouflage screen support	106	102	2	20
Code changer key	4	4	0	3
Compass, magnetic, unmounted	12	10	10	
Electronic, typewriter	7	5	4	
Generator set, diesel	2	2	0	
Generator set, gas, 5-KW	7	5	1	
Generator set, MEP-026A (sub)			4	
Installation kit, MK-1552	4	4	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1553	4	4	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1554	1	1	0	1
Installation kit, MK-1646	1	1	0	1
197th Field Artillery Brigade:				
Launcher grenade 40M	4	3	3	
Mask, CBR, headwound	4	4	3	
Mask, CBR, protective	144	132	132	
Meteorological station	1	1	0	1
Night vision goggles	6	6	0	2
Night vision sight	3	3	0	1
Power supply assembly	9	9	0	2
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27	2	2	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	4	4	2	
Radiacmeter, IM-174/P	3	3	0	
Radiacmeter, IM-174/PD (N-std asset)			2	
Radio set control gro	6	5	5	
Radio teletypewriter	6	4	4	
Reeling machine, RL-31	3	1	1	
Reeling machine, RL-39	12	12	8	
Reeling machine, RL-172A/G	2	1	1	
Reproducer signal	1	1	0	
Rifle, 5.56 mm	130	118	118	
Shelter system, collective	2	2	0	1
Speech security equipment	9	9	2	7
Surgical instrument A	4	3	3	
Tactical digital rege	1	1	0	1
Telephone set, TA-43/PT	40	35	35	
Tool kit, electronic	1	1	0	1
Trailer tank, water	2	2	1	
Truck cargo, 1 1/4 ton	2	2	1	
Truck cargo, 1 1/4 ton (sub)			1	
Truck van, expensible	1	1	0	
Truck, van, shop, 2 1/4 ton (sub)			1	
Truck, van, expensible, 5 ton	2	2	1	1
Truck, shop, van, 2 1/4 ton (sub)			1	
Watch, wrist, non-main	26	25	25	

NHARG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES.—Continued

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
1st Battalion, 172d Field Artillery (UIC: WP3BAA):				
Aiming circle	12	11	11	
Alarm chemical agent	1	1	0	1
Antenna, RC-292	21	21	15	
Axle cable reel	7	6	6	
Bayonet-Knife with scabbard	502	449	449	
Binocular modular co.	31	23	23	
Cable, telephone, DR-8	66	62	62	
Cable, telephone, RL-159	56	51	51	
Camouflage screen system	402	380	0	20
Camouflage screen support	363	347	0	20
Charger, battery, PP-1	1	1	0	1
Charger, battery, U/O	1	1	0	1
Code changer key	9	9	0	9
Compass, magnetic, unmounted	43	41	41	
Computer, gun direction	4	4	0	1
Display set, target	4	0	0	
Howitzer, towed, M-198	18	18	0	
Howitzer, towed, M-114 series (sub)			16	
Installation kit, MK-1225	1	0	0	
Installation kit, MK-1234	8	5	5	
Installation kit, MK-1552	3	3	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1553	7	7	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1554	5	5	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1629	2	2	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1646	1	1	0	1
Launcher grenade	40	37	37	
Locking device, atomic	1	1	0	1
Mask, CBR, headwound	10	10	4	
Mask, CBR, protective	514	461	461	
Mount, gun ring	6	6	0	3
Mount, tripod, M-3 (sub)			2	
Night vision goggles	28	28	0	10
Night vision sight	20	20	0	10
Pistol caliber .45 au	19	13	13	
Power supply assembly	17	17	0	8
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27	5	5	0	3
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	23	23	1	3
Radio set, AN/GRC-160	5	2	2	
Radio set, AN/VRC-47	11	11	5	
Radio set, AN/VRC-48	1	0	0	
Radio set control gro	21	20	8	
Range finder, fire control	2	2	0	1
Reeling machine, RL-31	7	6	6	
Reeling machine, RL-39	40	36	32	
Reproducer signal data	4	4	0	1
Rifle, 5.56 mm	494	447	447	
Speech security equipment	17	17	0	17
Splicing kit, tel	4	3	3	
Surgical instrument, A	8	7	7	
Surveying instrument	2	2	1	1
Surveying instrument	3	3	0	1
Surveying set, artillery	3	2	2	
Tactical digital rege	1	1	0	1
Telephone set, TA-1/P	6	0	0	
Telephone set, TA-312	98	97	96	
Test set, computer log	4	4	0	1
Test set, radio frequency	1	1	0	1
Theodolite survey	3	2	2	
Tailer, ammunition	20	18	0	
Tailer, cargo, 1/4 ton	13	9	9	
Trailer, cargo, 1 1/2 ton	8	8	7	
Truck, cargo, 2 1/2 ton	15	15	11	
Truck, cargo D/S M-35A2 (sub)			4	
Truck, 5 ton	39	34	0	
Truck, cargo, D/S 5 ton (sub)			11	
Truck, cargo, 5 ton, M-54 (sub)			14	
Truck, utility, 1/4 ton	17	13	13	
Watch, wrist, nonmaint	44	31	31	
2d Battalion, 197th Field Artillery:				
Aiming circle	12	11	11	
Alarm chemical agent	1	1	0	1
Antenna, RC-292	21	21	15	
Axle cable reel	7	6	6	
Bayonet-knife with scabbard	502	449	449	
Binocular, modular co.	31	23	23	
Cable, telephone, DR-8	66	62	62	

NHARG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES.—Continued

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
Cable, telephone, RL-159	56	51	51	
Camouflage screen system	402	380	4	20
Camouflage screen support	363	347	4	20
Charger, battery, PP-1	1	1	0	
Charger, battery, U/O	1	1	0	
Code changer key	9	9	0	9
Compass, magnetic, unmounted	43	41	41	
Computer, gun direction	4	4	0	1
Display set, target	4	0	0	
Howitzer, towed, M-198	18	18	0	
Howitzer, towed, M-114 series (sub)			18	
Installation kit, MK-1225	1	0	0	
Installation kit, MK-1234	8	5	5	
Installation kit, MK-1552	3	3	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1553	7	7	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1554	5	5	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1629	2	2	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1646	1	1	0	1
Launcher grenade, 40M	40	37	37	
Locking device, atomic	1	1	0	1
Mask, CBR headwound	10	10	4	
Mask, CBR, protective	514	461	461	
Mount, gun, ring	6	6	0	3
Mount, tripod, M-3 (sub)			2	
Night vision goggles	28	28	0	10
Night vision sight	20	20	0	10
Pistol, caliber .45 au	19	13	13	
Power supply assembly	17	17	0	5
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27	5	5	1	
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	23	23	3	
Radio set, AN/GRC-160	5	2	2	
Radio set, AN/VRC-7	11	11	5	
Radio set, AN/VRC-48	1	0	0	
Radio set, control gro	21	20	3	
Receiver, transmitter, AN/GRA-6 (sub)			10	
Range finder, fire control	2	2	0	2
Reeling machine cable	7	6	6	
Reeling machine, RL-39	40	36	35	
Reproducer signal data	4	4	0	1
Rifle 5.56 mm	494	447	447	
Speech security equipment	17	17	0	17
Splicing kit, telephone	4	3	3	
Surgical instrument, A	8	7	7	
Surveying instrument	2	2	0	1
Surveying instrument	3	3	0	1
Surveying set, artillery	3	2	2	
Tactical digital rege	1	1	0	
Telephone set, TA-1/P	6	0	0	
Telephone set, TA-312	98	97	97	
Test set, computer log	4	4	0	1
Theodolite survey	3	2	1	
Theodolite survey (sub)			1	
Trailer, ammunition	20	18	0	
Trailer cargo, 1/4 ton	13	9	9	
Truck, 5 ton	39	34	4	
Truck, cargo, 5 ton (sub)			14	
Truck, cargo, D/S 5 ton (sub)			8	
Truck, utility, 1/4 ton	17	13	13	
Watch, wrist, nonmaint	44	31	31	
3d Battalion, 197th Field Artillery (UIC: WP4JAA):				
Aiming circle	12	11	11	
Alarm chemical agent	1	1	0	1
Antenna, RC-292	21	21	15	
Axle cable reel, RL-2	7	6	6	
Bayonet-knife with scabbard	502	449	449	
Binocular, modular co	31	23	23	
Cable, telephone, DR-8	66	62	62	
Cable, telephone, RL-159	56	51	51	
Camouflage screen system	402	380	3	20
Camouflage screen support	363	347	3	20
Charger, battery, PP-1	1	1	0	
Charger, battery, U/O	1	1	0	
Code changer key	9	9	0	9
Compass, magnetic, unmounted	43	41	41	
Computer, gun direction	4	4	0	1
Display set, target alert data	4	0	0	
Howitzer, towed, M 198	18	18	0	
Howitzer, towed, M 114 series (sub)			18	
Installation kit, MK-1225	1	0	0	
Installation kit, MK-1234	8	5	5	
Installation kit, MK-1552	3	3	0	2

NHARG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES.—Continued

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
Installation kit, MK-1553	7	7	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1554	5	5	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1629	2	2	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1646	1	1	0	1
Launcher grenade, 40M	40	37	37	
Locking device, atomic	1	1	0	1
Mask, CBR, headwound	10	10	4	
Mask, CBR, protective	514	461	461	
Mount, gun, ring	6	6	0	3
Mount, gun, tripod, M-3 (sub)			2	
Night vision goggles	28	28	0	10
Night vision sight	20	20	0	10
Pistol, caliber .45 au	19	13	13	
Power supply assembly	17	17	0	5
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27	5	5	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	23	23	1	
Radio set, AN/GRC-160	5	2	2	
Radio set, AN/VRC-47	11	11	5	
Radio set, AN/VRC-48	1	0	0	
Radio set control gro	21	20	12	
Range finder, fire control	2	2	0	2
Reeling machine cable	7	6	6	
Reeling machine, RL-39	40	36	32	
Reproducer signal data	4	4	0	1
Rifle, 5.56 mm	494	447	447	
Speech security equipment	17	17	0	17
Splicing kit, telephone	4	3	3	
Surgical instrument A	8	7	7	
Surveying instrument	2	2	0	2
Surveying instrument	3	3	0	1
Surveying set, artillery	3	2	2	
Tactical digital reg	1	1	0	1
Telephone set, TA-1/P	6	0	0	
Telephone set, TA-312	98	97	97	
Test set, computer log	4	4	3	
Test set, radio frequency	1	1	0	1
Theodolite survey	3	2	2	
Trailer, ammunition	20	18	0	
Trailer cargo, ¼ ton	13	9	9	
Trailer cargo, 1¼ ton	8	8	7	
Trailer, tank, water	5	5	4	
Truck, cargo 2½ ton	15	15	12	
Truck, cargo, 2½ ton (sub)			3	
Truck, 5 ton	39	34	0	
Truck, cargo, 5 ton (sub)			14	
Truck, cargo, D/S, 5 ton (sub)			12	
Truck, utility, ¼ ton	17	13	13	
Watch, wrist, nonmaint	44	31	31	
Battery A (target acquisition), 197th field Artillery (UIC: WPSAAA):				
Aiming circle	7	6	6	
Bayonet-knife, with scabbard	158	143	143	
Cable, telephone, DR-8	28	26	26	
Cable, telephone, RL-159	95	92	92	
Camouflage screen system	94	90	0	20
Camouflage screen system	11	9	0	
Camouflage screen support	105	99	0	20
Charger, battery, PP-1	1	1	0	
Code changer key	1	1	0	1
Compass, magnetic, unmounted	25	24	24	
Computer, gun direction	2	2	0	1
Fire direction set, artillery	5	4	4	
Installation kit, MK-1246	6	0	0	
Installation kit, MK-1554	1	1	0	1
Launcher grenade, 40M	17	16	16	
Machine gun, 7.62M	11	10	10	
Mask, CBR, protective	158	143	143	
Mount tripod, machinegun	11	10	10	
Night vision goggles	6	6	0	6
Night vision sight	6	6	0	6
Oscilloscope, AN/USM	6	5	5	
Plotting set, artillery	9	8	8	
Plotting set, sound ranging	2	2	0	2
Power supply assembly	1	1	0	1
Radar set, AN/TPS-25	1	1	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	10	10	0	1
Radio set control gro	20	20	6	
Receiver transmitter, AN/GRA-6 (sub)			8	
Reeling machine cable, RI-31	13	12	12	
Reeling machine cable, RL-172	4	4	2	
Reproducer signal data	2	2	0	1
Rifle, 5.56 mm	157	142	142	

NHARNG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES—Continued

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
Sound ranging set.....	4	4	0	2
Sound ranging set, GR-8 (sub).....			1	
Speech security equipment.....	1	1	0	1
Surveying instrument.....	2	2	0	2
Telephone set, TA-312.....	34	31	31	
Test set, computer.....	5	4	4	
Test set, computer log.....	1	1	0	1
Test set, electron Tub.....	6	5	5	
Trailer, cargo, 1½ ton.....	13	13	5	
Trailer cargo 1½ ton.....	6	6	3	
Truck, 1½ ton.....	0	4	0	
Truck, cargo, 1½ to (sub).....			1	
Truck, cargo 1½ ton (sub).....			1	
Truck, cargo 1½ ton.....	10	0	0	
Truck, 2½ ton.....	15	15	4	
Truck, cargo, D/S (sub).....			5	
Watch, wrist, nonmaint.....	10	8	8	
3643d Maintenance Company (UIC: WQC4AA):				
Air conditioner fir.....	2	2	0	
Analyzer set engine.....	6	4	0	1
Bottle cleaning charg.....	1	1	0	1
Bipod rifle, 5.56M.....	17	15	15	
Burner unit, gasoline.....	4	4	0	
Camouflage screen system.....	144	144	0	30
Camouflage screen support.....	77	77	0	30
Crane wheel mtd, 5 ton.....	1	1	0	1
Crane wheel, H-446 (sub).....			1	
Card punch machine.....	1	1	0	1
Generator set, diesel.....	2	2	0	1
Generator set, MEP-006A (sub).....			1	
Generator set, diesel 10-KW.....	2	2	0	1
Generator set, MEP-018A (sub).....			2	1
Generator set, diesel.....	1	1	0	1
Generator signal, AN/GRM-50.....	1	1	0	1
Installation kit, MK-1817.....	1	1	0	1
Kitchen field trailer.....	1	1	0	1
Machinegun, 7.62 mm.....	6	5	5	
Mask, CBR, protective.....	221	218	218	
Mount, tripod, machine.....	6	5	5	
Radiacmeter, IM-83/UD.....	8	8	2	
Radio set, AN/VRC-46.....	3	3	2	
Rifle, 5.56 mm.....	220	217	217	
Semitrailer, low bed.....	2	1	0	1
Shop equipment, elec repair.....	1	1	0	1
Shop equipment, auto.....	1	1	0	1
Tool outfit, hydraulic.....	1	1	0	1
Tool kit, fire direction.....	1	1	0	1
Test set, radio frequency.....	2	2	1	
Tool kit, general mechanics.....	104	102	102	
Tool kit, electronic.....	5	5	3	
Tool kit, service refrig.....	6	6	5	
Tool kit, turret mechanics.....	4	3	3	
Tool kit, welders.....	2	1	1	
Trailer, 1½ ton.....	14	14	12	
Truck, 1½ ton.....	1	1	0	
397th Medical Detachment (helicopter ambulance) (UIC: WS9RAA):				
Alarm chemical agent.....	2	2	0	1
Alarm chemical agent (sub).....			1	
Camouflage screen system.....	28	28	0	20
Camouflage screen support.....	28	28	0	20
Code changer key.....	3	3	0	
Code changer (sub).....			1	
Helicopter, utility, UH-IV.....	6	6	1	
Helicopter, utility, UH-1H (sub).....			5	
Installation kit, MK-1554/VR.....	1	1	0	1
Installation kit, MK-1629.....	2	2	0	2
Night vision goggles.....	12	12	0	6
Power supply, PP-2953.....	1	1	0	1
Power supply assembly.....	3	3	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD.....	8	8	4	
Radio set, AN/PRC-90.....	24	24	12	
Reeling machine, RL-39.....	1	1	0	1
Speech security equipment.....	3	3	0	1
Tool kit, aircraft ins.....	2	2	1	
Transporter airborne.....	1	1	0	1
982d Medical Detachment (dispensary) (UIC: WVKTAA):				
Alarm chemical agent.....	1	1	0	1
Light set, general ill.....	1	1	0	1
Medical equipment set.....	1	1	0	1
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27.....	1	1	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD.....	1	1	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-174/P.....	1	1	0	1

NHARNG EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES.—Continued

Item	Required for (deployment)	Authorized	On hand	Actually needed for training
210th Engineering Detachment (utilities) (UIC: WS9SAA):				
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	2	2	0	1
Service kit, power line	1	1	0	1
Truck maintenance te	1	1	0	1
Sprayer, insecticide	2	2	0	1
Tool kit, mason and co.	1	1	0	1
Truck, dump, 5 ton	3	3	0	
Truck, dump, 5 ton			3	
Welding shop, trailer	1	1	0	
Welding shop, cargo, TM (sub)			1	
Torch outfit, set No. 2 (sub)			1	
114th Public Affairs Detachment (UIC: WVNTAA):				
Camera set, motion pict	1	1	0	1
Flash unit, photograph	2	2	1	
Meter, photographic ex	2	2	1	
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	1	1	0	1
39th Army Band (45 piece) (UIC: WQJ7AA):				
Bassoon, Heckel key	2	2	1	
Drum, congo, with stand	2	2	1	
Metronome, electric	3	3	1	
Metronome, mechanical	11	11	3	
Oboe, wood body close	2	2	1	
Piano, upright, service	1	1	0	1
Trumpet, B-flat, with mou	12	12	8	
195th Chemical Company (NBC defense) (UIC: WVNTAA):				
Alarm chemical agent	1	1	0	1
Alarm chemical agent	9	8	0	8
Alarm chemical agent	9	8	0	4
Analyzer set, engine	1	1	0	1
Antenna group, OE-254	1	1	0	1
Bayonet-knife, with scabbard	111	102	102	
Camouflage screen system	83	75	0	20
Camouflage screen support	83	75	0	20
Charger, radiac detect	12	11	11	
Code changer key	1	1	0	1
Decontaminating apparatus	9	8	0	2
Generator set, gas eng, 1.5 kW	11	10	10	
Installation kit, MK-1234	9	8	1	2
Installation kit, MK-1402 (sub)			1	
Installation kit, MK-1306	4	4	0	2
Installation kit, MK-1554	1	1	0	1
Installation kit, MK-1629	1	1	0	1
Launcher grenade, 40M	10	9	9	
Light set, general ill	10	9	9	
Machinegun, 7.62 mm	13	12	12	
Mask, CBR, protective	111	102	102	
Mount, tripod, machinegun	13	12	12	
Power supply assembly	2	2	0	1
Pump, reciprocal, power dvn	9	8	0	2
Radiac set, AN/PNR-27	18	16	0	16
Radiac set, AN/PDR-56	1	1	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-93/UD	38	30	0	1
Radiacmeter, IM-174	19	17	2	10
Radio set, AN/VRC-46	4	4	0	1
Radio set, AN/VRC-47	4	4	0	4
Radio set, AN/VRC-64	6	5	0	2
Radio set, control gro	1	1	0	1
Repair kit, collapsible	9	8	8	
Rifle, 5.56 mm	110	101	101	
Speech security equipment	2	2	0	2
Tank, fabric, collapsible	9	8	0	4
Shop equipment, auto M	1	1	0	1
Shop equipment, auto M	1	1	0	1
Trailer, cargo, 1/4 ton	13	12	0	
Trailer, cargo 1 1/2 ton	11	10	0	
Truck, 1 1/4 ton	1	1	0	
Truck, 2 1/2 ton	11	10	1	
Truck, cargo, 2 1/2 ton (sub)			3	
Truck, 5 ton	9	8	0	
Truck, cargo, 5 ton (sub)			6	
Truck, tank, water	1	1	0	
Truck, utility, 1/4 ton	13	12	8	
Watch, wrist, nonmaint	20	18	18	

The total cost of the items needed to provide adequate training as determined by the State Plans, Operations and Training Officer is \$3,596,564.63.

The total cost of the items required for deployment is \$30,441,013.85.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]